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1.0 SUMMARY
This report documents the work done under contract NAS1-18027, task assignment 13, titled "Classifi-
cation and Reduction of Pilot Error," during the period January, 1988 to February, 1989.
I.I SCOPE
The tasks described here constitute the first year's effort of a multiyear program aimed at reducing the
deleterious effects of pilot errors on aviation safety. It entailed an approximately 1.5 man-year effort and
consisted of a literature review, error classification analysis, factor-error hypotheses formulation, acci-
dent and incident data review, and empirical evaluation of hypotheses.
1.2 PURPOSE
The multiyear purpose of this effort is to reduce pilot errors in the commercial flight deck. The purpose
of this year's study was to (1) assess the state of the current understanding of human error events and (2)
based on this understanding, develop and test selected hypotheses concerning the relationship between
a specific set of underlying factors and resulting error types and frequencies.
1.3 RESULTS
The review of the literature indicated that much work in the area of human error has been done. Classifi-
cation taxonomies were reviewed and that of Jens Rasmussen was selected as representing the state of
the art. Description of the events, circumstances, factors, and internal mechanisms involved in human
error is quite complete, while explanation is in its infancy. The taxonomy of Rasmussen was modified
and tailored to operational factors and circumstances associated with pilot errors in commercial avi-
ation. Hypotheses involving a specific set of factors were developed, and four searches of the Aviation
Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident database were requested to determine if there were incidents
that substantiated the hypotheses. A piloted simulation experiment was initiated to further test these
hypotheses.
1.4 WORK IN PROGRESS
The searches of the ASRS database have yet to be fully analyzed and reported. A replication of the simu-
lation experiment is required, and analyses and report of the data are to be completed. This work is
scheduled to be performed in the second year of the program.
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
An excellent foundation exists in current error classification schemes and categorizations of underlying
factors for a better understanding of human error. The gap that exists is in converting general notions
concerning the relationship between underlying factors and error types and frequencies into testable,
quantifiable,operational hypotheses. We believe development of specific, testable hypotheses; substan-
tiation of these hypotheses through reports from accident and incident databases; design of empirical
tests aimed at error assessment under "worst case," but face valid, combinations of factors; and finally,
modification of key underlying factors to bring about error reduction, will be a very productive approach
to the pilot error problem.
1.6 LIMITATIONS
The tasks described here are a very preliminary step in a systematic approach to error reduction. This
approach must begin with a thorough understanding of the factors involved in human error, but in terms
of the total effort required for this approach to ultimately impact aviation safety, the current study just
scratches the surface.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
"Pilot error" has been cited as a contributing factor in 80% to 85% of general aviation accidents (refs. 1
and 2), in 50% of ASRS reported incidents (ref. 3), and in 60% to 65% of commercial jet accidents (refs. 4
and 5) in recent years. Consequently, while worldwide jet aircraft accident rates have been steadily de-
creasing and are currently very low, reduction of pilot error factors is viewed as the last frontier for sub-
stantial improvements to aviation safety. Interest in reduction of pilot error is not new. In 1947, Fitts and
Jones stated: "It should be possible to eliminate a large portion of so-called 'pilot error' accidents by
designing equipment in accordance with human requirements" (ref. 6).
2.1 BACKGROUND
Because the impact of human errors in aviation can be so catastrophic, efforts to reduce human errors
have a long history. Avoiding errors is part of the reason behind automation, the application of human
factors to cockpit design, rigorous selection criteria for pilots, and standardized operating and training
procedures. Efforts in error reduction continue. Cockpit design and operating procedures are continual-
ly improving, and crews are becoming aware of the kinds of errors that can occur in the flight deck
through programs such as cockpit resource management. While strides have been made in reducing the
probability of some kinds of pilot error, some error types as old as aviation itself continue to haunt us. As
the aviation environment and aircraft systems become more complex and automated, there is an oppor-
tunity for new error types to emerge (ref. 7). Reasons for this limited progress in reducing pilot error are
many-fold: the lack of a true understanding of the underlying causes, their interrelationships and
interactions; the lack of a total systems approach to pilot error reduction; and the absence of a compre-
hensive theory or model of pilot error, are just a few. Part of the problem has been the vague "umbrella"
definition of the term pilot error; in a sense pilot error "can explain everything and nothing about aircraft
accidents and incidents" (ref. 8).
Pilot error implies a lack of competence on the part of the pilot, but in fact describes a class of complex,
multidimensional circumstances that contribute to accidents and incidents, with the common denomi-
nator being pilot involvement. Commonly cited pilot errors include reversal or omission of steps in a
standard procedure, selection of an inappropriate control setting, poor judgment or decision making,
and miscommunication, each describing an event that includes its own set of circumstances, with each
circumstance including its own set of causes. Further, pilot error often involves a chain of events, i.e.,
pilot error cannot be understood as a static set of circumstances.
It is important to distinguish between two kinds of errors--those that are systematic (i.e., there is an
identifiable set of factors to which the error can be attributed) and those that are random (i.e., the occur-
rence of the error has no pattern of preceding and accompanying factors or at least that pattern has not
been discovered yet). This distinction underlies two approaches to eliminating the negative conse-
quences of pilot error:
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. Error reduction. Through an understanding of the factors underlying systematic pilot errors, those
errors can be reduced in frequency by changing the underlying factors, such as flight deck design and
operating or training procedures.
.
Error tolerance. Those errors that cannot be predicted (random errors) and those that might have
positive consequences (i.e., serve some adaptive purpose) can be tolerated if systems are designed to
detect, alert, warn, and protect against the negative consequences of these errors. The primary means
of accomplishing error tolerance has historically been redundancy (of systems and humans), but re-
cent advances in artificial intelligence and the general sophistication of system and human monitor-
ing capabilities make automated error tolerance one of the most promising ways of reducing the
negative consequences of crew error in the future.
2.2 PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
This program is concerned with error reduction. The multiyear goal of this effort is to reduce the proba-
bility of crew errors by modifying contributing factors. The multiyear objectives, which will aid in achiev-
ing this goal, are--
1. Identify and organize the heterogeneous set of circumstances that constitute a pilot error event.
a. Identifying, defining, and categorizing the operational factors that underlie errors, such as de-
sign, workload, and procedures.
b. Identifying the internal mental processes, such as memory, attention, and judgment, the failure of
which results in human error.
c. Distinguishing among different error types.
2. Evaluate the relationships among the factors, mechanisms, and errors. This process will form a
sound foundation for efforts to predict and, ultimately, reduce pilot error.
3. Develop and test hypotheses concerning the error-reducing effect of modifications to underlying factors.
A series of subtasks was performed as part of the 1988 contract effort to help achieve the first two
multiyear objectives. This series includes the following tasks:
1. Review of the literature.
2. Development of a comprehensive classification scheme.
3. Development of specific factor-error hypotheses.
4. Analytical evaluation of hypotheses.
5. Empirical evaluation of hypotheses.
These tasks are described in the following sections.
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3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of the literature and development of a computerized database of human error references was
the first task initiated under this contract. There has been a great deal of work in human error, crew
error, and related topics. Our strategy was to assess the theoretical state of the art as well as the opera-
tional. One of our working assumptions is that a conceptual understanding of the factors and internal
mechanisms underlying human error is essential to systematic reduction of errors. The literature review
allowed us to base our effort on the foundation of expertise in human error that already exists.
3.1 OPERATIONAL LITERATURE
Literature reviewed included work related to safety and human error issues from many operational envi-
ronments, including primarily industries such as aviation (refs. 6, 9, 10, and 11) and nuclear power (refs.
12 and 13). It is not surprising that industries in which human errors have readily observable and cata-
strophic effects are at the forefront of work on human error.
In terms of identifying all the factors that contribute to error events, particularly in the aviation environ-
ment, some of the aviation accident and incident investigation and reporting manuals were the most
comprehensive. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and others have detailed compila-
tions of factors for investigators and reporters to check in an accident or incident investigation. The
ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ref. 14), for example, lists 9 categories of more than 100
underlying factors, which they label explanatory factors (e.g., see table 3-1), that can contribute to the
human error cause of an accident or incident. Each of these factors can be associated with one or more
modifiers, from a list of about 100. Although these factor lists do not relate factors to internal mecha-
nisms or error types as will be discussed in the review of some of the theoretical error classification
schemes below, they are extremely thorough in what they were intended to do: identify and categorize
factors that could contribute to a human error that results in an aviation accident or incident.
Appendix 1 provides a comprehensive listing of factor categories found in the literature. Each category
includes a listing of the associated factors and the reference(s) that use that category. The accident and
incident manuals discussed above were the major source of this compilation.
3.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE
Other articles reviewed were more theoretically oriented, describing or explaining generic human errors
in terms of the relationship between factors, internal mechanisms, and different types of errors (refs. 15,
16, and 17). Norman (ref. 15), for example, described the distinction between mistakes (i.e., an error
based on an inappropriate intention) and slips (i.e., performance of an action that was not what was
intended). He divided slips into three categories (each with subcategories): errors in the formation of
intentions, faulty activation of schemas, and faulty triggering. These different types of slips are hypothe-
sized to occur as a result of different external factors and information processes, and thus it is important
in any effort to reduce errors to know the type of errors that are being addressed. Rouse and Rouse (ref.
Table 3-1. Factors Developed by ICAO for Accident and Incident Investigations
Explanatory factors Explanatory factors Explanatory factors
Subjects Subjects Subjects
Code Text
9900 O0 Physiologicai factors
9900 06 FaUgue- chronic
9900 09 Fatigue-time zone
9900 12 Fatigue-work schedule
9900 15 Fatigue-other
9900 18 Circadian rhythm
99O0 21 Diet
9900 24 Drugs
9900 27 Alcohol
9900 30 Cerbon monoxide
gg00 33 Hangover
g900 36 Heavy smoker
9900 39 Heart attack
g900 42 PrsexJ_ng rnedicaJ
condition
9900 45 Motion sickness
9900 48 Unconsciousness
9900 51 Decompression sickness
gg00 54 Disorientation/veCdgo
9900 57 Visual illusions
9900 60 Hypoxia/anoxia
99OO 63 Hyperventilation
9900 66 Previous diving
9g00 69 Acceleration
g900 72 Effect of vibration
9900 75 Effect of glare
9900 78 Effect of heat
9900 81 Effect of cold
9900 84 .Effect of windblast
9900 87 Effect of noise
9900 90 Effect of toxic fumes
9900 93 Vision
9900 96 Other
9905 00 Supervisory factors
9905 03 Briefing
9905 06 Crew coordination
9905 09 Monitoring
9905 12 Supervision
9905 15 Other
9910 00 ExperienceNaining
9910 03 Knowledge
9910 06 Compet_on
9910 0g Experience-in position
9910 12 Experience-on A/C type
g910 15 Experierme-totsJ AJC
9910 18 Ex_- other
9910 21 Recency-in position
g910 24 _--on instruments
g910 27 Recency-on type
9910 30 Racency-on aerodrome/
route
9910 31 Recency- other
Code Text
9910 33 Skill
9910 36 Training - initial
9910 39 Training-on the job
9910 42 Training-ground
9910 45 Training-flight
9910 48 Training- rscurrent
9910 51 QuaJification- position
9910 54 Qualification-on type
gg2 O0 Communicetion
9920 03 Interpretation
9920 06 Phraseology
9920 09 Language barrier
9920 12 Noise interference
g925 00 Psychological condition
9925 06 Anxiety
9925 09 Apprehension
9925 12 Attention
9925 15 Attention span
9925 21 Inattention
9925 24 Boredom
9925 27 Distraction
9925 30 Coordinetion_ming
9925 33 Confidence-in AJC
9925 36 Confidence-in equipment
gg25 39 Confidence-serf
9925 42 Complacency
9925 45 Emotions
9925 48 Mental capacity
9925 51 Mental pressure-external
9925 54 Mental pressure-serf
induced
9925 57 Panic
9925 60 Pemeption
9925 63 Task saturation
9925 66 Reactions
9935 00 Psycho-social factors
g935 03 Attitude
9935 06 Industrial action
9935 09 Interpersonal relationship
9935 12 Seniority
9935 15 Motivation
9935 18 Morale
Code Text
9940 O6 Management
9940 01 Approval
9940 03 Budge_ng
9940 O6 Compiku_,e
9940 09 Coordination
9940 12 Decisions
9940 15 Directives
9940 18 Instttctions
9940 21 Forecast
g940 24 Funding
gg40 27 Inspections
9940 30 Liaison
9940 33 Monitoring
9940 36 Observation
9940 39 Orders
9940 42 Organizing
9940 45 Personnel
9940 48 Planning
gg40 51 Policy
9940 54 Procedures
9940 57 Quality control
9940 60 Recruitment
9940 03 Regulations
9940 6g Requirements
9940 72 Resource management
9940 75 Specifications
9940 78 Staffing
9940 81 Standards
9940 54 Training
9940 87 Supervision
9940 90 Work environment
9945 O0 Design Factors
9945 03 Instrument/controls design
9945 06 Instrument/controls
location
9945 09 Workplace design
9945 12 Stn.ctures
9945 15 Systems
9950 00 Miscellaneous
9950 03 Action
gg50 06 Airmanship
9950 09 Planning
9950 12 Planning- pmffight
g950 18 Activities
9950 21 _l_n
9950 24 Equipment
9950 27 Facilities
9950 30 Manuals
9950 33 MedkcaJ_te
9950 36 license rating
9950 39 Publications
s-ug01_l-_
16) detailed particular characteristics of erroneous decision or actions that can occur in terms of general
categories of behavioral processes (i.e., categories such as observation and choice of hypotheses). These
categories and descriptions of what can go wrong at each stage is shown in table 3-2 (from ref. 16). Many
other articles reviewed (see app. I and 2) developed classification schemes, which vary in their approach.
Rouse and Rouse (ref. 16) have broadly categorized different classification schemes as being behavior
oriented, task oriented, or system oriented. We are concerned here with behavior-oriented approaches
that emphasize basic human information processing, because it is at this level that general principles
might be derived. However, these principles must be applied to a particular operational environment,
and the task-oriented and system-oriented classification schemes will provide an essential link for
successful migration of the general principles to solving real world problems.
As will be discussed in section 4, Rasmussen (ref. 17) has done the most extensive work in the area of
error taxonomies. He has also developed hypotheses concerning the effects of specific factors on the type
of malfunction and errors that might result. For example, table 3-3 (from ref. 17) shows Rasmussen's
hypotheses concerning the effects of different types of behavior (e.g., skill based, rule based, and knowl-
edge based) on the mental functions that might be involved in an human error.
3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND PRODUCTS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The primary thrust of the review of the literature was to determine what underlying factors were consid-
ered important in human error and what the relationships were among different categories of underlying
factors and between those categories and different kinds of errors. Many of the articles reviewed pro-
posed some kind of classification scheme, presenting at least in part, a structure for organizing the fac-
tors underlying error and factor-error relationships. Our goal was to use these schemes, in the aggregate,
to develop a comprehensive classification scheme of the factors underlying human error, particularly as
relevant to crews in commercial aircraft.
In the process of reviewing the literature, we developed a computerized database of all the reviewed
references, which can be retrieved by author. The database is maintained on R:Base System V version
1.1 for the IBM PC and contains about 180 articles (the complete list of references included in the data-
base is provided as app. 2). Future enhancement is planned to allow retrieval by key words. The key
words will be the labels of the categories of the classification structure we have developed on which each
reference focuses. For example, a study that addresses the effects of circadian rhythms and work-rest
cycles would be given the key word "fatigue," because that is the label of the category in our scheme that
covers those kinds of factors.
It became evident early in the review of the literature that it would be helpful to define many of the terms
associated with human error, because the way they are defined can often be domain specific and can
conflict with common usage. Consequently, as we reviewed articles, we compiled a glossary of terms
relevant to human error and aviation. The glossary is broad based and is essentially an expansion of the
G-10 Glossary of Terms for Human Practitioners in Aviation. This glossary has been released as Boeing
document D6-54686 and is available on request. A portion of this glossary (the terms not included in the
G-10 glossary) is included as appendix 3.
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Table 3-3. Rasmussen's Behavior-Based Mental Function-Error Classification Scheme
Mental
function
required
Observation Identification Interpretation
-.__ _bt Diagnosis _-
Define task
'_Preqiction ]-_ Evaluation I.- =_ Decision
j C,o_, ]
"-[L_ociationJ
Information
processes
Input information
_* -. _ Classification
Check
_b{ Featurematch
Recall ]conditions J
I
Schedule
order input
Note:
The diagram illustrates how the same required mental function can be served
by different information processes-each with particular error mechanisms.
Form
procedure
.)
b
 ure]
Recall
procedure
Knowledge-
based
Rule-based
_r
--I Stored J
"_1 routines
Output actions
ISkill-based
Copyrighted by Elsevier, 1982.
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4.0 DEVELOPMENT OF AN ERROR CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
4.1 STRATEGY
The strategy for development of an error classification was to select one or more primary schemes from
the literature that--
1. Represented current thinking in the field as to the relationships of underlying factors, human proc-
esses and attributes, and error events and circumstances.
2. Provided the most comprehensive structure in terms of inclusion of all the categories and factors
involved in the human error process.
The intent was to integrate and expand existing schemes to develop the best and most comprehensive
scheme possible with relevance to the aviation environment and pilot error. Many studies reviewed pro-
vided descriptive classification schemes (i.e., they enumerated and categorized the operational circum-
stances that contribute to error). Others were explanatory (i.e., they hypothesized why errors occur in
terms of human information processing malfunctions and causal factors). Of the literature reviewed, the
error classification taxonomy described in the work of Rasmussen (refs. 17, 18, and 19) was selected
because it was the most comprehensive, presented explanatory as well as descriptive details, and pro-
vided a general structure to which one could add details specific to a particular domain or environment.
4.2 RASMUSSEN'S CLASSIFICATION SCHEME
A summary of the Rasmussen classification scheme is shown in figure 4-1. Rasmussen has developed
seven different categories of factors relevant to human error, depicted by the boxes in the figure. The two
bottom right boxes involve factors that describe what error occurred, either in terms of the external
events or consequences (e.g., failed to set flaps) or in terms of the human process or action that
malfunctioned (e.g., forgot a checklist item or failed to attend to checklist item). The box above these
boxes describes who was involved (e.g., an operator, a maintenance person, or a dispatcher). The larger
bottom box describes what went wrong (i.e., what underlying human mental or physical process
Performance
Situation factors
shaping factors
Personnel task
Causes of human
malfunction
Copyrighted by Elsevier,1982.
IMech-,sin.o,human malfunction 1 IIntemal human _1 External mode
malfunction J_ of malfunction
Figure 4-1. Rasmussen's Human Error Classification
9-Ug0183-1
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malfunctioned and how it malfunctioned). For example, the information processing step of remember-
ing the sequence of items for a particular checklist might have failed due to competing memory
demands.
Finally, the remaining three boxes describe why some human information process malfunctioned (i.e.,
what the underlying causal and contributing factors are). The "causes of human malfunction" category
describes factors that directly cause a process to go astray, such as task demands beyond the human's
capability, equipment malfunctions or misinformation that induces a human error, or a nonnormal
cockpit distraction that diverts the pilot's attention. The "operator factors" (which Rasmussen labeled
"performance shaping factors") and "situation factors" categories can overlap with the "causes of hu-
man malfunction," but the main distinction is the directness of their effects. The "operator factors" and
"situation factors" can be thought of as contributory, because any single factor should not lead to infor-
mation processing failure, but the combination of factors could provide a situation that is conducive to a
certain kind of human malfunction. For example, a high level of personal stress combined with bad
weather in a busy terminal area could cause task demands to exceed the pilot's current capability, which
in turn causes a mental process to malfunction.
4.3 EXPANSION OF RASMUSSEN'S SCHEME
Our classification scheme development process used the basic structure of Rasmussen's taxonomy as a
foundation and then integrated categories and factors from other schemes to expand and tailor it to the
commercial aviation environment. A majority of the schemes reviewed were complementary to the
Rasmussen scheme: his provided a general structure of the different categories of factors, processes, and
descriptions of human error, and many of the other schemes elaborated on the contents of specific com-
ponents or categories. For example, as mentioned earlier, the ICAO Accident/Incident Reporting
Manual (ref. 14) provides one of the more comprehensive listing and categorization of operator and situ-
ation factors associated with human errors.
Figure 4-2 shows some minor structural changes and factors we have added to Rasmussen's classifica-
tion scheme, based on the integration of other schemes and on our own aviation and human factors
expertise. For example, situation factors have been divided into environment, task, and aircraft factors,
and the potential for interactions between factors of different categories (e.g., between situation and
operator factors) is depicted by connections between these boxes. The primary expansion has been that
of adding detail in terms of specific aviation items that fall into each category of contributing and causal
factors underlying pilot error. Figure 4-2 depicts some of these, but appendix 1, described earlier, pro-
vides a comprehensive listing of the factors in each category. Some of these factors were discussed by
Rasmussen as performance shaping factors in some of his writings and are expanded and added to here.
Others were added as a result of integration of the details supplied by other schemes.
The classification scheme is not an error model or testable error theory. It is, at this point, simply de-
scriptive. However, it should provide the framework from which to formulate and test specific hypothe-
ses between factors mechanisms and error types and frequencies.
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5.0 DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC FACTOR-ERROR HYPOTHESES
Hypotheses can be developed on the effect of combinations of factors on information processing mal-
functions and resulting error types, and independently, on the effect of combinations of factors on error
frequencies. Both are important and although the former is the more direct test of the general structure
of the classification scheme, demonstration of the latter is more important if any error hypotheses are to
be empirically verified. Empirically demonstrating operationally meaningful error frequencies as the
result of any combination of realistic factors is not trivial; errors are typically not observable in the com-
mercial flight deck environment and even if they could be observed they are made infrequently enough
that the number of observations required to assess the error potential of a particular design or procedure
would be impractical to achieve. In order to obtain error rates in simulation that can be meaningfully
measured, a unique set of factors, which are hypothesized to lead to high probability of error and can
occur in the real world but usually do not, must be selected.
5.1 SPECIFIC FACTORS SELECTED FOR EVALUATION
For the purposes of this contract, it was considered prudent to focus primarily on test of factor-error
_equency hypotheses and secondarily on the more basic hypotheses concerning factor-mechanism-
error type relationships. To this end, a small number of factors were selected that, in combination, were
hypothesized to be problematic in terms of leading to high error rates. Where possible, the internal
mechanism and error type were hypothesized as well. The factors selected had to meet the following
pragmatic criteria:
1. They had to be quantifiable.
2. They had to be capable of being simulated.
3. They had to be face valid (i.e., they had to represent situations that could actually occur in the com-
mercial flight deck environment).
Based on these criteria, factors from each of the factor categories of the classification scheme presented
in section 4 were selected. They included the following:
1. Two situation factors.
a. One aircraft factor (i.e., equipment design, specifically, the design of the flight management com-
puter (FMC) control display unit (CDU)).
b. One task factor (i.e., the level of task loading or task demands).
2. One operator factor (i.e., the amount of user experience with the FMC CDU).
3. Two causal factors (i.e., distractions and malfunctions).
15
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It should be noted that in the classification scheme, "excessive task demands" were also categorized as a
causal factor; the particular combination of situation and operator factors selected here could result in
excessive task demands (or workload), thus illustrating that operator and situation factors (contributing
factors) can, in combination, constitute a causal factor.
5.2 SPECIFIC FACTOR-ERROR HYPOTHESES EVALUATED
The hypotheses concerning these factors were fairly straightforward. In much previous work (refs. 7 and
20), it has been shown that an FMC CDU (fig. 5-1) can be difficult to use in high workload conditions.
Many airlines instruct their crews not to use the CDU below a certain altitude. It was hypothesized that
this less than "user friendly" design, coupled with a task and a situation that induces high workload,
would lead to manual input errors in programming the CDU or worse, in the programming not being
completed in time to meet a requested clearance, resulting in a pilot deviation. It was further hypothe-
sized that the error frequency would be increased even more if distractions or malfunctions occurred
during the programming process. It was also hypothesized that the mechanism of malfunction and re-
suiting error type would depend on the level of experience of the user. Experienced users, because of their
skill-based proficiency, would more likely make an error of judgment in trying to use the CDU when that
decision was questionable and would be more likely to make "slips" (i.e., manual mistakes in button
RTE (route)-allows access to flight
plan entered Into FMC. With an active
flight plan,
INIT REF (Inltlalizatlon/reference)-allows
access to data pages required for starlup
of the FMCS and IRS, plus various
reference data
DIR INTC (direct Intercept)- provides
prompts for data required to calculate
guidance from present position to any
designated reference point
LEGS-dlsplays datalled data concemlng
each leg of the flight plan. HS[ displays
aetNe leg data
FIX-displayS range/be_rtng Information
from present poaltlon to entered fix
N1 LJMIT-dlsplayS Nt limit values and
allows pilot selection of engine thrust
ltmlts for dlsDlay on NI limit bug and for
use by auto_hro_le
PREV PAGE-displayS the previous
page of a muitll=de page display
NEXT PAGE--displayS the next page
of a multiple page display
o
CI.B (cllmb) - di_otays cun_,t or
alllmlate cllmb data for
asN_m'mm and seledion
CRZ (crulce)-dlsplayS current or
alternate cruise data for
assessment end selection
,_ UNE SELECT KEYSI -
I, Moves d_a l)atween scrmch peal
(bottom ltne) and Nlacted |Ine or
field (le_ or rlgnt side)
2. Provides access to selected data
or funotlon
DES (descent)--dlsplayS curre_ or
alternate descent data foe
assessment and selection
PROG (progress)-dl_ays
current flight Inform_Ion
EXEC (execute)- FMCS command
key. I_es displayed data
Into FMC for Imp_lon
HOLD- attows development of
hotdlng pattern at a dealgnated way
point o¢ pflBont position
DEP/ARR
(aepatt ure/arrlval) - displays origin
or dalllnatlon runways. Runway
can then be Incorporated Into flight
plan
Figure 5-1. FMCS CDU Key Functions
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pushing when the intention was correct). Inexperienced users would be more likely to make errors of
intention, because while operating in a knowledge-based mode (see ref. 17), they would be more likely to
become confused about the right sequence of CDU button pushes required to perform the desired func-
tion. It was assumed that the task demands and the distractions and malfunctions would exert their
influence simply by stressing the attention capacity of the pilot; when that capacity is exceeded, actions
are omitted or performed so rapidly that a speed-accuracy tradeoff results.
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6.0 ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES
One method of confirming the hypothesized factor-error relationships discussed in section 5 is to review
epidemiological data. In aviation, one source of these kinds of data is accident and incident databases.
Our strategy was to review these data for cases in which the specified combination of factors did, in fact,
contribute to the errors hypothesized. The original intention was to search a variety of databases. It
became quickly evident, however, that the utility of many of the databases was limited, either by difficul-
ty of access or by the kinds of factors that they documented.
6.1 REVIEW OF ASRS REPORTS
The decision was made to concentrate primarily on the ASRS database, which included voluntary inci-
dent reports from all sectors of the aviation community. This database is the most extensive and detailed
available, in terms of the number of reports, the sophistication of the retrieval process, and the kinds of
factors that are likely to be mentioned. While the database is biased toward incidents that are likely to be
detected by more than the crew of the aircraft involved (e.g., altitude deviations), it does provide an
opportunity for any reporter to describe any kind of incident. The ASRS database is also easy to access.
Incident reports are much more likely to mention a variety of contributing factors than accident reports,
which mention only those factors that can be documented to the extent that they will withstand legal
scrutiny.
A member of the Boeing team performing this contract attended a one week training class at BatteUe's
ASRS facility at NASA Ames in order to learn the reporting and retrieval structure for ASRS data.
ASRS reports can be retrieved by a number of predesignated "diagnostic categories," and by key words
included in the narrative. Based on an understanding of the best way to retrieve the reports of interest,
which involved a combination of searching prespecified diagnostic categories and searching for key
words in the narrative, we requested a number of database searches to try to identify incidents in which
the hypothesized combination of factors was relevant to a reported incident. Four searches were initially
performed:
1. FMC programming anomalies (309 reports retrieved).
2. Manual input errors (158 reports retrieved).
3. Multiple task demands for low- and high-experienced pilots (60 reports retrieved).
4. Recent flightcrew upgrades and downgrades (18 reports retrieved).
Table 6-1 depicts the cover page of the search on FMC programming anomalies. This provides informa-
tion on the way the search was performed and the number of eases that resulted from the search. The
multiple task demands task was searched only for eases involving very high ( > 28 000) and very low
(< 2000) total hours to evaluate the effect of experience level on the type of errors that are made when
19
£/_C__i NTENTIOblALLY 8LANI_
May 17, 1988
Table 6-1. Example of Cover Sheet of ASRS Search
vBallelle
Columbus Division
ASRS Office
625 Ellis Street
Suite 305
Mountain View, California 94043
Telephone (415) 969-3969
Mr. William Rogers
Boeing Commercial Airplanes
RO. Box 3707, MS 9606
Seattle, WA 98124-2207
Special Request No. 1333
Flioht Manaoement Comouter Proarammina Anomalies
Dear Mr. Rogers:
In response to your request of NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System, the enclosed printout contains 309 reports
referencing problems with Flight Management Computers (FMCs), and ten reports specifically referencing Control Display
Units (CDUs). At the time of this search, the ASRS datsloase contained 28,933 full-form records of all types received since
January 1, 1982. (Them were also 11,636 abbreviated-form records in the database, but since FMCs and CDUs ere not
identified in these records, they were not included in the search.) Attached is an explanation of the coded Information
contained in your printout.
Due to the structure of the ASRS database, there is no way to specifically search for programming problems of FMCs or
CDUs. Therefore, your printout of 309 FMC reports were retrieved solely because they referenced FMCs. The same holds
true for the ten CDU reports. As per our telephone conversation, we are sending you all reports for you to apply your own
screening biases.
Please note with care the attached caveat regarding statistical use of ASRS information and the point Mr. Reynard makes in
his covering memorandum to recipients.
We hope you find this information both interesting and useful, and apologize for the delay in getting it to you. If we may
provide any additional assistance or clarification, please don't hesitate to contact us at your convenience. We also welcome
any comments you may have.
Sincerely,
Mitzi A. Wagner
Researcher
Ed S. Cheaney
ASRS Research Coordinator
MAW
Enclosure
9-t,_lO183R1-_
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dealing with multiple task demands. The experience level was also the focus of the search on upgrades
and downgrades.
6.2 RESULTS OF THE ASRS SEARCH
The cases of the search on the FMC were perused in some detail. A summary of the incidents that
resulted from FMC programming anomalies is provided in table 6-2. There were numerous reports that
included the combination of factors of interest in the narrative description of the incident. For example,
the incident narrative presented in table 6-3 illustrates the effect of multiple task demands, a difficult
procedure to perform with the CDU; time constraints; and distractions on an error in judgment in using
the CDU, which resulted in a pilot deviation. While a formal tabulation has not been done, it appears
that a number of cases from this search substantiate the notion that the combination of factors
investigated lead to errors resulting in undesirable consequences. However, this by no means provides a
quantification of the error probability resulting from this combination of factors.
The other searches have not been analyzed; review of these searches and a more complete report will be
performed as part of the second year's effort. As appropriate, searches will be initiated to provide pre-
liminary data on other factor-error relationships.
Table 6-2. Summary of Incidents of FMC CDU Programming Anomafies
ASRSSearch
• 309 out of 29 000 reports (from 1/82 to 5188) on
FMCICDU problems
• 44 altitude deviations
• 19 distracted due to CDU
• 8 VNAV disc. unnoticed
• 7 insufficient time to program
• 6 x'ing waypoint confused
• 4 descent constraints entered wrong
• 43 latl_r_ deviatkx_
• 14 incorrect route progremmed
• 10 FMC nav error
• 8 distnc'ted due to CDU
• 7 while in holding
• 3 k_fl(_mt time to progrem
• 1 nJnway change
9-LKIO183R1--4
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Table 6-3. Example of Narrative From FMC CDU Programming Anomafies Search of ASRS Database
ACCESSION NUMBER
DATE OF OCCURRENCE
REPORTED BY
PERSONS FUNCTIONS
FLIGHT CONDITIONS
AIRCRAFT TYPE
NARRATIVE
: 38908
:8411
: FLC
: FLC, PIC.CAPT; FLC, FO; ARTCC, RDR
: VMC
: WDB
: I SERVED AS CAPTAIN ON ACR
BETWEEN BOS AND EWR IN A WDB ACFT. WE ORIGINALLY FILED FOR FL350 BUT WERE HELD
DOWN TO 16 000' DUE TO CENTER CONGESTION. THE POINT HERE IS THAT WE HAD DONE NO
PREFLT FOR THE LOW ALT AIRWAYS STRUCTURE. OUR CLRNC READ: CLRD TO EWR
ARPT-V205 MOBBS, DIRECT EWR-MNTN 16 000'. AT APX 0900 EST WE WERE CLEARED TO
DESCEND TO 9000'. PASSING APX 12 000' WE WERE ISSUED A CLRNC THAT READ DESCEND TO
6000', CROSS THE SPARTA VOR 23 DME AT OR BELOW 8000'. THE F/O WAS FLYING AND I
IMMEDIATELY STARTED ENTERING DATA INTO THE FMS NECESSARY TO PORTRAY THE SPARTA
VOR (SAX-115.7 MH) ON THE EHSI MAP DISPLAYS. THIS IS ACTUALLY A RATHER TIME
CONSUMING TASK. FIRST SINCE OUR ROUTE OF FLT DID NOT GO OVER SPARTA, I HAD TO LOOK
UP ITS IDENTIFIER ON THE LOW ALT CHART, 2) THEN CENTER DIRECT TO THIS IDENTIFIER TO
FIND WHAT RADIAL WE WOULD PROCEED INBOUND ON, THEN 3) REVERSE THAT AND ADD THE
DESIRED DME, THEN, 4) ENTER DIRECT TO THAT FIX, THEN 5) CLEAR THE ROUTE
DISCONTINUITY, THEN 6) EXECUTE THE REVISED ROUTING. LEAVING APPROXIMATELY 9500' IN
DESCENT AND PRIOR TO COMPLETING THE KEYBOARD WORK, THE CTLR CALLED AND SAID
THAT WE WERE ALREADY 5 MILES PAST THE 8000' XING POINT. AS THIS WAS ONLY ABOUT ONE
MINUTE AFTER HE ISSUED THE XING RESTRICTION, WE MUST HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE TO IT
WHEN WE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC. WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING THIS HOWEVER UNTILTHE
XING FIX COULD BE PORTRAYED ON THE EHSI. THE 23 DME ON THE V205 RADIAL ACTUALLY
MAKES UP SILKY INTERSECTION. HAD THE CTLR USED THAT TERMINOLOGY INSTEAD OF
DESIGNATING A DME XING, WE WOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT WE WERE TOO CLOSE TO THE
XING FIX TO CROSS IT AT THE ALT SPECIFIED AS HE READ US THE ORIGINAL CLRNC. AS SILKY
INTERSECTION WAS ON OUR ROUTE OF FLT, AND IT WAS PORTRAYED ON THE EHSI AND
SEVERAL PAGES OF THE FMS, ALL THE CONFUSION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.
CALLBACK/COMMENTS
LOC ID (LOCATION IDENTIFIER)
AIRCRAFT TYPE
CREW SIZE
WINGS, GEAR, SURFACE, ENGINE
NUMBER OF ENGINES
ADVANCED COCKPIT
OPERATOR ORGANIZATION
OPERATION
FLIGHT PLAN TYPE
FLIGHT PHASE
AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEMS
AIRCRAFT POINTER
AIRCRAFT HANDLE
NONE
ZNY; SAX
WDB
2
LOW, RETRACT, LAND, TURBOJET
2
DISPLAY, NAVCTL, FLTENG
ACR
PAX
IFR
DSCNT, MNTN
OPPROC.3462.EFX
P1, P2
A1
Special Request No. 1333
Flight Management Computer Programming Anomalies
GI-Ug0183R1-5
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7.0 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES
A much more rigorous evaluation of the factor-error hypotheses was pursued assessing errors in piloted
simulations. The aim of these simulations was to manipulate the factors of interest in realistic flight
scenarios and assess the effect of the different combinations on the type and frequency of resulting
errors.
7.1 OBJECTIVE
There were three objectives of the experiment:
1. To test hypotheses concerning the frequency and type of pilot errors that result from a specified com-
bination of operational factors.
. To demonstrate the kind of experimental methodology that could serve as a useful tool for error eval-
uation. While error prediction and modeling is the ultimate goal, better empirical test methods are
also needed to evaluate the error potential of different design components early in the design process.
. To provide a baseline for evaluation of future CDU modifications. Once error frequencies have been
established for the present design of the CDU with the combination of other factors previously de-
scribed, this can be used as a baseline to assess if new CDU design concepts actually provide a reduc-
tion in error frequency under the demanding conditions simulated.
As mentioned in section 5, the specific factors we selected as likely to impact the pilot's error frequency
included the design of the FMC CDU, task demands, distractions, malfunctions, and pilot experience
level with the CDU. The experiment was designed on the general hypothesis that the current CDU de-
sign makes it difficult to perform certain CDU functions in high-workload conditions, particularly with
other flight deck distractions and/or malfunctions. Even restricting the CDU's use to above certain
altitudes, we believe that factors can combine to make its use difficult. This can lead to errors ranging
from simple slips (hitting the wrong buttons), which are quickly corrected, to more serious errors such as
trying to program a clearance restriction and violating that restriction before the programming is com-
plete. The kinds of errors that occur are hypothesized to vary with the experience level of the user (see
see. 5.2).
7.2 SCENARIOS
An FMC-equipped airplane was flown on autopilot with vertical navigation (VNAV) and lateral naviga-
tion (LNAV) connected and a single crewmember was required to perform a series of air traffic control
(ATC)-requested flight plan changes in flight using the CDU. The scenarios were developed to address
CDU functions that were hypothesized to be difficult to perform. This primarily involved using the
"Legs" page of the CDU (see fig. 7-1) to tactically change the flight plan in flight. Workload was designed
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Figure 7-1. CDU Legs Page 
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to be generally high by requiring the pilot to perform multiple tasks (e.g., monitoring displays and inter- 
acting with ATC) and was further varied by manipulation of the following factors: 
24 
Complexity of ATC clearance and resulting CDU task. Clearances can vary in how difficult it is to 
program them with the CDU, depending on the restrictions involved and the terms the clearance is 
defined in. In our scenarios, the number of button pushes required to program the clearances on the 
CDU varied between approximately 15 and 30. 
Time available to meet the clearance. Often when a clearance is given by ATC, the time to respond 
and make the clearance is minimal. We simulated this by allowing either 1 or 2 min between the time 
the clearance was given and when the point the clearance had to be met would be reached. It was 
important that the decision to use the CDU was in a "gray" area; the pilot knew its use would lead to 
more fuel-efficient flight, but could result in a pilot deviation if not done quickly and accurately. We 
made this decision more difficult by supplying the pilot with non-EFIS displays (fig. 7-Z), which do 
3. 
Figure 7-2. 737-300 Non-EFIS Display Configuration 
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not provide the situational awareness that the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) displays 
(fig. 7-3) do. 
Familiarity of the route. We designed the experiment so that the subjects had to fly routes they were 
familiar and unfamiliar with. The hypothesis was that the unfamiliar routes would create greater task 
demands and thus result in higher error frequencies. 
Flights were performed with and without an additional distraction and/or malfunction, such as an ATC 
request, a LNAV or VNAV disconnect, or other cautionary message. A questionnaire was administered 
that asked for background data, including experience on the CDU. These data will be correlated with the 
various error measures. 
Each subject received four 30-min flights, each including the end of climb, a short cruise phase, ap- 
proach, and stabilization for landing. Each subject was briefed on each filed flight plan prior to the flight. 
Four “miniscenarios” were inserted into each flight. Each miniscenario began with an enroute clearance 
change and ended with that clearance being met or deviated from. The four initial flight plans, the same 
25 
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Figure 7-3. 737-300 EFlS Display Configuration 
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flight plans as modified by inflight ATC clearances, and the ATC scripts that requested the inflight path 
changes to meet specific clearances, are included as appendix 3. Each flight included a departure and 
arrival point and five or six waypoints. The routes were Seattle to Moses Lake, Moses Lake to Seattle, 
Boston to New York, and New York to Boston. 
Each miniscenario represented a specific combination of the independent variables. There were five 
variables with two levels each (high or low CDU task complexity, high or low route familiarity, distrac- 
tionho distraction, malfunctionho malfunction, and short or long time to make the clearance), making 
possible 32 (2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2) combinations. The experimental design allowed 16 (4 miniscenarios x 4 
flights) of the combinations to be tested (see table 7-1 for a summary of the combinations tested). 
7.3 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
The experiments were performed in a Boeing engineering simulator configured as a 737-300 (fig. 7-4). 
The experimental team included two confederates: one serving as a second crew member and ATC and 
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7-1. Factor Combinations Tested in Simulation
ROUTE FAMILIARITY
High ............................ LOw ............. .,
i =
i i
CDU PROGRAMMING COMPLEXITY
High ............ Low ............ High ............ Low .....
0 i l l
i l i i
LEAD TIME
Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long
SeettJe Moses Lake Boston New York
Moses Lake Seattle New York Boston
MS#4 MS#2 MS#4 MS#2
Seaffie Boston
Moses Lake New York
MS #1 MS #1
Moses Lake Seaffie Seattle Moses Lake New York Boston New York Boston
Seattle Moses Lake Moses Lake Seattle Boston New York Boston New York
MS #1 MS #'2 MS #3 MS #3 MS #1 MS #2 MS #3 MS #3
SeattJe
Moses Lake
MS#4
New York
Boston
MS#4
MS- Miniscenado
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the other coordinating all aspects of the experiment and observing. The confederate pilot had EFIS dis-
plays and the experimental subject had non-EFIS displays.
Each cab session was 4 hr: i hr for instructions to the pilot and four 1/2-hr simulations separated by rest
intervals during which the next simulation was readied and the subject familiarized with the flight plan
for the next scenario. Pilots received the four flights in a counter-balanced order. Each flight simulation
started with an FMC-stored flight plan and, as mentioned, was scripted with specific events, such as
ATC messages including positional and clearance changes to the plan and malfunctions and distrac-
tions occurring at specified times in the simulation.
7.4 SUBJECTS
We recruited Boeing flightcrew training pilots for this experiment, all 737-300 type rated, with varying
degrees of experience with FMC-equipped airplanes. Eight subjects performed the experiment, but the
data of the first two will not be analyzed because changes to the experimental procedure were made
subsequent to these subjects' sessions.
7.5 ERROR MEASURES
A variety of pilot error measures were collected. The primary error measure collected was CDU button
pushes for each CDU "miniscenario" (table 7-2 shows output of the CDU monitoring program). CDU
error measures included the number of button pushes that deviated from the "optimal" path for each
miniscenario, as well as where'the deviations occurred, what button pushes constitute each deviation,
the time for each button push, and the timing of the entire sequence of button pushes. Also collected was
27
Figure 7-4. 737-300 Configuration Used for Error Simulation Studies 
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a time-referenced record of altitude, speed, track, latitude, longitude, etc., which will be used to assess 
pilot deviations. Data such as speed brake use, flap settings, and throttle settings were collected to assess 
how efficiently the scenario was flown (table 7-3 lists all performance data collected). An observer manu- 
ally recorded some data, such as when ATC messages were received and responded to, responses to 
nonnormals and malfunctions, timing of key strategical decisions, acknowledgments of committed er- 
rors, problems, and general pilot comments. 
This experiment was not completed. A replication will be run, and the data of all subjects will be ana- 
lyzed and reported in the second year of the program (see sec. 8). From experimenter subjective observa- 
tions during the experiment, however, it appears that many of the errors that were hypothesized and 
illustrated in the ASRS reports were committed during our simulations. For example, subject 3 did not 
make either the altitude (fig. 7-5) or speed (fig. 7-6) restriction given for ORTIN (miniscenario 4) in the 
Moses Lake to Seattle flight. We are optimistic that the analyses of the results will show some interesting 
findings consistent with the hypotheses. 
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Subject 3 Scenario 4
PH = Page Header
FK = Function Key
LS = Line Select
TX = Text
11:22:19.4 FK: INn" REF
11:22:20.7 PH: PERF INIT
11:22:20.8 TX: 11.0
11:22:22.8 LS: 1 left
11:22:23.8 TX: 5
11:22:24.4 LS: 4 Left
11:22:25.2 TX: 25
11:22:25.7 LS: 5 Left
11:22:28.2 TX: 190
11:22:29.1 I.S: 1 Right
11:22:32.6 FK: RTE
Table 7-2. Typical Output of CDU Monitor Program
CDU Keypush History
Date:01119/89 Tlme:l 1:23:00.0
1/2
11:22:00.6 FK: INIT REF
11:22:00.8 PH: ACT PERF INIT
1 1:22:01.0 PH: PERF INIT
1 1:22:01.6 IS: 6 Left
11:22:01.9 PH: INIT/REF INDEX
1 1:22:07.4 I.S: 2 Left
11:22:07.9 PH: POS INIT
11:22:08.6 TX: KBFI
11:22:09.9 LS: 2 Left
11:22:11.2 LS: 6 Right
11:22:11.5 PH: RTE
11:22:12.4 LS: 1 Left
11:22:13.4 TX: KMWH
11:22:14.6 LS:I Right
Table 7-3. Performance Data Collected During Simulation
• Throttle position engine 1 and 2
• Airspeed, altitude, and track
• Flap position
• Gross weight of fuel
• Speed brake position
• Lateral and vertical deviation from flight path
• Latitude and longitude
• Engine 1 and2 N1
• MCP settings
• Heading
• Autopilot A
• LNAV
= LVLCHG
-Altitude -Speed
-Autopilot B
-VNAV
-HDG SLCT -ALT HLD
1/2
1/2
111
1/3
1/1
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Figure 7-5. Altitude Deviation at ORTIN
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Figure 7-6. Speed Deviation at ORTIN
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8.0 FUTURE TASKS
The first experiment of the second program year will be to perform a replication of this study. The repli-
cation will simply repeat the first simulations to increase the statistical power of the tests. This is consid-
ered a baseline study and will establish methods and measures that can be used in succeeding studies as
well as establish an empirical error frequency baseline for the particular factor cluster chosen.
A second study will be performed that will test modified factor-error hypotheses; it is assumed that the
study reported here will result in changes to the original hypotheses. Another objective of the second
study will be to confirm results of the first study (which was performed with Boeing pilots) with line pilots
(the experience and skill levels are predicted to be different between the two populations). If no refine-
ments of the initial hypotheses are required as a result of the first experiment, then the second study will
simply repeat the first experiment with line pilots rather than Boeing pilots.
Based on expertise in the factor areas, we will develop and test methods that reduce the error frequency
shown to result from the selected combination of underlying factors. The focus of this effort will be to
develop and test design modifications that reduce the error probability, although modification of other
factors of the factor cluster, such as task procedures or training, will also be considered.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia 23665-5225
September 1989
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APPENDIX 1
CATEGORIES OF FACTORS, MECHANISMS, AND ERRORS
COMPILED FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Gerbert, K. and Kemmler, R., 1985
Factors
Physical factors
Psychological factors
Pilot's proficiency factors
Environmental factors
Mission requirement factors
Organizational and supervisory factors
Technical and design factors
Reason, J., 1985
Slips and Mistakes
Skill-based slips
Rule-based mistakes
Knowledge-based mistakes
McRuer, D.T., Clement, W.F., and Allen, R.W., 1980
Single Channel Operations--Compensatory
Extreme command or disturbance amplitude (unexpectedly large command or extreme environment)
Extreme command or disturbance bandwidth (broadband input signal noise)
Controlled-element change (malfunction/failure in controlled element)
Reduced attention field (poor signal/noise ratio)
Reversals (misperception of error sign, naivety)
Multi input Operations
Divided attention and perceptual scanning
Reduced attentional field
Illusions, kinetosis
35
Green, R.G., 1985
Stress
Environmental stress
Acute reactive stress
Life stress
Borowsky, M.S. and Wall, R., 1983
Mistakes versus Experience Level
Types of flights
Offensive maneuvers
Control loss
Cross country flights
Carrier landings
Overrun and undershoot during landing
Inadequate flight preparation
Failed to maintain flying speed
Improper use of flight controls in air
Misjudged distance, altitude, or position
Improper response and poor technique for landing
Physical and mental condition of pilot
Violation of existing regulations and instructions
Rockwell, T.H. and Giffen, W.C., 1987
Critical lnflight Event Model
Errors:
1. Inadequate preflight
2. Fails to recognize early warnings of problems
3. Fails to do sequence check
4. Decides to fly despite system discrepancies
5. Fails to recognize early warnings
6. Fails to monitor instrument readings
7. Fails to notice small discrepancies in flight sensations
8. Fails to notice lack of agreement of related instruments
9. Diagnostic error
10. Error is estimation of urgency
11. Improper corrective action
12. Poor emergency flying skills
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Pilot Fuel Mismanagement Model
Errors:
1. Fuel system status
a. No visual check of fuel status
b. Failure to drain tanks
c. Failure to check caps and vents
d. Failure to select proper tank
2. Fuel requirements
a. Miscalculate route miles
b. Miscalculate fuel consumption and power setting
c. Failure to get winds aloft
d. Failure to plan an alternate
e. Failure to account for traffic delays
3. Fuel added
a. Failure to observe refueling
4. Enroute procedures
a. Poor leaning procedure
b. Improper tank selection schedule
c. Failure to use proper switching procedures
d. Failure to update ground speed
e. Improper power management
f. Poor selection of refueling airport
g. Failure to have NOTAMS
5. How compensated for
a. Poor emergency flying skills
b. Fails to use ATC assistance
Model for VFR Flight into IMC
Errors:
1. Failed to
2. Failed to
3. Failed to
4. Failed to
get NOTAMS big weather picture and weather forecast (used wrong source)
understand weather
use weather in flight planning
prepare navigation alternatives for weather contingencies
.
6.
7.
8.
9. Failed to
10. Failed to
11. Failed to
12. Failed to
Failed to get correct weather
Poor fuel management in face of weather changes
Failed to note changes in weather enroute
Failed to note forecast would not hold
get weather updates
let ATC know of pending weather induced problems
consider 180" or diversion before IMC
note weather trend
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13.Failedto usearrivalweather sources
14. Failed to keep aircraft under control
15. Failed to contact ATC for assistance
Lubner, E.G. and Lester, L.F., 1987
Model To Predict Aviation Events
Exposure (time flown and aviation situation)
Environmental and agent variables (tractable and intractable)
Value of flying (motivation to fly)
Personal dispositions
Cognitive (hazardous thoughts, attitudes, and attention)
Noncognitive (I/E locus of control, ego strength, risk taking, and mental health)
Physical condition
Alcohol use
Drug use--prescription or not
Chronic disorders (e.g., high blood pressure)
Static physical defects (e.g., impaired vision)
Stress
Life events
Buffers (social and instrumental support)
Coping
Flying experience
Certificate/rating
Time spent flying
Safety behaviors
Familiarity with A/C
Mediating processes
Situation-specific responses
Judgment and decisions
Lubner, M.E. and Lester, L.F., 1987; Bush, G. and Diehl, A., 1984; Lester, L.F. and Bombaci, D.H.,
1984
Hazardous Thought Patterns
Antiauthority
External control
Impulsivity
Invulnerability
Macho
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Feggetter, A.J., 1982
Accident Investigation Checklist Development
1. Cognitive system
a. Human information processing system
(1) Sensory
(2) Perception
(3) Attention
(4) Memory
(5) Decision
(6) Action
(7) Monitoring
(8) Feedback
b. Visual illusions
c. False hypothesis
d. Habits
e. Motivation
f. Training
g. Personality
h. Fear
2. Social system
a. Social pressure
b. Role
c. Life stress
3. Situational system
a. Physical
(1) Physical stress
(2) Physical condition
(3) State of nutrition
(4) Drugs
(5) Smoking
(6) Alcohol
(7) Fatigue
(8) Sleep loss
b. Environmental stress
(1) Altitude
(2) Speed and motion
(3) Visual
(4) Glare
(5) Disorientation
(6) Temperature
(7) Lighting levels
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Co
(8) Noise
(9) Vibration
Ergonomic aspects
(1) Design of controls
(2) Design of displays
(3) Seating
(4) Presentation of material
(5) Policy of dealing with emergencies
Feggetter, AJ., 1985
DBMS Development on Accident Investigation
1. Cognitive system
a. Human information processing system
(1) Inadequate perceptual cues
(2) Misleading perceptual cues
(3) Attentional problems
(4) Distraction
(5) Inappropriate decision
(6) Inappropriate feedback
(7) Memory difficulties
(8) Inappropriate action
b. Visual illusions
c. False hypothesis
d. Disorientation
e. Personality
f. Overconfidence
g. Motivation
h. Arousal
i. Slow response time
j. Habits
k. Training
1. Supervision
m. Tasking
n. Briefing
o. Workload
2. Social system
a. Crew cooperation
b. Life stress
c. Rule breaking
d. Social pressure
e. Role conflict
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q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
3. Situational systems
a. Fatigue
b. Physical stress (health)
c. Drugs
d. Alcohol
e. Nutrition
f. Diurnal rhythms
g. Circadian rhythms
h. Environmental stress
i. Time pressure
j. Get-home-itis
k. Operational pressure
1. Unfamiliar aircraft
m. Weather
n. Ergonomics
Green, R.G., 1984
Stress and Accidents
° Stress
a. Environmental stress
(1) Noise
(2) Vibration
(3) Heat
(4) Cold
(5) Mild hypoxia
(6) Sleepdeprivation
b. Acute reactive
c. Life stress
(1) Bereavement
(2) Divorce
(3) Moving house
(4) New job
Stoklosa, J.H., 1983
Human Performance
° Human performance factors
a. Behavior
(1) A 24- to 72-hr history
(2) Operator behavior
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(3) Lifehabit patterns
(4) Lifeevents
b. Medical
(1) Generalhealth
(2) Sensoryacuity
(3) Drug andalcoholingestion
(4) Fatigue
c. Operational
(1) Training
(2) Experiencefamiliarityhabitpatterns
(3) Operatingprocedures
(4) Companypolicy
d. Task
(1) Taskinformation
(2) Taskcomponents
(3) Tasktimerelation
(4) Workload
e. Equipmentdesign
(1) Workspaceinterface
(2) Displayandinstrumentpaneldesign
(3) Controldesign
(4) Seatdesignandconfiguration
f. Environmental
(1) Externalconditions
(2) Internalconditions
(3) Illumination
(4) Noiseandvibration
Platenius, P.H. and Wilde, G., 1987
"Intuitively" Categorized Item-Sets (excluding purely biographical and flying-experience items)
1. Life events and preoccupations-included 14 'events' generally family or job related matters.
2. Risk acceptance-included about 12 items designed to assess degree to which respondents tended to
advocate, prefer, or actually carry out risky activities.
3. Lack of humor appreciation-respondents asked to indicate which of 17 syndicated comic strips they
read regularly.
4. Asocial or sedentary hobbies-respondents were asked to check off which of 27 leisure activities in
which they like to engage.
5. Medical symptoms-respondents were asked to pick which of a list of 14 symptoms, largely
stress-related, applied to them.
6. Perceiving oneself as unsuccessful.
7. Lack of initiative or self-control and dislike of constraints.
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8. Socialdisabilityor loneliness.
9. Alcohol use-one questionnaire was, "does the consumption of alcohol add to your pleasure in social
affairs?" (greatly, considerably, moderately, slightly, or not at all).
10. Accidents and violations in automobile driving.
11. Underattribution of accident causes-13 factors were listed that could be considered as causes of
accidents, and respondents were asked to "estimate the percentage of fatal accidents in which (each
one) would be listed as a partial cause."
Becker-Lausen, E., Norman, S., and Pariante, G., 1987
Information Sources for Human Error in Aviation
ASRS categories
Behavior
Aggression
Complacency
Emotional trauma
Fatigue
Illness
Inadequate human resources
Incapacitation
Interpersonal relationship
Personal injury
Physical discomfort
Resource utilization
Schedule pressure
Social pressure
Unfamiliar with operation
Unprofessional attitude
Each of the above categories are paired by the analyst with the individual involved; i.e., pilot/
behavior/personal injury, controller/behavior/fatigue, etc.
Feggetter, A.J., 1982
Human Factors Aspects of Aircraft Accidents and Incidents
Cognitive system:
1. Human information processing system, including senses, perception, attention, memory, decision,
action, and monitoring
2. Visual illusions
3. False hypothesis
4. Habits
5. Motivation
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6. Training
7. Personality
8. Fear
Socialsystem:
9. Socialpressure
10.Role
11.Life stress
Situationalsystem:
12.Physicalstress,physicalcondition,stateof nutrition,drugs,smoking,alcohol,fatigue,andsleeploss
Tarrel, R.J., 1985
Human Factors Associated with Runway Transgressions
Runway transgressions
1. Information transfer
a. Pilot distraction
b. Pilot workload
2. Awareness
a. Complacent attitude
b. Fatigue
3. Spatial judgment
a. Airport markings
b. Signs
c. Complex configurations
Hanley, M.J., 1985
The Human Oriented Mishap Reduction (HOMR) Program
HOMR-HF database on aircraft accidents
1. Mishap data: actual, near, and nonmishap
a. Aircraft
b. Crew
2. System parameter date: normative data
a. Human capabilities
b. Aircraft capabilities
Aderet, A. and Tal, Y., 1984
Human Error in Aircraft Accidents
Behavioral Sequence model
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Initial emergency
Motoricresponse
Recognition
Accident
Adams, J.A., 1982
Issues in Human Reliability
Task taxonomy
1. Behavioral description (what person does in system)
2. Behavioral requirements (the processes that intervene between stimulus and response)
3. Ability requirements
4. Task characteristics
Wiener, E.L., 1977
Controlled Flight into Terrain Accidents
Controlled flight into terrain
1. System failure
a. Pilot-controller (information transfer)
b. Noise abatement approaches
c. Cockpit workload
d. Crew coordination
e. Warning devices radar
f. Visual illusions
g. Confusing terminology and charts.
Danaher, J.N., 1988
Human Error in ATC System Operations
ATC Errors
1. Attention
2. Judgment
3. Communications
4. Stress
5. Equipment
6. Operations
7. Management
8. Environment
9. Procedures
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lO.Externalfactors
Norman, D.A., 1981
Categorization of Action Slips
Action slips
Errors of omission
Errors of commission
Errors of substitution
1. Slips that result from errors in the formation of intention
a. Errors that are not classified as slips
b. Mode errors: erroneous classification of the situation
c. Description errors: ambiguous or incomplete specification of the intention
2. Slips that result from faulty activation of schemas
a. Unintentional activation
(1) Capture errors
(2) Data-driven activation
(3) Associative activation
b. Loss of activation
(1) Forgetting an intention
(2) Misordering components of action sequence
(3) Skipping steps in action sequence
(4) Repeating steps in action sequence
3. Slips that result from faulty triggering of active schemas
a. False triggering
(1) Spoonerisms: reversal of event components
(2) Blends: combinations of components from two competing schemas
(3) Thoughts leading to actions: triggering of schemas meant only to be thought, not to govern
action
Premature triggering
Failure to trigger
(1) Action preempted by competing schemas
(2) Insufficient activation
(3) Failure of trigger condition to match
(4)
b.
Robinson, J.E., 1985
Classification and Determination of Aircraft Accidents (Reports Grouped into Phase of Flight
Categories)
1. Preflight
2. Takeoff and climb
46
3. Cruise
4. Approach
5. Landingor impact
6. Maintenanceandrepair
7. Operationandmaintenance
Subdivideeachphaseinto--
1. Weather conditions
2. Aircraft equipment and capabilities
3. Air traffic control transactions
4. Cockpit controls and displays
5. Crew coordination
6. Unplanned pitchups and liftoffs
7. Training and experience
8. Nonstandard patterns or techniques
9. Problems in diagnosis
Salvatore, S., Huntley, S., and Mengert, R, 1985
Air Transport Pilot Involvement in General Aviation Accidents
Aircraft accidents involving ATP and PVT flying GA
1. General cause category
a. Design
b. Manufacturer
c. Improper maintenance
d. Pilot and maintenance
e. Operational deficiency other than pilot
f. Pilot
2. Phase of flight
a. Approach, landing, and takeoff
b. Cruise
c. Acrobatics
d. Forced landing
e. Ground, practice, and other
3. Pilot induced
a. Flight planning
b. Traffic pattern errors
c. Weather
d. Collision
e. Fuel system error
f. Acrobatics
g. Other cruise
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.h. Ground operations
Supplementary factors
a. Weather
(1) Weather briefing received
(2) Weather briefing not received
(3) Weather not briefed
b. Mistake
c. Unskilled in operation of aircraft
d. Risk overconfidence
(1) Calculated risk
(2) Careless
(3) Reckless
(4) Misjudgment
Rouse, W.B. and Rouse, S.H., 1983
Proposed Human Error Classification Scheme
1. Observation of system state
a. Excessive
b. Misinterpreted
c. Incorrect
d. Incomplete
e. Inappropriate
f. Lack
2. Choice of hypothesis
a. Inconsistent
b. Unlikely
c. Costly
d. Irrelevant
3. Testing of hypothesis
a. Incomplete
b. False acceptance
c. False rejection
d. Lack
4. Choice of goal
a. Incomplete
b. Incorrect
c. Unnecessary
d. Lack
5. Choice of procedure
a. Incomplete
b. Incorrect
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,c. Unnecessary
d. Lack
Execution of procedure
a. Step omitted
b. Step repeated
c. Step added
d. Step out of sequence
e. Inappropriate timing
f. Incorrect discrete position
g. Incorrect continuous range
h. Incomplete
i. Unrelated inappropriate action
Johnson, W.B. and Rouse, W.B., 1982
Human Errors in Troubleshooting Live Aircraft Power Plants
Maintenance error
1 Observation of system state
a. Incomplete
b. Misinterpreted
c. Repeated
2. Choice of hypothesis
a. Inconsistent with symptoms
b. Consistent but unlikely
c. Consistent but costly
d. Functionally irrelevant
3. Choice of procedures
a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriate
c. Lack
4. Execution of procedures
a. Omission of steps
b. Performed steps out of sequence
c. Inadvertent action
5. Consequence of previous error
a. Error was logical consequence of previous error
Van Eekhout, J.M. and Rouse, W.B., 1981
Human Error in Engine Control Room of Supertanker
1. Observation of system state
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a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriate
c. Lack
2. Identificationof fault
a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriate
c. Lack
3. Choiceof goal
a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriate
c. Lack
4. Choiceof procedure
a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriate
c. Lack
5. Executionof procedure
a. Incomplete
b. Inappropriatetiming
c. Inadvertentaction
6. Contributingfactors
a. Basicknowledge
b. Controllerknowledge
c. Designinadequacies
d. Fidelityinadequacies
Caeser, C., 1987
Flight Phase Definition
1. Takeoff
2. Climb
3. Cruise
4. Descent
5. Approach
6. Landing
7. Ground
Human Failure
. Active failure (aware)
a. Nonadherence to rules and SOPs
b. Lack of discipline or vigilance
c. Inadequate flight management
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d. Short cuts
2. Passive failures (unaware)
a. Crew misunderstanding and communications problems
b. Complacency
c. Forgetfulness
d. Distraction
e. Coordination breakdown
f. Fatigue
g. Boredom
h. Lack of assistance
3. Proficiency of failures
a. Inappropriate handling of a/c or its systems
b. Wrong alternatives
c. Misjudgment
d. Lack of experience
e. Training
f. Competence
4. Crew incapacitation
a. Subtle or o.bvious incapacitation that requires takeover
b. Flightcrew member unable to perform due to physical inability
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 1987
Accident Statistics
1. Phase of flight
a. Load, taxi, and unload
b. Takeoff
c. Initial climb: ends at flaps up
d. Climb
e. Cruise
f. Descent: from cruise to navigational fix
g. Initial approach: includes holding pattern and continues to outer marker
h. Final approach
i. Landing
Edwards, E., Date and Title Unknown
Instrument Errors-Electro-Mechanical
. Types of errors
a. Interpretation errors
b. Reversal errors
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c. Signalinterpretationerrors
d. Legibilityerrors
e. Substitutionerrors
f. Usingan inoperativeinstrument
g. Scaleinterpretationerrors
h. Illusionerrors
i. Forgettingerrors
Morris, N.M. and Rouse, W.B., 1985
ERROR
Slips
Mistakes
Lautman, L.G. and Gailimore, RL., 1987
Classification of 93 crew-caused major accidents:
1. Pilot deviated from basic operational procedures
2. Inadequate cross-check by second crew member
3. Crews not conditioned for proper response during abnormal conditions
4. Pilot did not recognize the need for go-around
5. Pilot incapacitated
6. Inadequate piloting skills
7. Pilot used improper procedure during go-around
8. Crew errors during training flights
9. Pilot not trained to respond promptly to GPWS command
10. Pilot unable to execute safe landing or go-around when runway sighting is lost below MDA or DH
11. Operational procedures did not require use of available approach aids
12. Captain inexperienced in aircraft type
Kowalsky, N.B., Masters, R.L., Stone, R.B., Babcock, G.L., and Rypka, E.W., 1974
Pilot Error-Related Aircraft Accidents
Critical condition categories
1. Experience
a. Low pilot time in type
b. Low copilot time in type
c. Low pilot time in position (as captain)
d. Low copilot time (total)
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e. Other(e.g.,recentexperience,training,flightengineer,agedifferences,studentpilot new,crew
new,studentpilot dull, andnewairport)
2. Distraction
a. Communicationsor traffic (excessivecommunicationswith ATC or looking out for traffic)
b. Confusion (last minute approach change or other confusion)
c. Hurry (close departure on same runway or other hurrying)
d. Holding or delay
e. Other (e.g., wake turbulence, numerous distractions, foreign student, first officer monitoring
instruments, interrupted checklist, fuel burn, paperwork, poor destination weather, instructor
pilot checklist, takeoff position holding, and ashtray fire)
3. Crew coordination
a. Disagreement (disagreement on approach or configuration or other pilot calls 'off profile')
b. Jumpseat occupant or other additional crew
c. No required altitude callouts
d. Pilot acting as instructor
e. Other (e.g., loose student/instructor relationship or other interactions such as flaps without
student knowing, altitude confusion, distrust first officer, thought continuing takeoff, gear up
without visual verification, both pilots on controls, noncompliance, and confusion on who was
flying)
4. Neglect
a. No cross-check on ILS
b. Improper use of checklist
c. Improper rest/procedure
d. Other (e.g., company did not revise checklist, other aircraft collision light off, ATC, Mach trim
switch, engine reversing indicator lights, VOR out, and clearance deviation)
5. Air traffic control
a. Delayed landing clearance
b. Confusing radar vector
c. Advised of traffic
d. Poor, weak, or malfunctioning radar or radar return
e. Other (e.g., no acknowledgement, no advisories, vector confirmation, and advisory holds)
6. "Decisions"
a. Off acceptable profile
b. Institutional decisions; okay to operate
c. Copilot flying, taken over by pilot
7. Work/rest (fatigue)
a. On duty over 8 hr
b. Minimum rest
c. Early morning departure
8. Machine
a. Gross weight (overweight or heavy gross weight)
b. Simulated engine shutoff (engine failure simulation)
c. System failure
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d. Other(e.g.,simulatedrudderloss,flightdirectoroscillation, spoiler deployment and retraction,
battery switch, 3 and 4 engine reverse slow spool, air noise, parking brake versus mechanical
failure, and seat failure)
9. Airport
a. Stopping problem (runway slippery, wet, slush, braking action poor, or tire residue)
b. Touchdown problem (runway short or displaced threshold)
c. Vertical guidance problem (no approach light, approach lights out, or localizer only)
d. Runway hazards (upslope threshold, exposed lip or dropoff)
e. Other (e.g., runway markings obliterated, uncontrolled airport, irregular lights, loose pavement,
and hilly terrain)
10. Weather
a. Visibility problem (heavy rain at threshold, below circling minimums, fog, snow or haze, or other
visibility restrictions)
b. Thunderstorm influencing airport or enroute weather
c. Wind gusty
d. Other (e.g., same route, weather above circling minimums, enroute weather, freezing drizzle, and
venturi wind)
Critical decision categories
1. Decisions resulting from out-of-tolerance (off profile) conditions
a. Takeover of controls
b. Verbal instructions between pilots
c. Excessive deviation called out
d. Inadequate braking observed
e. Assistance inflight control operation
f. Attempt to regain directional control
g. Go-around initiated
h. Other
2. Decisions based on erroneous sensory inputs
a. Approach continued visually
b. Decided profile within limits
c. Misleading cockpit display
d. Misleading navigation information
e. Runway or braking misinformation
f. Final approach or flare profile misinformation
g. Standard operating procedure distraction
h. Other
3. Decisions delayed
a. Takeover of flight controls or assistance
b. Go-around decision
c. Takeoff abort
d. Thrust lever movement
e. Other
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4. Decisionprocessbiasedbynecessityto makedestinationor presson (meetschedule)
a. Continuedflightwith equipmentfailure
b. Altered cockpit procedures
c. Continue with weather conditions deteriorating
d. Runway misinformation
e. Decision involved approach procedure
f. Other
5. Incorrect weighting of sensory inputs or responses to a contingency
a. Deviation from checklist or altitude caUouts
b. Icing of aircraft
c. Disregard of cockpit displays
d. Traffic information disregarded
e. Disregard information on landing environment or conditions
f. Safety degradation due to training
g. Other
6. Incorrect choice of two alternatives based on available information
a. Left cockpit
b. Landed runway with unfavorable conditions
c. Flew visual approach
d. Other
7. Correct decision
a. Checked approach light level
b. Confirmed minimums
c. Took over and flew approach
d. Other
8. Overloaded or rushed situation for making decisions
a. Primary attention diverted
b. Aircraft power difficulty
c. Observed traffic and rolled aircraft
d. Other
9. Desperation or self-preservation decision
a. Directional control or stopping problem
b. Airborne loss of control
c. Avoid ground contact
d. Avoid other aircraft
e. Other
Critical decisions listed as "other" in each category were miscellaneous and too few in number to list
therein.
This report (Kowalsky, et al.) has an accident analysis sheet, lists their "accident characteristics and
variables," and broke out "combinations of critical decisions."
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AccidentCharacteristicsandVariables
00 Numberof engines
01 Time of occurrence
02 Type of accident (lst)
03 Phase of operation (lst)
04 Condition of light
05 Type weather conditions
06 Type instrument approach
07 Airport proximity
08 Airport elevation
09 Runway composition
10 Runway condition
11 Runway lighting
12 Runway length
13 Type of terrain
14 Pilots involved
15 Total flight time (lst)
16 Total flight time (2nd)
17 Hours in type (lst)
18 Hours in type (2nd)
19 Pilot age (lst)
20 Pilot age (2nd)
21 Pilot at controls
22 Sky condition
23 Ceiling
24 Visibility
25 Precipitation
26 Obstruction to vision
27 Relative wind component
28 Temperature
29 Wind velocity
30 Approach lighting availability
31 Pilot time last 24 hr (lst)
32 Pilot time last 30 days (lst)
33 Pilot time last 90 days (lst)
34 Duration of this flight (lst)
35 On duty time (lst)
36 Rest period prior to flight (lst)
37 Pilot time last 24 hr (2nd)
38 Pilot time last 24 hr (FE)
39 Pilot time last 30 days (2nd)
40 Pilot time last 30 days (FE)
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41 Pilot time last 90 days (2nd)
42 Pilot time last 90 days (FE)
43 Duration of this flight (2nd)
44 Duration of this flight (FE)
45 On duty time (2rid)
46 On duty time (FE)
4"7 Rest period prior to flight (2nd)
48 Rest period prior to flight (FE)
Billings, C.E. and Chaeney, E.S., 1981
Information Transfer Problems
Classification
1. Instructions
a. Message origin
(1) Controller
(2) Some other device
b. Message type
(1) Clearance
(2) Coordination
(3) Request
(4) Warning
(5) Other control
(6) Statement of intentions
(7) Data
(8) Advisory
(9) Confirmation
c. Message problems
(1) Absent
(2) Incomplete
(3) Inaccurate due to phonetic similarity
(4) Transposition
(5) False
(6) Ambiguous
(7) Untimely
(8) Garbled in transmission or presentation
(9) Not transmitted because of device failure
(10) Not received due to failure to monitor by intended recipient
d. Message medium
(1) Publication
(2) Radio
(3) Interphone
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A
(4) Video
(5) Taperecording
(6) Chartor similargraphic
(7) Telephone
(8) Direct voice
(9) Visual(instrument,etc.)
2. Errors involvingbriefingof reliefcontrollers
a. Absentbriefing
b. Incompletebriefing
c. Inaccuratebriefing
d. Associated factors
(1) Nonrecall of pertinent information
(2) Failure of technique
(3) Failure of perception
(4) Complacency
(5) Distraction
(6) Message ambiguity
(7) Workload
(8) Inattention
(9) Misidentification of aircraft
(10) Other factors
3. Human errors associated with coordination failures
a. Human errors
(1) Nonrecall
(2) Technique errors
(3) Perceptual errors
(4) Failure to monitor
(5) Message inaccuracy
(6) Misidentification
b. Predisposing factors
(1) Distraction
(2) Excess workload
(3) Experience and training level
(4) Complacency
(5) Airspace configuration
(6) Procedural problem
(7) Automation mindset
(8) Equipment failure
(9) Interpersonal relationship
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Prendal, B., 1987
Categorization of Failures:
Active failures: Nonadherence to rules, standards, and procedures, lack of resource management, gross
lack of appropriate vigilance or discipline, and laziness.
Passive failures: Complacency, forgetfulness, boredom, low arousal level, coordination breakdown, dis-
traction,misunderstanding, communication problems, lack of assistance, and high workload.
Proficiency failure: Inappropriate handling of aircraft and its systems, misjudgment, and wrong decision
(lack of experience, training, and competence).
Incapacitation: Flightcrew member unable to perform his/her duty due to physical inability.
Becker-Lausen, E., Norman, S., and Pariante, G., 1987
Cockpit Crew Cause Factors, from Boeing Report, 1983
Judgment and technique
Variance from established procedures or regulations
Navigational error position or altitude
Improper system operation
Improper flight control operation
Failure to heed weather precautions
Failure to see and avoid midair collisions
Significant Accident Causes and Their Percentage of Presence in 93 Major Accidents from Sears,
1986
Pilot deviated from basic operational procedures (33%)
Inadequate cross check by second crew member (26%)
Design faults (13%)
Maintenance and inspection deficiencies (12%)
Complete absence of approach guidance (10%)
Captain did not respond to crew inputs (10%)
ATC failures or errors (9%)
Crews not conditioned for proper response during abnormal conditions (9%)
Other (9%)
Weather information insufficient or in error (8%)
Runway hazards (7%)
ATC/crew communication deficiencies (6%)
Pilot did not recognize the need for go-around (6%)
No GPWS installed (5%)
Weight or center of gravity in error (5%)
Deficiencies in accepted navigation procedures (4%)
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Pilot incapacitation (4%)
Inadequate piloting skills (4%)
Pilot used improper procedure during go-around (3%)
Crew errors during training flights (3%)
Pilot not trained to respond promptly to GPWS command (3%)
Pilot unable to execute safe landing or go-around when runway sighting is lost below MDA or DH (3%)
Operational procedures did not require use of available approach aids (3%)
Captain inexperienced on aircraft type (3%)
United Airlines Proposed Classification Scheme by Simmons, 1987
1. Receipt and dispatch incident: Ground workers hit by aircraft--about 4 to 8 fatalities per year hap-
pen between brake release and taxi or taxi and park
2. Runway incursion: Turning down the wrong runway; e.g., Tenerife
3. Other ground damage
4. Minimum terrain separation: Too close to ground on landing/approach; landing in water, etc.
5. Altitude deviation
6. Navigation deviation: Left or right of route; e.g., Korean Airlines
7. Midair collision: e.g., PSA, San Diego
8. Weather-related injury damage: Icing, wind shear; e.g., Air Florida
9. Unstabilized approach: Unsteady parameters on approach
10. Landing on wrong runway or wrong airport: e.g., Delta
11. Other procedural problems: behavioral problems, "Cowboy Flying," significant deviation from SOP
12. Runway excursions: Running off end or side of runway or landing too short
British Army Air Corps Proposed Classification Scheme by Feggetter, 1985
Database No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Aircraft details
Location of accident
Mechanical report
Biographical details of crew
Personal history of aircrew
Aircrew selection tests
Initial training records of aircrew
Continuation training records of crew
Details of previous week's activities
Details of previous night's activities
Details of activities on the accident day
Life stress
Life stress
Purpose of sortie
Supervisory details
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16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
Meteorological forecast
Meteorological conditions according to aircrew
Meteorological aftercast
Witness accounts of the accident
Pilot's account of the accident
Board of Inquiry's account of the accident
Injuries sustained
Aircrew's flying hours
Status of aircrew
Personality assessment
Aircrew's information processing system
Cause factors cognitive
Cause factors social
Cause factors situational
Human factors recommendations
Board on Inquiry's recommendations
Diehl, A.E., Hwoschinsky, P.V., Livack, G.S., and Lawton, R.S., 1987
Top 10 Causes for All Fixed Wing Aircraft Accidents-1982-NTSB
1. Pilot--failed to maintain directional control
2. Undetermined
3. Pilot--failed to maintain airspeed
4. Pilot--misjudged distance
5. Fuel exhaustion
6. Pilot--inadequate preflight preparation and/or planning
7. Pilot--selected unsuitable terrain
8. Pilot--inadequate aircraft preflight
9. Pilot--inadequate visual lookout
10. Pilot--misjudged airspeed
SAE, 1987
Managing Human Performance--Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Human Performance
Evaluation System
1. Behavioral aspects of sensing and mental processing
a. Failure to detect the error
b. Adverse environmental condition
c. Self-checking/verification inadequate
d. Not familiar/well practiced
e. Misinterpretation or misdiagnosis
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L Insufficient time to take action
g. Following a procedure incorrectly
h. Cognitive overload
i. Distractions or interruptions
j. Lapse of memory
k. Mental or physical fatigue or sickness
1. Overconfidence or complacency
m. Boring or repetitious task
2. Error evoked by sensing and mental process problems
a. Omission
b. Transposition
c. Quantitative
d. Miscommunication
e. Extraneous act
f. Untimely act
g. Out of sequence
3. Verbal and written communications
a. Failure to transmit information
b. Lack of or failure to use established communications procedures
c. Information transmitted but not received
d. Inaccurate messages
e. Time constraints
f. Noise
g. Glare
h. Inadequate of malfunctioning communications equipment
4. Defects in training content and methods
o
a. Insufficient practice and hands-on experience
b. Inadequate course content
c. Insufficient refresher training
d. No training provided
e. Use of informal or unstructured on-the-job training methods
f. Insufficient specific system or component training
g. Lack of training on the potential consequences or error and how to verify proper task completion
h. Inadequate training on procedures or references used to guide task performance
Work place environment
a. Distractions
b. Inadequate installed lighting
c. Uncomfortable temperature or humidity
d. Improperly fitted or selected protective clothing
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e. Selected type of respiratory equipment
f. Poorly identified components such as electrical terminations, electronic circuit boards, cabinets,
controls, and valves
Harwood, K., 1986
Error Categories
1. Flightcrew errors
2. ATC communication errors
3. Navigation facility errors
4. Aircraft problems
5. Airport facility problems
6. Weather and terrain obstruction problems
7. Problems with charts, published procedures, and publications
Bureau of Air Safety Investigation
Human Factors Guide for the Conduct of Aircraft Accident Investigation
1. Anthropometrics
a. Give height of the pilot in centimeters
b. Give weight of the pilot in kilograms
c. Describe the build of the pilot (select one)
(1) Slender
(2) Average
(3) Muscular
(4) Heavy
(5) Obese
d. Could any of the following dimensions have been a factor in the cause of this accident?
(1) Sitting height
(2) Functional reach
(3) Leg length
(4) Shoulder width
(5) Height
(6) Weight
(7) Build
2. Physical condition
a. Describe the physical condition of the pilot (select one)
(1) Sedentary
(2) Average
(3) Athletic
b. Could the physical condition of the pilot have been a factor in the cause of this accident?
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3. Physical strength
a. Describe the relative strength of the pilot for his/her age and body type (select one)
(1) Frail
(2) Below average
(3) Average
(4) Above average
(5) Strong
b. Could the physical strength of the pilot have been a factor in the cause of this accident?
4. Physical fatigue
a. Was the pilot physically fatigued at the time of the accident?
b. Physical fatigue was due to-- (select one)
(1) Prolonged physical activity
(2) Brief but extreme physical activity
(3) Both prolonged and extreme physical activity
5. Physical task saturation
a. Was the pilot physically task saturated at the time of the accident?
b. Physical task saturation was due to--(select one)
(1) The difficulty of the task exceeded the pilot's physical capacity to perform it
(2) The number of necessary tasks exceeded the pilot's physical capacity to perform all of them
(3) Both the number and difficulty of tasks exceeded the pilot's physical capacity to perform
them
6. Physical coordination
a. Describe the relative motor skill ability of the pilot (select one)
(1)
(a)
(3)
(4)
(5)
b.
Awkward
Below average coordination
Average coordination
Above average coordination
Agile
Could the physical coordination of the pilot have been a factor in the cause of this accident?
Physiological Variables
. Illusions--If applicable, indicate the type of illusion experienced in the course of the accident se-
quence of events
a. Vestibular
(1) Somatogyral illusion
(2) Somatogravic illusion
(3) The leans
(4) Coriolis illusion
(5) Elevator illusion
(6) Giant hand illusion
b. Visual
(1) Autokinesis
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(2) Horizontal misplacement
O) Circularvection
(4) Linearvection
(5) Landing illusions
(6) Chain-link-fence illusion
(7) Flicker vertigo
(8) Geometric perspective illusion
2. Other factors to be considered in dealing with illusions
a. Previous history
b. Previous training
c. Type of training
3. Vision, hearing, and smell--For the sense of vision, hearing and smell, characterize visual, auditory
and olfactory stimuli by one of the following, if applicable:
a. Subthreshold
b. Detectable but not interpretable
c. Detectable but distracting or incapacitating
d. Detectable but not processable along with other stimuli
e. Detectable
4. Vision
a. Visual acuity--Was the requirement to distinguish different parts and to resolve fine details in
the environment beyond normal limits of visual acuity?
b. Focus time--Was there sufficient time within the accident sequence of events for the pilot to
change focus distance from one significant visual cue to another?
c. Light adaptation--Was the pilot adapted to the light intensity level that was required to perform
the accident task?
d. Speed perception--Was the pilot able to judge accurately his rate of movement or that of another
significant object, by outside visual cues?
e. Depth perception--Was the pilot able to accurately judge his/her distance from another signifi-
cant object, including the ground, by outside visual cues?
f. Empty field myopia--Was the pilot's visual field essentially void of significant objects on which
to focus?
g. Waiver--Was the pilot on waiver for vision?
h. Did the pilot wear glasses? (select one)
(1) The pilot did not wear glasses
(2) The pilot wore glasses but not while flying
(3) The pilot wore glasses while flying
i. Did the pilot have a current prescription for his glasses?
j. Did the pilot wear contact lens?
k. Was the pilot wearing glasses or contact lenses at the time of the accident?
1. Should he/she have been?
5. Reaction time
a. Was there sufficient time for the pilot to detect and process significant environmental cues?
b. Was there sufficient time to make a appropriate decision?
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c. Was there sufficient time to take the appropriate action?
6. Nutritional factors
a. Did the food and water intake of the pilot, within 24 hr prior to the accident, meet recommended
nutritional standards?
b. How many hours were there between the pilot's last full meal or snack and the accident?
c. Had the pilot consumed food within 6 hr of the accident flight which is known to produce gas-
tro-intestinal discomfort?
d. Had the pilot experienced a recent (last 30 days) significant (> 5%) weight loss?
e. Was the pilot on a weight control or other prescribed diet at the time of the accident?
f. Indicate the type of weight control or other prescribed diet he/she was on (select one)
(1) None
(2) High carbohydrate, low protein, low fat (Pritikin)
(3) High protein, low carbohydrate, low fat (Scarsdale)
(4) High protein, high fat (Atkins, Stillman)
(5) Starvation
(6) General reduction in calorie intake
(7) Other
g. Based on the pilot's physical activity level, ambient conditions, and fluid intake in the past 24 hr,
indicate his or her probable level of dehydration (select one)
(1) Not dehydrated
(2) Mildly dehydrated
(3) Moderately dehydrated
(4) Severely dehydrated
7. Circadian rhythm
a. How many time zones did the pilot cross within the 48 hr preceding the accident?
b. Was the accident flight the first night flight after a series of day flights or no flying activity?
c. Was the accident flight the first day flight after a series of several night flights?
d. Was the accident flight preceded by several days of irregular waking or sleeping schedules?
8. Acute/transient fatigue
a. How many hours of uninterrupted sleep did the pilot get in his/her last regular sleep period prior
to the accident flight?
b. How many hours elapsed between his/her last regular sleep period and the time of accident oc-
currence?
c. Did the pilot have a nap between his/her last regular sleep period and the accident flight?
d. What was the duration of the nap between his/her last regular sleep period and the accident
flight?
e. At what level would you place the activity engaged in by the pilot between the last sleep period
and the accident flight (select one)
(1) Low physical or mental activity
(2) Moderate physical or mental activity--brief period
(3) Moderate physical or mental activity--prolonged period
(4) Extreme physical or mental activity
f. Of what duration was the pilot's usual regular sleep period in hours?
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g. Wastheregularsleep period of the pilot prior to the accident flight interrupted?
h. What was the scheduled duration of the accident flight?
j. How long (in minutes or hours) into the flight did the accident occur?
9. Cumulative/chronic fatigue
a. Indicate the number of duty hours performed by the pilot in the 7-day period prior to the accident
b. Indicate the total number of hours the pilot slept in the "/-day period prior to the accident
c. Indicate the number of days since the pilot's last leave period
d. What was the duration of the pilot's last leave period?
e. What was the primary activity during the pilot's last leave period? (select one)
(1) "Ii'aveling vacation (sightseeing, skiing, etc.)
(2) Visiting relatives
(3) Working at home
(4) Relaxing at home
(5) Other (specify)
f. Indicate the mode of travel while on leave, if recent-- (select one or more)
(1) Local travel only
(2) Commercial air standby
(3) Commercial air
(4) Private auto
(5) No travel
(6) Other (specify)
10. Skill fatigue
a. For this particular pilot, did the accident flight demand sustained concentration and a high de-
gree of skill (e.g., agricultural, mustering, single pilot IRE and low level operations)?
b. How long had the pilot been flying under these high mental workload conditions prior to the
accident?
c. Had the pilot been flying similar high workload operations in the 24 hr preceding the accident
flight? (give details)
11. Hypoxia
a. Did the pilot show any signs of hypoxia prior to or during the accident sequence of events?
b. Indicate the type of hypoxia experienced (select one)
(1) None
(2) Stagnant
(3) Hypemic
(4) Hypoxic
(5) Histoxie
12. Hyperventilation--Did the pilot show any signs of hyperventilation prior to or during the accident
sequence of events?
13. Acceleration
a. Did the pilot have a history of low tolerance to "G"?
b. How long had it been prior to the accident flight since the pilot was exposed to high "G"?
c. Indicate any acceleration effect the pilot experienced during the accident sequence of events
(1) Gray out
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(2) Blackout
(3) Loss of consciousness
(4) Restricted movement due to high "G"
(5) None
d. Did the pilot experiencemore than 3 "Gs" during the accident maneuver?
14.Decompressionsickness
a. Did the pilot experienceany type of decompressionsicknessduring the accident flight?
b. Indicate the type of decompressionsicknessexperiencedduring the accidentflight (selectone)
(1) Bends
(2) Chokes
(3) Neurological manifestations
d. At what altitude was the flight conducted?
e. What was the pressurization schedule in the cockpit?
f. How long did he/she remain at maximum altitude?
15. Trapped gas effects
a. Did the pilot experience any trapped gas effects in the course of the accident flight?
b. any surgery or dental care in recent past?
c. Indicate the type of trapped gas effects experienced (select one or more)
(1) Gastrointestinal gas expansion
(2) Ear block
(3) Sinus block
(4) Tooth pain
d. Had the pilot received formal training in trapped gas effects within the last 6 to 12 months?
16. Motion sickness
a. Did the pilot have a history of motion sickness?
b. Did the pilot experience motion sickness prior to or during the accident sequence of events?
c. Was the female pilot pregnant?
d. If the pilot is female, what stage was she in, in her menstrual cycle? (select one)
(1) Within one week prior
(2) During
(3) Other
Psychological Variables
° General adaptation
a. What was the emotional state of the pilot prior to the accident flight? (select one or more)
(1) Apprehensive
(2) Confused
(3) Panicked
(4) angry
(5) Frustrated
(6) Happy
(7) Sad
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o.
(8) Confdent
(9) Depressed
(10) Cynical
(11) Unremarkable
(12) Other
b. What was the emotional state of the pilot during and at the point ofthe accident flight? (select one
or more)
(1) Apprehensive
(2) Confused
(3) Panicked
(4) Angry
(5) Frustrated
(6) Happy
(7) Sad
(8) Confident
(9) Depressed
(10) Cynical
(11) Unremarkable
(12) Other
c. Was an intense emotional state at the time of the accident the result of-- (select one or more)
(1) An inflight emergency
(2) An inflight contingency
(3) Routine fl!ght demands
(4) Realization of impending disaster
(5) Nonflight related
(6) Other (no intense emotional state)
Information processing--Within the course of the accident sequence, indicate which of the following
occurred
a. Nonperception
b. Misperception
c. Delayed perception
d. Delayed decision
e. Poor decision
f. Delayed response
g. Poor response
h. Cognitive task saturation
i. Cognitive disorientation (loss of situational awareness)
j. None
k. Other (specify)
Attention level
a. Indicate the level of task involvement of the pilot in the action (or lack of action) that sustained
the accident sequence
(1) Focused attention
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C.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Moods
a. Did
b. Did
(2) Peripheral attention
(3) Automatic performing of procedures
(4) None
Was the task that the pilot was performing appropriate at the time of the accident?
Which of the following occurred in the accident sequence of events?
(1) General inattention
Selective inattention
Channelized attention
Fascination
External distraction
Internal distraction
Habit pattern interference
Habit pattern substitution
Boredom
Complacency
Inappropriate response
Expectation or inappropriate perceptual set
None
the pilot have a history of sudden or unexplained mood changes?
the pilot's mood change noticeably prior to the accident flight?
c. Did the date of the accident in terms of day and month correspond with the death of any person
considered to be a "significant other" to the pilot (e.g., parent, sibling, spouse, or child)
d. Did the pilot's mood change noticeably during the accident flight?
Personality--Describe the pilot's personality in terms of his or her typical behavior along the contin-
uum between the following 16 opposite traits. Assume that a "normal" or "stable" person will always
score a 4 on the 7 point scale.
This personality profile is part of an empirically proven personality test called the "16 personality factor
test." The words listed in uppercase letters are the main personality traits, while the words in lowercase
letters describe what the creator of the test means by using a particular trait.
RESERVED, detached,
critical, cool
1234567 OUTGOING, warmhearted,
easy-going, participating
LESS INTELLIGENT,
concrete thinking
1234567 MORE INTELLIGENT,
abstract thinking, bright
AFFECTED BY FEELINGS
emotionally less
stable, easily upset
1234567 EMOTIONALLY STABLE, faces
reality, calm, mature
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HUMBLE, mild,
conforming,
accommodating
SOBER, prudent,
serious, taciturn
EXPEDIENt, evades
rules feels few
obligations
SHY, restrained
diffident, timid
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
ASSERTIVE, independent,
aggressive, stubborn
HAPPY-GO-LUCKY, impulsive,
lively, enthusiastic
CONSCIENTIOUS, persevering
staid, rule-bound
VENTURESOME, socially bold,
uninhibited, spontaneous
TOUGH-MINDED,
self-reliant, realistic,
no-nonsense
1234567 TENDER-MINDED, dependent,
over-protected, sensitive
TRUSTING, adaptable
free of jealousy,
easy to get on with
PRACTICAL, careful,
proper, conventional
FORTHRIGHZ, natural
artless, sentimental
PLACID, self assured
confident, serene
CONSERVATIVE,
respecting
established ideas,
traditional
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
1234567
SUSPICIOUS,
self-opinionated, hard to fool
IMAGINATIVE, wrapped up
in inner urgencies, careless
of practical matters
SHREWD, calculating,
worldly, penetrating
APPREHENSIVE, worrying
depressive, troubled
EXPERIMENTING, critical,
liberal, analytical, free
thinking
GROUP-DEPENDENt,
a joiner and sound
follower
1234567 SELF-SUFFICIENT prefers
own decisions, resourceful
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UNDISCIPLINED, SELF
CONFLICT, follows
own urges, careless
of protocol
1234567 CONTROLLED, socially
precise, following self
image
RELAXED, tranquil,
torpid, unfrustrated
1234567 TENSE, frustrated, driven
overwrought
Psycho-Social Variables
1. Professional variables
a. Describe the primary duty of the pilot
b. Describe any additional duties of the pilot
c. Did the pilot participate in formulating company policies or procedures?
d. Was the pilot characteristically sensitive to supervisory or peer pressure?
e. With whom did the pilot most often socialize?
f. Was the pilot satisfied with his/her choice of career?
g. Was the pilot satisfied with his/her career progression?
h. Did the pilot violate rules, regulations, or established procedures in the course of the accident
sequence of events?
i. Indicate the reason for the violation of any rules, regulations, or established procedures (select
one)
(1) Did not violate rules
(2) Pilot did not know them
(3) Pilot perceived that they did not apply to his or her
(4) Pilot perceived he/she could best accomplish the flight by violating them
(5) Pilot did not agree with them
(6) Other (specify)
j. Indicate the pilot's reason for wanting to be a pilot (if known)
(1) Love of flying
(2) Family expectations
(3) Financial considerations
(4) Image
(5) Other (specify)
2. Familial factors:
a. Was the pilot having significant interpersonal problems with any of the following?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
b.
Spouse
Girl/boy friend
Children
Parents
Other
Were any of the foregoing suffering from a serious illness at the time of the accident?
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c. Indicate the degree to which personal problems usually affected the pilot's performance (select
one)
(1) None
(2) Mildly
(3) Moderately
(4) Significantly
d. Had any of the foregoing recently (last 12 months) died?
Motivation
a. Indicate the type of motivation of the pilot to achieve the objective or complete the flight during
the accident sequence of events (select one)
(1) Constructive motivation
(2) Misplaced motivation
(3) Excessive motivation
(4) Undermotivation
b. Indicate the source of the pilot's motivation to achieve the objective or complete the flight
(1) Prestige/power
(2) Peer respect/affection
(3) Safety/security
(4) Survival
(5) Other (specify)
Financial factors
a. Had the pilot's financial obligations recently changed significantly or were about to change
significantly (e.g., new home or new car)?
b. Had the pilot recently incurred a significant financial loss or gain?
c. Was the pilot involved in, or about to be involved in, any legal action that may have threatened
his/her security?
Habit patterns
a. Indicate the number of packs of cigarettes the pilot smoked daily
b. Indicate the number of drinks containing alcohol the pilot usually consumed daily
c. Indicate the number of drinks containing alcohol the pilot consumed within 24 hr prior to the
accident flight
d. Indicate any of the following pilot's habits that had changed in the past 30 days
(1) Drinking
(2) Smoking
(3) Eating
(4) Sleeping
(5) Socializing
(6) Recreational
(7) Work related
(8) None
(9) Other (specify)
What type of vehicle does the pilot drive?e°
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Pathological Variables
1. Drugs
a. Was the pilot using any drugs whose intended or unintended effects were present at the time of
the accident?
b. Indicate the purpose of the drugs (select one of the following)
(1) Treatment of disease or illness (colds, flu, etc.)
(2) Prevention of disease
(3) Weight management
(4) Mood alteration
(5) Birth control
(6) Sleep control
(7) Other
c. Indicate the source of the drugs (select one)
(1) Over the counter
(2) Prescribed
(3) Borrowed
(4) Other (specify)
2. Organic pathology
a. Was the pilot suffering from any disease or trauma at the time of the accident that may have
reduced his/her performance ability, either directly or by preoccupation with the symptoms?
b. Did the pilot have any recent (30 days) episodes of fainting?
c. Did the pilot's parents have a history of heart disease, stroke, or epilepsy?
3. Functional pathology
a. Did the pilot ever demonstrate suicidal tendencies?
b. Was the pilot suffering from subjective fatigue?
c. Was the pilot's behavior significantly different than usual prior to the accident flight?
d. Was the pilot chronically depressed prior to the accident flight?
Selection, Training, and Experience
1. Flight experience other than civil pilot (in hours)
a. None
b. Armed forces
c. Overseas
d. Other (specify)
2. Current phase of training in applicable
3. Indicate any problem areas in training
a. None
b. Aircraft control
c. Academics
d. Anxiety or depression
e. Airsickness
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L Disorientation
g. Other (specify)
4. Undergraduate pilot's training class standing?
5. Time since last altitude chamber training
a. Never accomplished
b. <6 months
c. 6 months - 1 year
d. 1 - 2 years
e. 3 - 4 years
f. > 4 years
6. Time since last spatial disorientation training received
a. Never accomplished
b. <6 months
c. 6 months - I year
d. 1 - 2 years
e. 3 - 4 years
f. > 4 years
7. Type of most recent spatial disorientation training received
a. Academic only
b. Barany chair
e. Vertigon
d. Motion simulator
e. Inflight demonstration
f. Other (specify)
8. Currency--indicate any of the following in which the pilot was not current at the time of the accident,
if relevant:
a. None
b. Landing (day or night)
c. Nonprecision approach
d. Precision approach
e. Sortie (day or night)
f. Low level
g. Other (specify)
9. Time since accident maneuver was last performed
a. Never performed prior to accident
b. < 1 week
c. 1 - 2 weeks
d. 3 - 4 weeks
e. 1 - 2 months
f. >2 months
10. Describe upgrade training if applicable
11. Time since pilot's last instrument checkride
a. < 1 month
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b. 1 - 6 months
c. 7 - 12 months
d. > 12 months
e. Accident sortie was an instrument checkride
12. Type of other aircraft the pilot was current in at time of accident
a. None
b. Single engine
c. Multiengine
d. Glider
e. Helicopter
f. Other
13. Indicate the pilot's total flying time
14. Indicate the pilot's total time in the accident aircraft
15. Indicate the number of hours flown in the last 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days
16. Indicate the number of hours the pilot flew in the last 48 hr as a crewmember
17. Indicate the number of flights flown in the last 30 days, 60 days, and 90 days
18. Had the pilot ever performed the accident maneuver before?
19. Had the pilot performed the accident maneuver before, but not within the last 30 days?
20. How much of the duty day had elapsed at the time of the accident?
21. How many flight hours had the pilot flown in that duty day?
22. What was the number of flights flown in the crew duty day of the accident?
23. Had the pilot ever had an accident before? If yes, what were the circumstances behind the acci-
dent(s)?
24. The pilot's last reportable incident (describe if relevant)
Command and Control
This category addresses the adequacy of both the supervision and guidance provided to and/or by the
pilot. Guidance may be in the form of briefings, regulations, operating instructions, etc., designed to
assist the pilot in performing the flight. Supervision includes all levels of command involved with the
authority and responsibility to make the decision relevant to the accident sequence of events and extends
all the way from company policy down to crew/flight coordination. Of particular importance is the ow-
ner/operator's responsibility to ensure that the pilot is qualified to undertake the proposed flight
(ANOa0.1.0.6.1.n.(d)).
1. The person with the authority to make the decision and/or responsible for making decisions relevant
to the accident flight was--
a. Timely and at the appropriate level
b. Made at too low a level to have sufficient information
c. Made at too high a level to have sufficient information
d. Not timely because of level at which decision was made
e. Other (specify)
2. Decision made relevant to the accident sequence of events were--
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a. Clearly defined and accessible
b. Not clearly defined
c. Not readily accessible
d. Other (specify)
3. Supervision during the accident flight by other than the flightcrew was--
a. Not required
b. Required to coordinate with other agencies
c. Required for continuing guidance
d. Required due to crew inexperience
e. Other (specify)
4. Supervision of the accident flight by other than the flight crew was--
a. Adequately provided
b. Not adequately provided
c. Excessively provided
d. Other (specify)
5. Technical orders, checklist(s), regulations, operating instructions, instrument departure and ap-
proach plate(s), area charts/maps, etc., were--
a. Adequate and available
b. Incomplete (not sufficient and/or timely) or noncurrent
c. Misleading or confusing
d. Not adequately available
e. Other (specify)
6. Cockpit duties were--
a. Clearly defined and integrated
b. Not clearly defined
c. Not effectively integrated among crewmembers (weighted too heavily on one or more members)
d. Other (specify)
7. Crewmember effectiveness in adhering to assigned duties
a. It was clear who was in command of the aircraft
b. It was not clear who was in command of aircraft
c. All crewmembers performed their assigned duties
d. Individual duties were abandoned to assist other crewmember
e. Other (specify)
8. Pilot violations; regulations were--
a. Not violated by the pilot
b. Violated, but unintentionally
c. Violated intentionally
d. Violated with the knowledge and consent of supervisors
e. Violated without the knowledge and consent of supervisors
f. Violated with knowledge and consent of peers
g. Violated without knowledge and consent of peers
h. Other (specify)
9. Supervisor violations; regulations were--
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a. Not violated by the supervisor
b. Violated, but unintentionally
c. Violated intentionally
d. Violated with the knowledge and consent of pilot(s)
e. Violated without the knowledge and consent of pilot(s)
f. Other (specify)
10. Violation precedents; regulations were--
a. Never previously violated in company
b. Seldom violated in company
c. Sometimes violated in company
d. Often violated and it was general knowledge in company
e. Other (specify)
11. Apparent reason for violation was--
a. Lack of knowledge of applicable rule(s)
b. Lack of time to follow rule(s)
c. Perception that rule(s) did not apply to this situation
d. Perception that rule(s) did not apply to the pilot
e. Mission could not be completed if rule(s) strictly adhered to
f. Other (specify)
12. Operational rules, training rules, and maintenance rules
a. No operational, training, or maintenance rules were waived
b. Operational, training, or maintenance rules were waived
c. Other (specify)
13. Medical standards (including crew rest, medication, etc.)
a. No medical standards were waived
b. Medical standards were waived
c. Other (specify)
14. Supervisor's role in flight planning
a. Considered all significant factors
b. Some significant factors not considered
c. Did not participate in flight planning
d. Other (specify)
15. Pilot's role in flight planning
a. Considered all significant factors
b. Omitted some significant factors
c. Did not formally plan flight
d. Other
16. Flight briefing was--
a. Thoroughly briefed to all participants
b. Not briefed to supervisors
c. Not briefed to all participating crewmembers
d. Different from flight flown
e. Other (specify)
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17. Controlling agency--indicate if any of the following were in a position to provide supervision, guid-
ance, and/or support to the pilot during the accident sequence of events
a. Tower
b. Ground control
c. Air route traffic control center
d. Departure/approach control
e. Runway supervisory officer
f. Owner/operator
g. Other member of the flight
h. Other aircraft
j. Other (specify)
Operational Requirements
1. Flight type--describe
2. Flight urgency--relative importance, real or perceived, placed on flight by the pilot
a. Routine
b. Special
3. Maneuver type--indicate the basic flight maneuver that was being performed at the time of the acci-
dent
a. Taxi
b. Takeoff
c. Climbout
d. Cruise
e. Penetration and descent
f. Approach
g. Go around or missed approach
h. Landing
j. Other (specify)
4. Tactics employed were--
a. Authorized or unauthorized
b. Familiar or unfamiliar
c. Appropriate or inappropriate
d. Other (specify)
5. Time constraints--factors that might have resulted in the pilot feeling rushed
a. None
b. Delay in takeoff
c. Anticipated bad weather
d. Flight demands or constraints
e. Return home from absence or cross country, etc.
f. VIP flight
g. Press-on-itis
h. Other (specify)
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6. Operating location
a. Deployed
b. Home base
c. Familiar area (not home base)
d. Unfamiliar area
e. Other (specify)
7. Availability of resources--constraints imposed by short supply, nonavailability, or acquisition
delays
a. None
b. Aircraft
c. Fuel, oil, or water
d. Parts
e. Personnel
f. Other (specify)
Support Agencies
Indicate the role of each of the following in contributing to or sustaining the accident sequence of events.
1. Other crewmembers: personnel; airfield maintenance personnel, weather services, air route traffic
controller, approach and departure controller, medical support personnel, and supply personnel
a. Did not enter into accident sequence of events
b. Caused high workload
c. Did not perform assigned or delegated duties
d. Provided inadequate or misleading information
e. Created high accident potential
f. Caused delays
g. Other (specify)
. Aircraft designers, maneuver designers, life support equipment designers, and personal equipment
designers
a. Did not contribute to accident sequence of events
b. Caused high workload
c. Overlooked human engineering considerations
d. Created high accident potential
e. Other (specify)
. Aircraft manufacturer,
manufacturers
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
life support equipment manufacturers, and personal equipment
Did not contribute to accident sequence of events
Caused high workload
Material defect or deficiencies not detected
Created high accident potential
Other (specify)
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Morale Considerations
Factors within the operational environment or organizational climate of the company that might influ-
ence the pilot's motivation or behavior.
1. Pilot was in the past 1-year passed over for promotion
2. Pilot designated for, considered for, or about to be considered for--
a. None
b. Promotion
c. Upgrade
d. Conversion
e. Other (specify)
3. Was the pilot at the duty location and/or base of his choice?
4. How many years until the pilot was eligible for retirement?
5. Duty satisfaction --based on peer perception or on self-report, how would the pilot rate the following
aspects of his duties on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 is a low/unfavorable rating and 5 a high/favorable rating).
Challenge 1 2 3 4 5
Recognition 1 2 3 4 5
Fulfillment 1 2 3 4 5
Additional duties 1 2 3 4 5
Absences from home 1 2 3 4 5
Standby 1 2 3 4 5
Time off 1 2 3 4 5
Pay compared to rest of industry 1 2 3 4 5
Advancement opportunity 1 2 3 4 5
Flying frequency 1 2 3 4 5
Job satisfaction 1 2 3 4 5
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Doc 9156-AN/900 1987
Personnel Information
Pilot at controls
a. Pilot in command
b. Copilot
c. Student
d. Supervisory pilot
e. None
f. Both pilots
g. Instructor
y. Other
z. Unknown
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Pilot in command and copilot
Age
In years
z. Unknown
License
Airplane
A - Student pilot
B - Private pilot
C - Commercial pilot
5 - Senior commercial pilot
D - Airline transport pilot
Helicopter
V - Private pilot
W - Commercial pilot
X - Airline transport pilot
T - Glider pilot
U - Free balloon pilot
Y - Other
I - None (not issued or expired)
Z - Unknown
Class ratings (select up to two items)
Airplane
A - Single-engine, land
B - Multiengine, land
C - Single-engine, sea
D - Multiengine, sea
Helicopter
1 - Single-rotor
2 - Multirotor
3 - Gyroplane
9 - Other, helicopter
Y - Other, airplane
X - None
Type rating
Y - Possessed required rating
X - Did not possess required rating
W - Rating not required
Z - Unknown
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Instructorrating
Y - Yes
X - No
Z - Unknown
Instrument rating
A - Airplane - Yes
B - Airplane - No
C - Helicopter - Yes
D - Helicopter - No
E - Airplane/helicopter - Yes
F - Airplane/helicopter - No
Z - Unknown
Last check--instrument rating (weeks)
Enter direct number of weeks since the last check flight followed by "S" for simulation or "F" for flight
cheek.
z - Unknown
Last check--aircraft type
Enter direct number of weeks since the last check for the aircraft type in the same capacity as that held
during the occurrence.
z - unknown
Total flight experience
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Flight experience in type
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Number of landings on type--last 90 days
Enter direct number of landings
z - unknown
Total time instrument flight actual
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Total time instrument flight simulated
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
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Total time instrument flight actual--last 90 days
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Total time night flight
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Flight time last 24 hr
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Flight time last 30 days
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Flight time last 90 days
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Duty period prior to occurrence
(Includes duty time before takeoff plus duration of flight before occurrence)
Enter direct time in hours
z - unknown
Rest period before duty
Enter direct time in hours before subject flight
z - unknown
Medical requirements
1 - Valid medical requirement with no waivers or limitations
2 - Valid medical requirement with waivers or limitations
3 - Nonvalid medical requirement
z - unknown
Other flightcrew
Crew identifier
A - Flight engineer/systems operator
B - Flight navigator
C - Flight radio operator
S - Student pilot/pilot under instruction
D - Supervisory pilot
E - Supervisory flight engineer
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F - Supervisory flight navigator
O - Supervisory flight radio operator
H - Not applicable
(See the following data fields and codes for any three of the other flightcrew as listed above)
Age
Enter direct in years
z - unknown
Validity of license
A - Valid
B - Not valid
z- Unknown
Ratings
Y - Yes
X-No
Z - Unknown
Total flight experience
Enter direct in hours
Flight experience on type
Enter direct in hours
Medical requirements
1 - Valid medical requirement with no waivers or limitations
2 - Valid medical requirement with waiver or limitations
3 - Nonvalid medical requirement
z- Unknown
Air traffic controller
(Associated with the flight at the time of the occurrence)
Age
Enter direct in years
z - unknown
License or qualifications
A - Licensed
B - State qualified
C - Neither licensed dr qualified
D - No license required by state
Z - Unknown
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Rating
A - Aerodrome control--without radar rating
B - Aerodrome control--with radar rating
C - Approach control--without radar rating
D - Approach control--with radar rating
E - Area control--without radar rating
F - Area control--with radar rating
G - Radar--PAR
H - Radar--SRE (surveillance)
I - No rating required by state
Z - Unknown
Experience
(In position occupied at the time of occurrence)
A - 0-1 month
B - 1-3 months
C - 3-6"months
D - 6-12 months
E - 12-24 months
F - 24-36 months
G - Over 36 months
Z - Unknown
Duty time
(Immediately prior to occurrence)
Enter direct in hours to nearest hour
Z - Unknown
Rest time before duty
Enter direct in hours to nearest hour up to 99 hr
P - Over 99 hr (99 plus)
Z - Unknown
Communications
Two-way communication
A - Established and satisfactory
B - Established but not satisfactory
C - Radio communication failure recognized by SSR Code 7600
X - Not established
Z - Unknown
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Groundstation
(Record last unit in communication with the aircraft)
A - Aerodrome control tower
B - Approach and departure control office
C - Area control center
D - Flight information center
E - Flight information service
F - Operator ground station
("Company frequency" or equivalent)
G - Flying Club
Y - Other
Z -Unknown
Record of R/T communication
(Select up to two items)
A - Available and functioning
B - Available and not functioning
C - Available and partially functioning
D - Transcripts made
E - Transcripts partially made
F - Transcripts not made
G - Not available
H - Not existing
Z -Unknown
Record of ATS intercommunication available
A - Available
B - Partially available
C - Not available
Z - Unknown
Medical and pathological information
General information
Autopsy performed
A - All occupants
K - Some of the occupants
B - Flightcrew only
C - Passengers only
D - None performed
Z -Unknown
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Pilot In Command/Copilot/Flight Engineer/Systems Operator
Medical Information Available Pilot In
Command
Y - Yes
X - No
Z - Unknown
Copilot Fit Engr/
Sys Opr
Incapacitation in flight
Y - Yes
X - No
Z - Unknown
Psychological investigation performed
Y - Yes
X - No
Z - unknown
Exposure to chemicals
(Toxic effect)
A - Not affected
B - Affected in flight
C - Affected on ground prior to flight
D - Not exposed
Z -Unknown
Result of toxicology investigation
(Select up to four items)
A - 10% or less
B - Over 10%
J - No test made
E - Drug test positive
F - Drug test negative
L - No drug test made
G - Alcohol test positive
H - Alcohol test negative
M- No alcohol test made
C - Lactic acid 200% or less
D - Lactic acid over 200%
K - No lactic acid test made
N - Toxicological test results considered unreliable
I - Toxicological samples inadequate for testing
Z - Unknown
Carbon Monoxide
88
Alcohol content
(Enterblood or urinecode)
A -I -50 mg per 100 ml
B - 51- 120 mg per 100 ml
C - 121- 250 mg per 100 ml
D - 251- 300 mg per 100 ml
E - Over 300 mg per 100 ml
H - 1 - 70 Mg per 100 ml
I - 71 - 160 mg per 100 ml
J - 161- 350 mg per 100 ml
K - Over 350 mg per 100 ml
Air traffic controller
Medical information available
Y - Yes
X - No
Z - Unknown
Personnel
Pilot in command
Copilot
Dual student
Supervisory pilot
Blood
Urine
Pilot--Operational Decisions
Attempted operation with known deficiencies in equipmenl_
Refers to instances where deficiencies in equipment are known by the pilot prior to the flight.
Attempted operation beyond experience/ability level
Refers to cases in which the pilot is not qualified in the type of aircraft or operation involved or at-
tempted flight under conditions beyond his experience and ability.
Encountered unforeseen circumstances beyond his capability
Refers to instances in which the pilot is faced with several unforeseen or unexpected conditions or cir-
cumstances that exceed his capability.
Continued flight into known area of severe turbulerl_,e,
Refers to those instances in which the pilot had prior knowledge of the possibility of severe turbulence or
where the pilot deliberately continued into increasingly turbulent conditions.
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Delayed action in aborting takeoff
Refers to slow reaction or faulty judgment by the pilot in not aborting in sufficient time when the circum-
stances indicated the advisability of such action.
Delayed in initiating missed approach or overshoot
Refers to slow reaction or faulty judgment by the pilot in delaying the initiation of a go-around, under
circumstances that indicated the advisability of such action.
Retracted gear prematurely
Used in those instances during takeoff where the aircraft weight is still on the gear or the circumstances
are such that the aircraft settles back to the surface during or after retraction.
Improper inflight decisions or olanning
The failure to use good judgment or follow good operating procedures while in flight. Examples are fail-
ure to refuel enroute when reasonable prudence would require it, (or failure to resolve problems arising
in flight), miscalculated fuel consumption, and poorly planned approach.
Exercised poor judgment
Refers to recklessness, irresponsibility, deliberate, or unnecessarily hazardous operations. This code is
intended to be used primarily in those cases for which there is no other descriptive factor (in the pilot
area) to reflect the act of recklessness.
Selected unsuitable area for takeoff, landing, or taxiine
Includes all cases where a pilot selected an unsuitable area for taxi, takeoff, or landing. Excludes cases
where the pilot exercises normal and reasonable precautions, but encounters hidden hazards or condi-
tions not easily determined. Excludes forced landing unless pilot definitely had the choice of a more
suitable area.
Selected wrong runway relative to existing wind
Factor of pilot judgment
Failed to abort takeoff
Factor of pilot judgment
Failed to initiate go-around/missed approach/overshoot
Factor of pilot judgment
Initiated flight in adverse weather conditions
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Pilot--Procedures, Regulations, and Instructions
Attempted operation beyond exp_erience or ability level
Refers to cases in which the pilot is not qualified in the type of aircraft or operation involved or at-
tempted flight under conditions beyond his experience ability.
Continued VFR flight into adverse weather conditions
Includes those instances where VFR flight was attempted or continued in adverse weather conditions. If
loss of control results, code 66, "spatial disorientation," will also be coded as a factor.
Diverted attention from operation of airerafI
Refers to the failure of the pilot to give the degree of attention required, under the circumstances, to the
operation of the aircraft.
Exceeded desimaed stress limits of aircraft
Refers to instances of overstressing of the airframe, whether of a willful nature or due to lack of ability
and experience.
Failed to follow approved procedures, directives, instructions, eta,
Disregard of standard procedures, written or verbal instructions, directives, operations manuals, etc.,
when such are known by, or available to, the pilot.
Improper IFR operation
Includes improper operation of the aircraft and its equipment and/or failure to use or incorrectly use
standard procedures and techniques while on an instrument flight; includes VFR landing after "last
light."
Inadequate preflight preparation and/or planning
Refers to ground preparation for flight. The preflight check of the aircraft and its equipment, the plan-
ning of the flight, weather briefing, fuel reserve, etc., are examples of action which could be improperly
performed or omitted.
Inadequate supervision of flighl
Refers to cases where a pilot in command fails to exercise the degree of supervision required by the
circumstances. Includes failure of an instructor to take over controls in time to prevent an accident.
Mismanagement of fuel
Refers to the improper operation of, or lack of attention to, fuel supply. Examples are the failure to turn
the proper tank on or to switch to the proper tank; includes miscalculation of fuel consumption.
Operated carelessly (unintentional or forgot)
Refers to acts of neglect, forgetfulness, or carelessness, not of a deliberate or intentional nature.
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Improper starting procedures
Used where engine starting procedures either in flight or on the ground, results in failure to start or an
unwanted condition, e.g., an engine overspeed or fire.
Started engine without proper assistance and/or equipment
Refers to cases where an engine is started by pulling the propeller through without a qualified person
seated in the cockpit and/or without proper equipment such as wheel chocks.
Taxied or parked without proper assistance
Used in cases where normal prudence would dictate the use of outside assistance such as wing walkers,
signalers, etc., if available, e.g., taxiing in confined or dark unlighted areas or when wind or other weather
conditions are such that the use of outside assistance is indicated.
Failed to check position and locking of the landing gear
Failure of pilot to check gear position and locking after actuating gear controls.
Failed to relinquish control
Generally refers to failure of student, copilot, etc., to relinquish control to the pilot in command in time
for effective corrective action to be taken.
Control interference (includes all controls_
Interference with the controls by a pilot other than the pilot actually flying the aircraft. (Flight control
interference by a passenger is coded 68 K4 "passenger," code 88 77 "interference with flight controls."
Interference with flight controls by inanimate objects is coded 88 77 with object identified in remarks.)
Left aircraft unattended, engine running
Factor of pilot judgment.
Pilot--Aircraft Handling
Failed to obtain or maintain flying speed
Failure of the pilot to obtain and/or maintain sufficient airspeed for the conditions involved.
Maintained excessive airspeed
Refers to cases where a pilot maintains excessive airspeed for the operation and conditions involved.
Failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm
Loss of rotor rpm due to pilot action or inaction.
Improper operation of powerplant controls
Improper operation of the powerplant from a mechanical standpoint, through improper use of throttles,
supercharger cowl flaps, carburetor heat, mixture controls, propeller controls, etc., under the conditions
and circumstances involved.
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Improper operation of brakes and/or flight controls on ground
Refers to eases involving poor or inadequate pilot "technique" in the operation of the brakes and/or
flight controls on the ground. Includes landing roll or takeoff run and taxi.
Improper operation of primary, flight controls
Refers to pilot "technique" in the operation of flight controls in the air; includes trim control and ex-
cludes flaps and spoilers.
Allowing an aircraft to become airborne without sufficient speed for proper climb or control.
Approached high and fast
Refers to cases where a pilot maintains an excessive angle of approach, height, or airspeed during a
landing approach.
Improper landing flare
Leveling off too high on a landing or. failure to break glide properly and flying into the ground.
Improper comt_ensation for wind conditions
Failure to make proper drift corrections or allowances for the wind conditions prevailing when taxiing,
taking off, or landing.
Improper recovery_ from bounced landing
Factor of pilot technique.
Failed to maintain directional control
A general code used when the cause of the loss of control is not clear. Generally used in conjunction with
loss of control during takeoff or landing.
Misused or failed to use flaps (or other lift device_)
Factor of pilot judgment, training, lack of familiarly with the aircraft, or carelessness.
Misused or failed to use lift dump devices (spoilers. etc,)
Pilot--Medical
Physical imt_airrnent
Spatial disorientation (vertigo)
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Psychological condition
Used when the pilot's actions or words indicate a mentally disturbed state, e.g., tells the tower he is going
to commit suicide by crashing the aircraft.
Pilot--Miscellaneous
Became lost or disoriented
Refers to improper or faulty navigation resulting in becoming lost under VFR conditions.
Failed to see or avoid other aircraft
Used where there is complete failure to see and avoid another aircraft and also where the pilot sees the
other aircraft too late to avoid it.
Failed to see or avoid objects or obstructions
Used where there is complete failure to see and avoid objects or obstructions other than aircraft and also
where the pilot sees the object or obstructions too late to avoid it.
Spontaneous-improper action
A reflex type action that may or may not have a logical explanation.
Lack of familiarity, with aircraft
Refers to lack of experience with the aircraft involved for the type of operation attempted. It is not used
interchangeably with "attempted operation beyond experience or ability level" as it is more specific and
could apply to a pilot of broad general experience.
Inadequate training of student (instructor in airplane)
Factor of training inadequacy.
Misunderstanding of orders or instructions (including ATC clearances)
Refers to verbal orders or instructions, e.g., clearances, instructor's orders or instructions to student, etc.
Navigation Error
Refers to displacement from intended track in enroute flight.
Encountered unforeseen circumstances beyond his capability
Refers to instances in which the pilot is faced with several unforeseen or unexpected conditions or cir-
cumstances that exceed his capability.
Other
Other Personnel
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Other pilot same aircraft
Failure to comply with company procedures
Improper use/operation of equipment
Gave incorrect information to other crewmembers
Failure to follow instructions
Other
Flight Engineer/Systems Operator
Improper use of equipment/operation of equipment
Inadequate preflight preparation
Failure to follow instructions
Other
Other flight personnel
Flight attendant
Flight instructor (on ground)
Inadequate supervision of flight
Inadequate training of student
Other
Flight operations officer (flight dispatcher)
Dispatched aircraft improperly equipped for flight
Failed to comply with proper dispatching procedures
Disregard of adverse weather conditions
Cleared flight with inadequate facilities at destination
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Dispatchedflight overweight or with improper center of gravity
Failed to keep flight properly advised (flight following)
Other
Maintenance. Servicing. and Inspection Personnel
Improper maintenance (maintenance personnel)
Improper maintenance (owner personnel)
Improperly serviced aircraft (ground crew)
Improperly serviced aircraft (owner pilot)
Inadequate inspection of aircraft (maintenance personnel)
Inadequate inspection of aircraft (owner-pilot personnel)
Inadequate maintenance and inspection
Other (including failure to observe license limitations, etc.)
Unknown
Operational Supervisory. Personnel
(Company, owner, operator)
Inadequate flight training--procedures
Inadequate ground training--procedures
Inadequate supervision of flightcrew
Inadequate supervision/training of ramp crews (signalmen, etc.)
Failure to provide adequate directives, manuals, and equipment
Deficiency, company maintained equipment, services, regulation manuals, etc.
Other
Meteorological Personnel
Incorrect weather forecast
Inadequate or incorrect weather observation or meteorological watch
Incomplete weather report
Inadequately maintained facilities
Training deficiency
Inadequate or incorrect weather briefing
Inadequate or incorrect coordination
Other
Air Traffic Services Personnel
Failure or delay in providing alerting service
Failure to advise of hazardous weather condition
Failure to advise of hazardous airport condition
Failure to advise of other traffic
Cleared aircraft to wrong runway for existing conditions
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Issued improper or conflicting instructions
Inadequate spacing of aircraft
Failure to properly identify aircraft on radar
Other
Airport Supervisory_ Personnel
(Airport management)
Improper maintenance--airport facilities (includes "marking"--amplify in remarks)
Failure to notify of hazardous condition and/or failure to mark obstruction
Improper or inadequate snow removal
Improper operation of facilities
Improper inspection and/or reporting of facilities
Other
Air Traffic Services Maintenance Personnel
Inadequately maintained airways facilities
Inadequately maintained approach facilities
Failure to notify hazardous condition
Improper removal of facilities from service
Other
Production --Design
Substandard quality control
Incorrect factory installation
Poor or inadequate design
Other
Miscellaneous Personrl¢]
Pilot of other aircraft
Ground signalman
Spectator
Ground crewman
Passenger
Driver of vehicle
Operational Control/SAR
Flight Service
Airport Safety Service
Other (including military and fuel servicing personnel)
Additional Facts. Conditions. and Cireumstance,s
ACTION--lack of (see also psychological condition)
ADI (Antidetonant injection) fluid improper
ADJUSTMENT/alignment improper (see also CLEARANCE)
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C _-
AIRPORT--landed or approached wrong airport or runway
ALCOHOLIC impairment of efficiency and judgment
ALTIMETER setting incorrect (cockpit)
APPROACH poorly planned
BLIND CANYON--flew into
BOGGED--aircraft became bogged (mired)
' BRrITLE fracture (due to improper forging, heat treatment, etc.)
CARBON MONOXIDE poisoning
CARBURETOR heat equipment--improper operation or failed
to use (see also ICE carburetor or ICE induction)
CARGO shifted (see also SECURED--improperly)
CENTER OF GRAVITY out of limits (see LOADED improperly)
CHECKLIST--failed to use
CONSTRUCTION AREA--landed in
CORRECTING LENSES required but not used
COWL FLAPS improperly positioned
CREW COORDINATION inadequate
CROSSED (e.g., threaded parts, control cables, and electrical connections)
DANGEROUS CARGO (radioactive/hazardous materials, acids, etc.)
DISREGARD of good operating practice
DOWNWIND landing or takeoff
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES improperly used/not used
ENGINE--shut down wrong
ENGINE--leaded up (leaded plugs)
EVASIVE maneuver
FATIGUE, pilot
FLAP/SLAT, etc.--premature retraction of
FLUID level low (see also LEAK)
FUEL consumption miscalculated
FUEL contamination (exclusive of water, see WATER in fuel)
FUEL dumped (intentional)
FUEL exhaustion (ran out of fuel) (see also FUEL starvation)
FUEL grade improper
FUEL selector--positioned between tanks
FUEL spill
FUEL starvation (see also FUEL exhaustion)
FUEL supply--inattentive to
GLASSES see CORRECTING LENSES
GROUND/WATER loop swerve intentional
GUST LOCKS (controls) engaged
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS see DANGEROUS CARGO
HEART ATtACK--pilot suffered
HOT START
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HYPERVENTILATION
HYPOXIA/ANOXIA
IMBALANCE lateral
IMPROPER loading/securing/carriage of passengers/cargo
(see also CARGO shifter and LOADED improperly)
INATTENTION (to be used for "Other Personnel")
INSTALLED improperly (i.e., in a manner not in accordance
with specific or accepted practice)
(see also ADJUSTMENT and/or ALIGNMENT)
INSTRUCTIONS misinterpreted (other than copilot)
INSTRUMENTS--misread or failed to read
LANDING on wrong runway or airport
LEADED plugs (ENGINE leaded up)
LIGHTS--failed to use landing lights
LOAD jettisoned
LOAD not jettisoned
LOADED improperly (in respect of aircraft weight or center of gravity)
LOOSE part of fitting (see also UNDERTORQUED)
LOW flying--unwarranted
LUBRICATION--lack of (not system but specific part - see also OIL)
MODIFICATION unapproved (see also PART - wrong)
OIL contamination
OIL exhaustion--engine lubrication system (see also OIL starvation, LEAK)
OIL exhaustion--propeller system, (see also LEAK)
OIL grade--improper--lubrication system
OIL grade--improper--propeller system
OIL starvation (see also OIL exhaustion, LEAK, lubrication lack of)
OPTICAL ILLUSION--pilot experienced an
OVERLOADED--aircraft weight (see LOADED improperly)
OXYGEN SYSTEM--improper use of or failed to use
PART bogus (not genuine; of unauthorized manufacture
PART wrong
PILOT/CREW made equipment inoperative (e.g., switched off equipment, system, etc.)
PROCEDURES see EMERGENCY
RAN OFF RUNWAY END
RUNWAY--failed to use all available
RUNWAY/intended landing area--not aligned with
RUNWAY--landed on foamed runway
SEAT belt not fastened
SEAT belt sign off
SEAT belt sign on and not obeyed
SECURED improperly (see also CARGO shifted)
SLING/LOAD snagged/caught (rotorcraft)
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SPECTACLES see CORRECTING LENSES
START hot
THRUST reversal--asymmetrical or incomplete
TOUCH-AND-GO LANDING
TRIM setting incorrect
UNQUALIFIED person operated aircraft
WEIGHT--aircraft (see LOADED improperly)
WHEELS UP - intentional
WORK LOAD EXCESSIVE
WRONG airport/runway--landed on (see AIRPORT)
PERSONNEL--other
Rasmussen, J., 1982
Multifacet Taxonomy for Description and Analysis of Events Involving Human Malfunction
. Causes of human malfunction
a. External events (distraction, etc.)
b. Excessive task demand (force, time, knowledge, etc.)
c. Operator incapacitated (sickness, etc.)
d. Intrinsic human variability
. Performance shaping factors
a. Subjective goals and intentions
b. Mental load and resources
c. Effective factors
° Situation factors
a. Task characteristics
b. Physical environment
c. Work time characteristics
. Mechanisms of human malfunction
a. Discrimination
(1) Stereotype fixation
(2) Familiar shortcut
(3) Stereotype takeover
(4) Familiar pattern not recognized
b. Input information processing
(1) Information not received
(2) Misinterpretation
(3) Assumption
c. Recall
I00
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(1) Forget isolated act
(2) Mistake alternative
(3) Other slip of memory
Inference
(1) Condition or side effect
(2) Not considered
Physical coordination
(1) Motor variability
(2) Spatial misorientation
Internal human malfunction
a. Detection
b. Identification
e. Decision
(1) Select goal
(2) Select target
(3) Select task
d. Action
(1) Procedure
"(2) Execution
(3) Communication
6. Personnel task
.
a. Equipment design
b. Procedure design
c. Fabrication
d. Installation
e. Inspection
f. Operation
g. Test and calibration
h. Maintenance and repair
i. Logistics
j. Administration
k. Management
External mode of malfunction
a. Specified task not performed
(1) Omission of set
(2) Inaccurate performance
(3) Wrong timing
b. Commission of erroneous act
c. Commission of extraneous act
d. Sneak-path, accidental timing of several events, or faults
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APPENDIX 3
GLOSSARYOF HUMANERRORTERMS
(termsnot includedin theSAEG-10HumanFactorsGlossary)
AccelerationCardiovascularEffects/ACE-(AFP)Reductionin performancecapabilitydueto grayout
(loss of peripheral vision due to positive "G"), blackout (loss of all vision due to positive "G"), or loss of
consciousness due to positive "G." Analogous negative "G" effects also exist.
ACE-Lateral - (AFP) Gy forces. This is associated with canard flight control surfaces, which has
caused up to 2.5 Gy (without cardiovascular difficulty).
ACE-Negative - (AFP) When red out occurs, it is associated with substantial negative (2.5 to 3)
"G" for 3 to 5 sec.
ACE-Rapid Onset - (AFP) Usually associated with loss of consciousness as a result of transition
from normal to high ( > 7) "G" in a period less than 3 sec and a warning "grayout" is thus not seen.
Acceleration Orientation Effects - (AFP) Influence on performance capability due to the effects of ac-
celeration on the proprioceptive tactile or vestibular apparatus. See Ambient Orientation.
(BASI) An impaired condition caused by "G" forces on the body. This includes loss of consciousness,
reduced visual perception, and all other physical and physiological reactions to "G" loads.
Acceleration Tolerance: (AFP) The ability of an individual to preserve performance capability in the
face of the various effects of acceleration. See Physical Condition.
Accident: (BASI) ANR defines an accident as an occurrence associated with the operation of the aircraft
that takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such
time as all persons have disembarked in which (1) any person suffers death or serious injury as a result of
being in or on the aircraft or by direct contact with the aircraft or anything attached to the aircraft,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, are self-inflicted, or inflicted by other persons or when
the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the area normally available to the passengers and crew;
(2) the aircraft incurs damage or structural failure that adversely affects the structure strength, perform-
ance, or flight characteristic of the aircraft and would normally require major repair or replacement of
the affected component; or (3) the aircraft is missing or inaccessible.
(Annex 13) - An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time
any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disem-
barked, in which (1) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of being in the aircraft or direct
contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts that have become detached from the aircraft or
direct exposure to jet blast, except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted, or inflicted by
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otherpersonsor whentheinjuriesareto stowawayshidingoutsidethe areas normally available to the
passengers and crew; (2) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure that adversely affects the
structure strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft and would normally require ma-
jor repair or replacement of the affected component, except for engine failure or damage, when the dam-
age is limited to the engine, its cowlings, or accessories or for damage limited to propellers, wingtips,
antennas, tires, brakes fairings, small dents, or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or (3) the aircraft is
missing or is completely inaccessible.
Note 1: For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within 30 days of the date of the
accident, is classified as a fatal injury by ICAO.
Note 2: An aircraft is considered to be missing when the official search has been terminated and the
wreckage has not been located.
(Barnhart, et al., 1975) - An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such
persons have disembarked, in which any person suffers death or serious injury as a result of being in or
on the aircraft or by direct contact with the aircraft or anything attached thereto or the aircraft receives
substantial damage.
Accident, Antecedent Events: (BASI) Those events or conditions that occurred prior to the demonstra-
tion of intent for flight but which relate to the conditions making the accident more likely (e.g., fatigue
and get-home-itis).
Accident, Maneuver: (BASI) A subelement of the accident phase of flight described by the sequence of
tasks required to perform the event (e.g., turn out of traffic, go-around, etc.).
Accident, Point of: (BASI) That point in the accident sequence of events at which no preventative or
evasive action by the pilot would have avoided the accident.
Accident, Predisposing Events: (BASI) Those events or conditions more general in nature or more long-
standing than accident antecedent events, but that are predisposing to accident occurrence (e.g.,
risk-taking tendencies and lax supervision).
Accident, Sequence: (BASI) A series of events, one or more of which must involve human action, that
eventually results in (i.e., terminates in) an accident.
Accident, Task: (BASI) A subelement of the accident maneuver that describes each specific action re-
quired of the pilot to accomplish that maneuver (e.g., controls and display, target tracking, and aircraft
positioning).
Accident Rate: (BASI) For statistical purposes, the number of air accidents may be quoted as a "rate".
This rate is calculated per 100 000 flying hours.
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Accident Zone: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Performance demands exceed the actual performance
ability thus provoking errors leading to accidents. Prevailing 'internal' factors in the origination of fail-
ures and critical situations are physical factors, psychological factors, and pilot's proficiency factors.
Prevailing 'external' factors in the origination of failures and critical situations are environmental fac-
tors, mission requirement factors, organizational and supervisory factors, technical and design factors.
Accredited Representative: (Annex 13) A person designated by a state, on the basis of his qualifications,
for the purpose of participating in an investigation by another state.
Acrophase: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Phase angle of the maximum in a sinusoidal function or in a
function used to approximate a rhythm; given in units of time, angular degrees, or radians.
Acute or Transient Fatigue: See Fatigue, Acute/Transient.
Acute or Transient Performance Decrement: (AFP) The type of exhaustion associated with physical or
mental activity between two regular sleep periods. Acute or transient performance decrement is elimi-
nated after a regular sleep period.
Adjustment Error: See Error, Technical.
Adviser: (Annex 13) A person appointed by a state, on the basis of his qualifications, for the purpose of
assisting its accredited representative at an investigation.
Aerobatic Demonstration: (BASI) Aerobatics intended to demonstrate pilot skill and/or to demonstrate
aircraft capabilities.
(AFP) Aerobatics intended to demonstrate pilot skill and aircraft capabilities.
Aerospace Medicine: (AFP) A medical specialty dealing with prevention, especially dealing with the
environments related to flight and individual capabilities in meeting those demands. Flight surgeons
receive at least a basic course reviewing these concerns in addition to whatever physician training they
hold.
Affective States: (BASI) Subjective feelings of different types of pleasantness or unpleasantness that a
person has about aspects of his environment, other people, or himself. Affective states are subdivided
into moods and emotions depending on their duration and intensity.
Emotions - (BASI) A complex temporary state marked by strong feelings, bodily changes, and
mental excitement or perturbation. Emotions are relatively brief in duration, but strong in
intensity.
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q(AFP) An excited affective state that tends to be disruptive of mental, physiological, or behavior-
al process. Emotions are relatively brief in duration but strong in intensity (may be influenced by
fatigue or various stressors).
Mood - (BASI) An affective state or attitude of relatively low intensity, but long in duration.
(AFP) An affective state of relatively low intensity, but long in duration. A mood can facilitate a
perceptual or response set.
Aircraft: (Annex 13) Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air
other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface.
Alcohol: (BASI) "Misuse" is deemed to have occurred when a member's use of alcohol--
1. Interferes with his performance of duty or regular attendance at the place of duty.
2. Creates an administrative burden by causing domestic or other problems.
3. Interferes with his satisfactory social or economic functioning.
4. Interferes with his health.
Ambient Orientation: (AFP) A means of maintaining gross orientation without "thinking" about it. It is
the result of the preconscious level of awareness keeping track of various sensory inputs (including pe-
ripheral visual, tactile, kinesthetic, vestibular, and auditory) to keep us oriented with respect to the vari-
ous inputs. Discontinuity between such inputs is thought to predispose to motion sickness. In vision this
involves peripheral vision.
Amplitude: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Difference between maximum and mean value, between value,
or between minimum and mean value.
Anomaly: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) A deviation from the common rule; an irregularity. As used here, an
anomaly is a departure from normal or expected performance in the course of a mission. The departure
from normal operation may be that of the airplane, including its components, its crew, or others con-
cerned with the direction and control of aircraft. Synonym: Operational anomaly. A behavioral anomaly
is a departure from normal or expected performance of some person--an error. Carl Lager's term "dys-
function"--an unwanted result of operation, an unwanted system state, or unwanted component re-
sponse-is analogous.
Antecedent Events/Mishap: See Mishap, Antecedent Events.
Anthropometrics: (BASI) Measurement of the physical height, weight, build, and dimensions of a
person.
(AFP) Measurement of the physical height, weight, build, and dimensions of a person. (Used in solving
biomechanical issues in equipment design.)
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Approach Phase: (AFP) Final approach fix to missed approach point for an instrument approach; from
reaching traffic pattern altitude until crossing the runway threshold for a visual approach. A go-around
is considered part of the approach phase if it occurs before the missed approach point for an instrument
approach or before crossing the runway threshold for a visual approach.
Attention: (BASI) Investment of some level of awareness towards a certain task.
(AFP) The use of some level of conscious mental or cognitive resources in processing information. See
Vigilance.
Attention, Anomalies of: (AFP) Misallocation or untimely interruption of attention to a task (all may be
influenced by fatigue or various stressors).
Boredom - (BASI) A state of reduced conscious attention due to a perceived unchallenging envi-
ronment. A dull, undemanding task may lead to low level of awareness and compromise a re-
sponse in an emergency.
Channelized Attention - (BASI) When a person's full attention is focused on one stimulus to the
exclusion of all others. This becomes a problem when the person fails to perform tasks or process
information of a higher or more immediate priority and thus fails to notice or has no time to
respond to cues requiring immediate attention.
Cognitive Task Saturation - (BASI) The situation in which the quantity or quality of necessary
information to process or the number or complexity of the decisions to be made, exceeds a per-
son's capacity. The span of attention is insufficient for the task. See Channelized Attention.
Complacency - (BASI) A state of reduced conscious attention or awareness due to a sense of
security, self-confidence, or a perceived absence of threat from the environment.
Distraction - (BASI) When a person's focus of attention on tasks is interrupted by the introduc-
tion of another stimulus unrelated to the task he is currently performing.
Fascination - (BASI) An anomaly of attention in which a person monitors the relevant environ-
mental cues around them, but fails to respond to them because of a sense of unreality or detach-
ment from events, as if he were viewing them from the outside. Fascination is usually associated
with a high-stress situation.
Habit-Pattern Interference - (BASI) Reverting to previously learned response modes that are
inappropriate to the task at hand. Habit pattern interference usually occurs at the preconscious
level of awareness. See Learning - Learning Transfer.
Habit Pattern Substitution: (BASI) (AFP) Reverting to previously learned and (objectively,
AFP) inappropriate response modes when the appropriate response is unavailable due to a lack
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of procedural knowledge. Habit pattern substitution usually occurs at the conscious level of
awareness.
Inattention - (BASI) An inappropriately low level of attentiveness to a task and/or failure to at-
tend to all of the relevant environment cues.
Focus of Attention - (BASI) That part of the span of attention directed toward conscious infor-
mation processing.
Span of Attention - (BASI) The total individual capacity to invest conscious attention.
(AFP) The total individual cognitive or attentional resources, both in quantity and duration, to
process information at the conscious level.
Attitude,Aircraft: (AFP) The orientation of the three major axes of an aircraft (longitudinal, lateral, and
vertical) with respect to a fixed reference such as the horizon, the relative wind, or direction of flight.
Attitude, Personal: (AFP) An enduring, learned predisposition to behave in a consistent way toward a
given circumstance; a persistent mental state of readiness to react to a certain circumstance, not as they
are but as they are conceived to be.
Awareness, Level of: (AFP) The theoretical level of cognitive or mental function resulting in our
behavior.
Background: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) This term includes all relevant activities to the conduct of a mission
that take place prior to the beginning of a flight.
Base Leg: See Traffic Pattern.
Behavioral Profile: (Stoklosa, 1983) Illustrates ways in which an operator interacts with the environment
and the behavioral repertoire that he/she brings to an operating situation. Factual information is gath-
ered on 24- to 72-hr history, operator behavior, life habit patterns, and life events.
Boredom: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Briefing Inadequacy: (AFP) When a mission element that should have been briefed was not or was inad-
vertently briefed, briefing is considered a factor. Normal tasks, such as lowering the gear for landing, are
not considered mandatory briefing items, and briefing is not considered inadequate when such tasks are
not covered.
Busting: (AFP) Failure to perform to a standard (as in "busting" a maneuver sortie).
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Carelessness: (BASI) Did not exercise due care. Display of indifference, laxity, or disregard of estab-
lished procedures.
Cause: (Annex 13) Action(s), omission(s), condition(s), or a combination thereof, which led to the acci-
dent or incident.
Cause Factor: (BASI) A cause factor is defined as being any event, condition, or circumstances, the
presence or absence of each, within reason, increased the likelihood of an aircraft occurrence.
Channelized Attention: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Chokes: See Decompression Sickness.
Circadian: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) With a period of approximately 24 hr (strictly 20 to 28 hr); CIR-
CA (about, approximately) and DIES (day, 24 hr).
Circadian Rhythm: (AFP) The tendency for some biological process to recur at regular intervals within
sequential 24-hr periods.
Ciicadian Rhythm Upset: (BASI) Performance decrement due to an upset in the biological process,
(e.g., body temperature and hormonal activity) as a result of crossing several time zones quickly or differ-
ent work shifts with inadequate transition periods between them.
Clearance: (AFP) Authorization by a traffic control facility for an aircraft to proceed within controlled
airspace.
Climbout Phase: (AFP) From the time of configuring for climbout to reaching cruise altitude.
Cockpit Resource Management: (BASI) Cockpit resource management refers to the effective utilization
of flightcrew members to enhance crew interaction, communication, and decision making in multicrew
aircraft operation. (The term can be extended to refer also to the effective utilization of all available
resources in decision making in single pilot operations.)
(AFP) The aircrew's prioritized, coordinated, and timely use of available resources, to include use of
automation, delegation of tasks to other erewmembers, effective communication, and interface with
control agencies. (Indicates enforcement of crew coordination.)
Cognitive (Mental) Flexibility: (AFT) An individual's ability to shift from one mental task to another or
to effectively timeshare between several tasks while maintaining situational awareness.
Cognitive Task Saturation: See Attention, Anomalies of.
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Command and Control: (AFP) The orderly distribution of authority and responsibility designed to sys-
tematically accomplish a mission and the continuous-feedback-loop communications network connect-
ing all levels of command so that decisions can be made, efforts coordinated, and discipline maintained.
Command and control are considered factors when supervision is inadequate or when procedures over
which the MAJCOM has control are inadequate, nonexistent, or characterized by inadequate supervi-
sion at unit or wing level or inadequate mission planning scheduling. Failure to monitor the conduct of
operations or failure to provide close inflight supervision where training and proficiency are suspect are
also indicators of command and control deficiencies.
Command/Controh (BASI) The orderly distribution of authority and responsibility designed to system-
atically accomplish a flight and the continuous-feedback-loop communication network connecting all
levels of command so that decisions can be made, effort coordinated, and discipline maintained.
Communication: (BASI) To include interpersonnel communication at all levels and also communication
discipline (i.e., aircrew; ATC).
Communication Problems: (AFP) Information transfer ineffectiveness.
Equipment Failure.
Message Content - Garbled, inaccurate, or ambiguous.
Message Generation - Message not originated.
Message Reception - Receiving party did not receive or understand.
Message Timing - Message correct, but not timely.
Confidence: (BASI) A personality characteristic that allows one to act with some degree of self-assur-
ance. Overconfidence and lack of confidence may degrade one's ability to make rational judgments or
decisions in the performance of his tasks.
Overconfidence - (AFP) An attitude in which a person assumes that he or she can perform a task,
even though this may not be true, because he or she has not successfully performed it in the past,
has performed it in the past but under different circumstances, or because it is unrealistic to
attempt it at all.
Underconfidence - (AFP) An attitude in which a person assumes that he or she cannot perform a
task, even though he or she has the demonstrated capabilities necessary.
Confusion: (AFP) Loss of situational awareness that is recognized by the individual concerned. A state
characterized by bewilderment, emotional disturbance, lack of clear thinking, and (sometimes) percep-
tual disorientation.
Conscious Level: See Awareness, Level of.
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Contingency: (AFP) One or more contributing factors that influence a situation, but may not be in-
herently hazardous (e.g., unforecast bad weather, ATC delays, supervisor comments, and unspoken or
written rules).
Contingency Discrimination: (AFP) The process of effectively rank ordering environmental consider-
ations by importance in terms of real and near term consequences as perceived by the individual.
Copilot Syndrome: (AFP) An attitude resulting in ineffective crew coordination based on the comforting
premise that one or more other crewmembers have the situation under control and are looking out for
your best interest. Implicit in the term "other crewmembers" are other nonflight members, such as ATC,
the command post, and RAPCON. Rank may at times play a role.
(BASI) Ineffective crew coordination based on the comforting premise that one or more other crewmem-
bers have the situation under control and are looking out for your best interests.
Coping Style: (AFP) Individual techniques for responding to environmental challenge (may be personal-
ity dependent).
Coriolis Illusion: See Illusion, Vestibular.
Crew Coordination: (BASI) (AFP) The systematic division of subtasks between crew or flight members
so as to accomplish a larger task more efficiently. Crew coordination is the most basic level of command
and control.
Critical Angle of Attacle (AFP) The minimum angle of attack of a given airfoil or airfoil section at which
extensive flow separation occurs, with consequent loss of lift and increase of drag; generally results in
stalling of the airfoil.
Cruise Phase: (AFP) From reaching cruise altitude to arrival at the area of range activity or from leaving
the range activity to beginning descent into the base of intended landing.
Cumulative or Chronic Performance Decrement: (AFP) The type of exhaustion resulting from an inad-
equate recovery from successive periods of acute or transient fatigue. One regular sleep period will not
eliminate cumulative fatigue; however, several sleep periods and reduced interim activity will eliminate
it.
Damage: (BASI) Annex 13 defines substantial damage in the same manner as ANR 270 (b) except for the
following exemptions:
"Except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings, or accesso-
ries or for damage limited to propellers, wingtips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents, or punc-
ture holes in the aircraft skin."
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Annex13providesthefollowingnotein respectofmissingaircraft:'_maircraftisconsideredtobemiss-
ingwhentheofficial searchhasbeenterminatedandthewreckagehasnot beenlocated."
Decision: (AFP) The perception of information and selection of a response designed to achieve a desired
goal after having made a judgment as to significance and priority. There are four main types: (1) informa-
tion processed, correct decision, (2) information processed, incorrect decision, (3) information not ade-
quately processed, incorrect decision, and (4) information not adequately processed, correct decision.
Poor Decision - (AFP) Selection of an inappropriate response assuming adequate information
and time to decide. (May be a result of diminished personal capacity due to stressors or fatigue.)
Indecision - (AFP) Wavering between two or more responses resulting in failure to select a re-
sponse in a timely manner.
Decompression Sickness: (BASI) Effects produced by evolution of gas (usually nitrogen) from tissues
and fluids in the body due to changes in barometric pressure, resulting in impairment or incapacitation
of the aircrew.
(AFP) Effects produced by evolution of gas (usually nitrogen) from tissues and fluids in the body due to
changes in barometric pressure (symptoms may also result from air embolism).
Chokes - (AFP) Deep and sharp pain centrally located under the sternum most often due to nitro-
gen evolving from the blood and locating in the smaller blood vessels of the lungs and producing a
dry, nonproductive cough.
Delayed Perception: See Perception.
Delayed Response: See Response.
Department of Defense Flight Information Publications: (AFP) Publications used for flight planning,
enroute, and terminal operations. FLIPs are produced by the Defense Mapping Agency for worldwide
use. In route charts and instrument approach procedure charts are incorporated in DOD FLIPs for use
in the National Airspace System (NAS).
Descent Phase: (AFP) From the initial approach fix to the final approach fix for an instrument descent;
from beginning descent from cruise altitude to the final approach f'tx for an enroute descent to an instru-
ment approach: from beginning descent from cruise altitude until reaching traffic pattern altitude for an
enroute descent to a visual approach. Holding is considered part of the descent phase of flight.
Desynchronization: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) State in which different rhythms previously synchro-
nized run with different periods.
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Discipline (Personal): (AFP) Discipline is evident when an individual willfully adheres to known and
understood directives or restrictions.
Discipline Enforcement: (AFP) Discipline enforcement is the process of supervisory support of known
principles, rules, or directives.
Dissociation, Internal: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Transitory state in which different rhythms within
one organism temporarily loose their mutual phase relationship (e.g., adjustment to a change in external
Zeitgeber with a different speed).
Distraction: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Distress: (AFP) An effective state of feeling pressure or threat, usually at the limit of coping skills and
associated with physiological changes and perhaps symptoms (see General Adaptation Syndrome). Be-
havior under a condition of distress will tend to be a behavior that was learned earlier than the appropri-
ate one or one that was overlearned.
Double Standard: (BASI) The stated or implied condoning of violations of established rules in the inter-
est of flight accomplishment or a perception that the rules do not apply to everyone.
(AFP) The stated or implied condoning of violations of established rules or a perception that the rules do
not apply to everyone.
Drugs: (BASI) Any chemical compound taken for purposes of prevention of disease, treatment of dis-
ease, weight management, mood alteration, or birth control. The effects may be direct or residual, but
either may reduce performance capability.
Emergency: (BASI) A sudden unplanned occurrence that jeopardizes the safe completion of the flight
and requires specific and timely action to avoid damage or injury.
(AFP) An unplanned occurrence that jeopardizes the safe completion of a task and requires specific and
timely action to avoid damage or injury.
Emotion: See Affective States.
Endogenous Rhythm: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Self-sustained biological rhythm maintained from
within the organism independently of external periodicities.
Entrainment: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Steady state in which a self-sustained rhythm runs synchro-
nously with a Zeitgeber.
Envelope (Personal): (AFP) The real range of physical and mental capacity of an individual that varies in
time.
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Environmental factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Sudden transition from VMC to IMC, restric-
tions in visibility due to weather phenomena, turbulence, or vibration.
Environmental Profile: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Involves intrinsic and extrinsic physical factors
that could affect performance. Factual information is gathered on internal and external conditions, illu-
mination, and noise, vibration, and motion. Requires consideration of such issues as weather conditions,
temperature, carbon monoxide, artificial light sources, and speech communication interference.
Equipment Design Profile: (Stoklosa, 1983) Operator-equipment interaction dynamics includes work-
space interface, display and control design, and seat and design configuration. It also includes layout,
anthropometry, communications, and other user considerations.
Equipment Malfunction: (AFP) This factor is used to refer to the occasions when an aircraft failure or
malfunction, rather than a mission element, caused the pilot to be distracted or otherwise fail to accom-
plish the task at hand.
Ergonomics: (BASI) (Human Engineering) Human factors engineering studies of machine design and
workspace environment so that they match human capacities and limitations. Human engineering prob-
lems in the cockpit may in many cases, be known by the pilots but are lived with. These factors should be
discussed in a human factors investigation to determine probability of disorientation, confusion of con-
trol, or misreading of instruments. Design factors to be investigated include (1) design of instruments
and controls, (2) location of instruments and controls, (3) cockpit lighting, (4) cockpit visual obstruction,
(5) personal equipment interference, (6) workspace compatibility with operator, (7) habit interference
and using wrong control, (8) confusion of control and switches, (9) misread instruments, (10) misinter-
preted instrument reading, (11) mislead by faulty instrument, and (12) visual restriction by structures.
Error: (BASI) An unintended and inappropriate physical or mental operation.
(Barnhart, et al., 1975) An act involving a departure from accuracy; a mistake.
Error, Adjustment: See Error, Technical.
Error, Air Traffic System: (cited in Danaher, 1980)An operational error in which a failure of equipment,
human, procedural, and/or other system elements, individually or in combination, results in less than the
appropriate separation minima, as specified in the ATC Terminal and Enroute Handbooks and supple-
mentary instructions, being provided to an aircraft receiving an air traffic service (DOT, 1973, p. 1).
Error, Forgetting: (BASI) Failing to check, set, or use a control at the proper time.
Error, Grievous: (McRuer, et al., 1980) A grievous error will involve an exceedence of safe operating
tolerances.
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Error, Human: (cited in McRuer, et al., 1980) An inconsistency with a predefined behavior pattern es-
tablished by virtue of system requirements and specifications and the design of the equipment and pro-
cedures to meet those specifications.
Error, Human Error Causes: (McRuer, et al., 1980) Causes are external factors that induce undesirable
deviations in human behavior, such as unexpectedly large or extreme disturbances, high workload, dis-
tractions, inaccurate or noisy information, illusions, equipment design deficiencies, and inadequate
training.
Error, Human Error Sources: (McRuer, et al., 1980) Sources are internal to the human operator and
their consequences should be measurable as changes from normal or ideal human behavior, which is
consistent with system requirements.
Error, Reversal: See Error, Technical.
Error, Substitution: See Error, Technical.
Error, Technical: (AFP) An objectively inappropriate individual discreet action (error of execution).
Examples are missing a radio call, b.eing off altitude or airspeed, or improper switch or control opera-
tion. (May be influenced by a perceptual set, response set, or misleading environmental cues.)
Adjustment Error - (AFP) Operating a control too slowly or too rapidly, moving a control or
switch to the wrong position, or following the wrong sequence in operating several controls or
switches.
(BASI) Operating a control too slowly or too rapidly, moving a switch to the wrong position, or
following the wrong sequence in operating several controls.
Forgetting Error - (AFP) Failing to check, set, or use a control or switch at the proper time.
Reversal Error - (AFP) Moving a control or switch in a direction opposite to that necessary to
produce the desired result.
(BASI) Moving a control in a direction opposite to that necessary to produce the desired result.
Substitution Error - (AFP) Confusing one control or switch with another or failing to identify a
control or switch when it was needed.
(BASI) Confusing one control with another or failing to identify a control when it was needed.
Unintentional Activation - (AFP) Accidently operating a control or switch.
(Fitts and Jones, 1947) Inadvertently operating a control without being aware of it.
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(BASI)Accidentlyoperatinga control.
Error,Unableto Reach a Control: (Fitts and Jones, 1947) Accident or near accident resulting from "put-
ting head in cockpit" to grasp a control or inability to reach a control at all.
Error, Unintentional Activation: See Error, Technical.
Errors, Information Processing/Procedurah (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Erroneous judgment, mis-
calculations, wrong decisions, and faulty design of action plan (e.g., deficient flight preparation, neglect
of procedures or use of improper procedures, misjudgment of weather, continued application of VFR
after entering IMC, faulty fuel management, and loss of geographic orientation). Mainly associated with
following background variables: lack of proficiency, lack of procedural knowledge, difficulties of
memory and recall, information overload, inadequate briefing, and short-term changes of flight plan.
Errors, Perception: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) False utilization of objectively only partially present
information (e.g., spatial disorientation, visual illusion, faulty identification, misjudgment of distances
and heights, and too late or too early pull up or flare out). Errors are mainly associated with contradicto-
ry environmental cues or stimuli close to the threshold (e.g., restriction of visibility, camouflage of stimu-
li, and nonperceptibility of horizon).
Errors, Vigilance: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Missing or fragmentary uptake of objectively present
information due to inattention, channelized, or shifted attention. Examples are omission of necessary
actions, failure to maintain altitude, attitude, or airspeed; poor cross check; poor visual lookout; and
failure to stay within aircraft's performance limits. Vigilance errors generally associated with intraperso-
nal conditions, such as nervousness, high tension, oversaturation of information channels, carelessness,
and other background variables.
Event Proficiency: (AFP) Event proficiency (lack of) is considered a factor when the pilot attempting the
mission element has (1) never done it before, (2) done it before but not recently, or (3) done it recently but
for the first time. "Proficiency" and "currency" as defined by MAJCOM criteria are not necessarily syn-
onymous, as the pilot's demonstrated ability to perform the task is the governing factor.
Evolved Gas Disorders: See Decompression Sickness.
Excessive Motivation: See Motivation, Anomalies of.
Exercise (Operational): (AFP) A period of enhanced operational activity to demonstrate readiness.
Expectancy (or Perceptual Set): (BASI) When a person expects to perceive certain environmental cues
and tends selectively to search for those cues more actively than others. One extreme of this anomaly is
when the expectancy is so strong that he perceives cues that in fact are not there; the other extreme is
when he does not expect cues to the extent that he does not detect cues that are there.
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Expectation: (AFP) A mental set in which environmental conditions are anticipated before their occur-
rence. This may lead to a perceptual or response set.
Experience Lack: (AFP) Lack of experience is a factor when the events during a mishap were caused by a
pilot's lack of background in the type aircraft being flown (e.g., fighter, bomber, and cargo), the type
mission being attempted (e.g., air to ground, air to air, and low level), or the role being performed (e.g.,
flight lead and I'P). Whether or not the aircrew was "experienced" according to MAJCOM definitions, if
his or her inexperience in the aircraft, mission, or role led to the mishap, this factor is assigned.
Face Time: (AFP) Time invested in increasing supervisory awareness of the individual (may be positive
or negative.)
Factor: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) One of the elements that contribute to produce a result; a constituent.
Factor, Associated: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) An element that is present in the history of an anomaly and is
pertinent to the occurrence under study, but does not fulfill the requirements of an enabling factor.
Factor, Enabling: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) An element that is present in the history of an anomaly and
without which the anomaly probably would not have occurred.
Fascination: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Fatal Injury: (AFP) Any injury that results in death within 30 days of occurrence.
Fatigue: (BASI) The progressive decrement in performance ability due to prolonged mental or physical
activity, extreme mental or physical activity, or sleep deprivation.
(AFP) The progressive decrement in ability due to prolonged or extreme mental or physical activity.
Sleep deprivation, disrupted diurnal cycles, or life event stress may all play a role in producing a retro-
spectively unmeasurable but significant performance decrement.
Fatigue, Acute/Transient: (BASI) The type of fatigue associated with physical or mental activity between
two regular sleep periods. Acute/transient fatigue is eliminated after a regular sleep period.
Fatigue, Cumulative/Chronic: (BASI) The type of fatigue resulting from an inadequate recovery from
successive periods of acute/transient fatigue. One regular sleep period will not eliminate cumulative fa-
tigue; however, several sleep periods and reduced interim activity will eliminate it.
Fatigue, Physical: (BASI) The effects of prolonged physical activity and/or the effects of brief but ex-
treme physical activity, either of which taxed a person's physical capacity.
(AFP) The effects of prolonged physical activity or the effects of brief but extreme physical activity,
either of which taxes a person's physical strength to the level of exhaustion.
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Fatigue,Skill: (BASI) Defined as the deterioration in performance caused by work that demands per-
sistent concentration and a high degree of skill. It is an insidious phenomenon associated with failure of
memory, judgment, integrating ability, and presence of mind. Its effects may occur in conjunction with,
and be accentuated by, other factors such as sleep loss.
Fatigue, Subjective: (BASI) The type of fatigue associated with the wearing effects of such psychosocial
problems as unresolved conflicts, prolonged frustration, or constant worrying. Subjective fatigue is not
eliminated by any number of sleep periods without first resolving the conflict or removing the
frustrations.
Fight or Flight Response: (AFP) The heightened physiological state, automatically assumed by the body
when faced with a crisis, to prepare for "fight or flight." This heightened physiological state may detract
from rational processes and cause a person to overreact, overcontrol, or overlook significant cues.
Fitness: See Physical Condition.
Flight: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) A flight begins when an airplane's engines are started or when it is moved
from its blocks for the purpose of undertaking a mission. It ends when the airplane is parked at its blocks
and engine shutdown is complete or when it comes to rest following an impact with the surface of the
earth.
Flight Clothing: (AFP) Items of clothing designed for inflight needs for protection and utility.
Flight Discipline: (BASI) Adhering to established procedures throughout the course of a flight. This
includes not pursuing irrational or impulsive courses of action, actions that are inconsistent with estab-
lished procedure, or actions not prebriefed.
Flight Path Angle: (AFP) The angle between the flight path of the aircraft and the horizontal.
Flight Recorder: (Annex 13) Any type of recorder installed in the aircraft for the purpose of comple-
menting accident or incident investigation.
Flying Proficiency: (AFP) As opposed to event proficiency, this factor is assigned if limited recent flying
time or sorties were considered to be a factor in the mishap.
Forgetting Error: See Error, Technical.
Foveal Visual Cues: (AFP) Visual stimuli falling within an approximately 6" cone from a person's nor-
mal sight line. Visual cues in this region are typically detected photopically (with cones). Foveal vision is
mostly used for discerning fine detail, depth, and distance estimation and differentiating colors. Acuity
falls to 0.25 (20/80) at 5" off foveal axis. Visual information more peripheral to this is thought to function
heavily as a contributor to ambient orientation.
Free-Running: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Running autonomously under constant conditions, i.e., after
removal of Zeitgeber.
Function: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) A distinctive process or activity; a useful activity. As used here, a spe-
cific class of behavior.
G-Adaptation Illusion: See Illusion, Kinesthetic.
G-Differential Illusion: See Illusion, Kinesthetic.
Gamesmanship: (AFP) (Also called careerism.) A form of manipulation of "the system" or its rules ex-
e/ted by an individual for the sake of convenience or personal interest, often to the detriment of the intent
of rules or guidance.
General Adaptation Syndrome: (AFP) The entire syndrome of psychological adaptive response in three
stages:
1. Fight or flight response in alarm reaction--see flight or flight response.
2. Stage of resistance--stage of full adaptation to the stresses with consequent disappearance of symp-
toms (but with decreased coping reserve).
3. Stage of exhaustion--under severe or prolonged stress, finite coping ability is exceeded, resulting in
reappearance of symptoms (burnout).
Geographic Misorientation: (AFP) The type of misorientation in which a person is correctly oriented
with reference to the pitch, roll, and yaw axis (position in space), but not oriented in relation to known
ground references or navigation fixes. (Lost or not spatially oriented.)
Geometric-Perspective Illusion: See Illusion, Visual.
Giant-Hand Illusion: See Illusion, Vestibular.
Greenwich Mean Time/GMT: (AFP) The mean solar time of the meridian of Greenwich, England used
as the prime basis of standard time throughout the world. Expressed in hours GMT or hours Z (zulu
phonetically).
Habit Pattern Interference: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Habit Pattern Substitution: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Hangover: (AFP) A popular term for the state of diminished mental and physiological capacity asso-
ciated with a period following heavy alcohol intake (usually less than 24 hr).
Hazard: (ICAO-APM) Any condition, event, or circumstance that could induce an accident.
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Histotoxic Hypoxia: See Hypoxia.
Horizon Misplacement: See Illusion, Visual.
Hull Loss: (cited in BCA, 1984) Damage due to an accident that was too extensive to repair or, for eco-
nomic reasons, the aircraft was not repaired and returned to service.
Human Error: (cited in McRuer, et al., 1980) An inconsistency with a predefined behavior pattern estab-
lished by virtue of system requirements, and specifications and the design of the equipment and proce-
dures to meet those specifications.
Human Error Causes: (McRuer, et al., 1980) Causes are external factors that induce undesirable devi-
ations in human behavior, such as unexpectedly large or extreme disturbances, high workload, distrac-
tions, inaccurate or noisy information, illusions, equipment design deficiencies, and inadequate
training.
Human Error Sources: (McRuer, et al., 1980) Sources are internal to the human operator and their con-
sequences should be measurable as changes from normal or ideal human behavior, which is consistent
with system requirements.
Human Factors: (BASI) The study of the physical, physiological, psychological, psychosocial, and path-
ological limitations of man as he interfaces with his environment.
(AFP) The study of the human side of safety (i.e., the capacities and limitations of the human meeting
environmental demands). (There is also HF engineering, referred to here under biomechanical, ergo-
nomic, and cockpit design topic headings.)
Human Information Processing: (BASI) The mental process of perceiving incoming information from
the environment, assessing its meaning, and deciding on an appropriate response° People have a limited
capacity to process information that is received from different sources simultaneously, especially when
the signals are of short duration and are not anticipated. Processing of such information can result in the
loss of signals that are concurrent or follow closely on the processed signal.
Humor: (AFP) An affective response to an event where expectations differed grossly from actuality. It
may be positive or negative depending on whether expectations were exceeded or not met.
Hypemic Hypoxia: See Hypoxia.
Hyperventilation: (BASI) Abnormally fast and/or deep respiration.
(AFP) Abnormally fast or deep respiration that results in sufficient change in blood pH to cause symp-
toms in an individual.
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Hypoxia: (BASI) Oxygen deficiency in the tissues sufficient to impair function or performance. The most
common form in aviation is hypoxic hypoxia due to a reduction of the oxygen tension in the inspired gas
by ascent to altitude.
(AFP) Insufficient oxygen delivered to tissue, of which the brain is most sensitive.
Histotoxic Hypoxia - (BASI) Reduced cellular utilization of oxygen or inability of the body's tis-
sues to accept oxygen from the blood (e.g., cyanide poisoning). Cyanide binds cytochrome oxi-
dase and prevents oxygen utilization.
Hypemic Hypoxia - (BASI) Hypoxia resulting from reduced oxygen-carrying capacity of the
blood. The basic causes are reduced concentration of hemoglobin (e.g., anemia caused by an iron
deficiency, reduction in the amount of red blood cells as in hemorrhage, or failure of oxygen to
saturate hemoglobin at a given PO2, such as carbon monoxide poisoning).
Hyl_xic Hypoxia - (BASI) Oxygen deficiency in the blood, cells, and tissues caused by a decrease
of the partial pressure of oxygen in the lungs or other conditions that reduce the diffusion of oxy-
gen across the alveolar-pulmonary capillary membrane (e.g., asthma and pneumonia).
Stagnant Hypoxia - (BASI) Reduced blood flow to a tissue unit or failure of the blood to transport
oxygen rapidly enough (e.g., shock, heart attack, and venous pooling from + Gz fo_'ces).
Illusion: (AFP) An erroneous interpretation of reality due to limitations of sensory receptors or the man-
ner in which sensory information is presented or interpreted.
Illusion, Kinesthetic: (AFP) An erroneous perception of somatosensory stimuli to the ligaments,
muscles, or joints of the body (proprioceptive).
(BASI) An erroneous perception of somatosensory stimuli to the ligaments, muscles, or joints of the
body. Referred to as Somatosensory Illusion.
G-Adaptation Illusion: (AFP) An erroneous perception that motion has ceased after exposure to
a sustained velocity. For example, movement in an elevator is only perceived at the beginning and
end of the ascent or descent.
G-Differential Illusion: (BASI) An erroneously perceived aircraft attitude based on "seat of the
pants" sensation. Without other sensory inputs, a 30" bank level turn feels the same as a 60" bank
descending turn.
(AFP) An erroneous perception of aircraft attitude based on "seat of the pants" sensations.
Without other sensory inputs, a 30" bank level turn feels the same as a 60" bank descending turn.
Illusion, Somatosensory: See Illusion, Kinesthetic.
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Illusion, Vestibular: (BASI) (AFP) An erroneous perception orienting stimuli to the semicircular ducts
or otolith organs of the vestibular apparatus.
Giant-Hand Illusion: (BASI) (AFP) The erroneous sensation that controls will not respond to
inputs, even with seemingly great effort, when the source of resistance is in fact the operator him-
self attempting to respond to conflicting sensory cues.
Illusion, Visual: (BASI) (AFP) An erroneous perception of stimuli to the visual system.
False Horizon Illusion - (AFP) A visual illusion that occurs when ground lights are mistaken for
stars or vice versa or when sloping terrain or clouds are mistaken for level horizon. A variant of
this can occur at night on a range when the receding margins of an area lit by a falling flare create
a false horizon effect.
Foreground Loss Illusion - (AFP) The blending or blurring into the foreground of nearby objects
when focusing on a distant object.
Geometric-Perspective Illusion - (BASI) An erroneous perception of being nearer or farther
away from an object than you actually are due to equating retinal image size to distance of famil-
iar objects. For example, an 8 000 ft runway viewed from 1 000 ft above it may appear the same
size as a 10 000 ft runway viewed from 1500 ft; another example is the tendency to flare high on a
wider than usual runway.
Horizon Misplacement: (BASI) A visual illusion that occurs when ground lights are mistaken for
stars or vice versa or when sloping terrain or clouds are mistaken for the horizon.
Vestibulo-Ocular - (AFP) An erroneous and pathological vestibularly generated sensation of
spinning that will affect visual interpretation of the environment (possibly inducing nystagmus).
Inactive: See Physical Condition.
Inattention: See Attention, Anomalies of.
Incident: (Annex 13) An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft
that affects or could affect the safety of operation.
(BASI) ANR 270 defines an incident as: 'An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the
operation of the aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operation of the aircraft." For the pur-
pose of uniformity with ICAO and other member states, Australia also complies with the definitions
given by ICAO in Annex 13.
(AFP) An occurrence other than an aircraft mishap, associated with the operation of an aircraft, that
adversely affects or could affect the safety of operations.
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(Barnhart,et al., 1975)An unwantedoccurrencelessseriousthananaccident,whichinvolvesanyof
severalspecificclassesof occurrence:
Flightcontrolsystem malfunction or failure; inability of a flightcrew member to perform his duties be-
cause of injury or illness; turbine engine rotor failures of certain types; inflight fire; and aircraft collide in
flight.
Information - Mis: (BASI) When necessary information in written or orai instructions was omitted, in-
correct, impractical, or vague.
Injury: (BASI) Annex 13 defines serious injury as:
An injury that is sustained by a person in an accident and (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48
hr, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone
(except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) involves lacerations that cause severe hemorrhage,
nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves injury to an internal organ; or (5) involves second- or third-
degree burns or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface.
Note: For statistical uniformity only, an injury (sustained in the accident) resulting in death within 30
days of the date of the accident is classified as fatal injury by ICAO.
Annex 13 includes the following in the definition of an accident: a person is fatally or seriously injured as
a result of direct exposure to jet blast.
Injury, Serious: (Annex 13) An injury that is sustained by a person in an accident and (1) requires hospi-
talization for more than 48 hr, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) re-
sults in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) involves lacerations
that cause severe hemorrhage, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves injury to any internal organ;
or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface.
Insight: (AFP) Awareness of one's own capabilities and relationship to various environmental
circumstances.
Internalized Unit Values: (BASI) (AFP) A value system in which a person has taken the values, motives,
and prioritized goals of the unit as his own. Such a person is referred to colloquially as a "team player."
Investigation: (Annex 13) A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention that includes the
gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of
cause(s); and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations.
Investigator-In-Charge: (Annex 13) A person charged, on the basis of his qualifications, with the re-
sponsibility for the organization, conduct, and control of an investigation.
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Note:Nothingin theabovedefinitionis intendedtoprecludethefunctionsof aninvestigatorincharge
beingassignedto a commissionor otherbody.
Job Satisfaction: (BASI) (AFP) A person's subjective evaluation of the extent to which he/she is per-
forming and progressing satisfactorily in the occupation of his/her choice and that meets his/her "pro-
fessional need."
Judgment: (BASI) Assessing the significance and priority of informational data from the environment
in terms of how they relate to the task at hand. The result of this process forms the basis on which deci-
sions are made. Assigned when an individual is faced with a choice and the decision, or lack of decision,
subsequently proves to be wrong and results in an occurrence. Judgment involves a mental reasoning
process requiring an assessment of options rather than mechanical skills or the assessment of speeds,
distance, and the like.
(AFP) Assessing the significance and priority of information from the environment in terms of how they
relate to the overall task at hand. The exercise of this process forms the basis on which subsequent tech-
nical decisions are made.
Judgment Delay - (BASI) Failure to assess the significance and priority of information from the
environment in a timely manner, assuming adequate quality and quantity of information, due to
an anomaly of attention or motivation.
Judgment, Poor - (BASI) Failure to realistically assess the significance and priority of informa-
tion from the environment, assuming adequate quality and quantity of information, due to an
anomaly of attention or an anomaly of motivation.
Kinesthetic Illusion: See Illusion, Kinesthetic.
Knowledge Lack: (AFP) When a pilot was adequately exposed to the information needed to perform the
mission element but did not absorb it, lack of knowledge is considered a factor. Lack of knowledge im-
plies no deficiency in the training program, but rather the failure of the pilot to absorb or retain the
information (exposure to information at a point in the past does not imply "knowledge" of it).
Landing Phase: (AFP) From the missed approach point until touchdown for an instrument approach;
from crossing the runway threshold until touchdown for a visual approach. A go-around is considered
part of the landing phase if it occurs after the missed approach point for an instrument approach or after
crossing the runway threshold for a visual approach. After touchdown, a touch-and-go is considered a
takeoff.
Law of Exception: (AFP) In the investigation of aircraft mishaps, the principle according to which, if all
concrete or provable causes have been ruled out, it is concluded that the operative cause was one based
on history of the particular aircraft or perhaps a typical or logical operator input.
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Learning: (BASI) Long-term adjustments to a person's behavior as a result of reinforcement and prac-
tice. These adjustments may be either physical or mental.
(AFP) Adjustments to a person's behavior or thinking as a result of internalization of information. It is
observed through either manual skill or vocabulary. This process is less efficient under the extremes of
stress, whether too little or too great.
Learning Rate - (AFP) The relative efficiency with which new information is acquired and rela-
tively permanent adjustment made in one's behavior or thinking.
Learning Reinforcement - (AFP) The activity of recalling and reviewing information or experi-
ences to retain them for use in applied situations.
(BASI) The requirement, over time, to recall and review experiences in order to retain them in
long-term memory.
Learning Transfer - (AFP) The ability of a person to apply, in present or future situations, the
related experience (or less significantly, knowledge) acquired in past situations.
(BASI) The ability of a person to apply in real world situations the experience acquired in learn-
ing situations.
Life Change Events: (BASI) Death of spouse, divorce, marital separation, detention in jail, death of a
close family member, personal injury or illness, marriage, being fired from work, marital reconciliation,
change in health or behavior of family member, pregnancy, major business readjustment (major job
readjustment), sexual difficulties, change in financial state, death of a close friend, change to a different
line of work, change in number of arguments with spouse, mortgage or loan greater than $40 000, foreclo-
sure of mortgage or loan, gaining a new family member (by birth, adoption, or someone moving in), son
or daughter leaving home, change in responsibilities at work, in-law troubles, outstanding personal
achievement, wife beginning or ceasing work, beginning or ceasing formal schooling, change in living
conditions, change in personal habits, troubles with boss, change in residence, change in working hours
or conditions, changing to a new school, change in recreational habits, mortgage or loan less than
$40 000, change in sleeping habits, change in eating habits, change in family get-togethers, vacation, and
minor violation of the law.
Lighting Regimen: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Schedule of light and/or darkness exposition; L - light,
D = dark, LL-continuous light, and DD - continuous dark.
Major Injury: (AFP) An injury that (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hr, commencing within
7 days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures
of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe hemorrhages, or severe nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4)
involves any internal organ: or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns or any burns affecting more
than 5% of the body surface.
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Mandelbaum or Screen Porch Effect: (BASI) Any visual stimulus coincident with the dark focus traps
the focus and degrades acuity beyond. The dark focus is the relaxed accommodation distance. Dark
focus distance in the normal emmetrope averages about lm, is shorter for myopes and greater for hyper-
opes. Should this distance coincide with that between eye and windscreen, any visual stimulus on the
windscreen, such as dirt, moisture, gun-gas residue, crazing, sunglare, reflections, or bug spatter, could
trap the focus and impair visual acuity beyond. In addition to the hazard of no perception, the loss of
definition and accommodative minification of objects seen may convey the false impression of height or
distance.
Maximum Mass: (Annex 13) Maximum certificated takeoff weight.
Maximum Weight: See Maximum Mass.
Medical Profile: (Stoklosa, 1983) Involves the predisposing physiological and sensory variables that
could affect performance. Includes general health, sensory acuity, drug or alcohol ingestion, and fatigue.
Consideration also includes physical condition, nutrition, medication, sleep cycle, and circadian
rhythm.
Memory: (AFP) The mental activity of recalling past experience. Experience includes any information a
person receives through any means, any cognitive functions he/she performed on that information, and
any he/she response made as a result of it.
Long-Term Memory - (BASI) The recall of information or events after a period in excess of sever-
al minutes after its occurrence (days, months, and years).
Short-Term Memory - (BASI) The recall of information or events within I min of its occurrence.
Working Memory- (AFP) That experience or knowledge that is immediately available. It is usual-
ly sensory rather than verbal.
Metacontrol: (McRuer, et al., 1980) The human's activity-supervising control, transcending the various
directly involved systems such as the perceptual, central, and neuromuscular systems (from Greek
"meta" meaning "involved with changes").
Microburst: (AFP) A localized but very severe weather phenomenon resulting in dramatic and abrupt
changes in wind direction and velocity.
Mishap Factors: (AFP) An attempt to explain and catalog at HQ AFISC why "primary causes" oc-
curred. The factors defined are not mutually exclusive but rather are often interrelated and in some
cases, influence one another. As a result, most mishaps involve multiple mishap factors.
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Mishap ]_ype Categories: (AFP) The type mishap is a mishap category assigned by the Reports and
Analysis Division at AFISC. Type mishap does not necessarily imply "cause," but rather I of the natural
mishap groupings that emerged from a comprehensive study of 3 400 mishaps done in 1975.
Cargo Delivery. (AFP) Mishaps directly involving cargo delivery problems (LAPSES, etc.) com-
prise this category.
Collision With the Ground - (AFP) This mishap category is assigned when a pilot flies the air-
craft into the ground without being forced to by a material failure. A material failure may exist,
but if adequate control and power were available to avoid the terrain, this category is assigned.
Control Loss - (AFP) Control loss is a mishap category assigned when a pilot stalls, spins, de-
parts, or otherwise exceeds the aircraft's flyable angle of attack. Mishaps where the pilot fails to
cope with the aerodynamic characteristics of the aircraft (such as putting it in a position from
which recovery is impossible) are included in this category, but flight control or autopilot mal-
functions are not.
Flameout (Pilot) - (AFP) This mishap category involves pilot-induced flameouts for any reason.
Inadvertent or intentional shutdown, fuel mismanagement, and flying out of the engine's toler-
able envelope are examples of this type mishap.
Flight Controls, Landing Gear, Engine, Fuel System, Etc. - (AFP) Mishaps that involve failure of
aircraft systems are categorized by the system that failed. The rationale for this is twofold. First,
our material failure prevention efforts are better served by isolating those mishaps where an
aircraft system failure precipitated an aircrew error from those involving aircrew error only. Sec-
ond, we believe that given enough system failures, the potential for an aircrew error increased, an
error the pilot would not have made had the system not failed to begin with. Mishaps involving
aircrew error preceded by an unrelated system failure are categorized by the type of error made.
Midair Collision - (AFP) Mishaps that involve aircraft hitting each other during flight (starting
takeoff roll to end of landing roll) are categorized as midair collisions, regardless of whether the
pilot or a flight-control failure was the cause.
Ops Other - (AFP) Mishaps that involve the aircrew but do not fit any of the major operations
types are classified by HQ AFISC as "ops other." Examples are a pilot who perceives a problem
that does not really exist and ejects from a perfectly good airplane or a pilot who has a taxi mishap
because he or she did not notice brake hydraulic systems were turned off.
Range - (AFP) This mishap category is assigned when a pilot fails to recover from an
air-to-ground ordnance delivery pass or if a pilot loses control while engaged in the activity of
delivering ordnance. Again, the activity is the governing factor rather than the location and mis-
haps that occur during actual or simulated ordnance delivery are categorized as range mishaps
whether or not the aircraft crashed on range property.
141
Takeoffor Landing - (AFP) Mishaps that occur during takeoff or landing and that do not involve
any material failure are categorized as takeoff or landing mishaps. These mishaps must occur on
takeoff before configuring for climb or during landing after the pilot begins to flare or align the
aircraft with the runway.
Mishap, Antecedent Events: (AFP) Those events or conditions that occurred before the demonstration
of intent for flight but that relate to the conditions making the mishap more likely (e.g., fatigue and
get-home-itis, etc.).
Mishap, Maneuver: (AFP) A subelement of the mishap phase of flight described by the sequence of
tasks required to perform the event (e.g., turn out of traffic, formation crossover, and egress from a
weapons delivery pass).
Mishap, Phase of Flight: (AFP) The phase of flight being performed at the point of the mishap.
Mishap, Point of: (AFP) That point in the mishap sequence of events at which no preventive or evasive
action by the operator would have avoided the mishap. (Not always the point of impact.)
Misperception: See Perception.
Misplaced Motivation: See Motivation, Anomalies of.
Mission: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) This term refers to the composite of pilot and vehicle functions that must
be performed to fulfill a given set of operational requirements. Those operational requirements impose
the boundaries on expected operation during a flight.
Mission Demands: (AFP) The relative degree of workload requirements inherent in different types of
missions as a function of the number or difficulty of mission events.
Mission Requirement Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Low-level flight, formation flight, tactical
exercise, terrain following flight, information overload, cross country flight, and approach landing.
Mistake: (Norman, 1981) It is a mistake if the intention is not appropriate.
Modeling: (AFP) Behavior exhibited by peers and supervisors in the context of its influence on learning
in an individual observing them.
Mood: See Affective States.
Morale: (AFP) A mindset consisting of a set of subjective assessments of well being relative to factors an
individual perceives as important (which may be characterized by confidence and optimism or by bitter-
ness and pessimism). Morale suffers when unnecessarily high or vague expectations are created because
subsequent actual experience cannot measure up to them.
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Motivation: (BASI) A value system that operates in determining the direction of an individual's behavior
toward an end or goal. That which stimulates and causes an individual to act. Excessive motivation or
undermotivation may degrade one's ability to make rational judgment or decisions.
(AFP) A person's underlying or internalized drive consisting of a prioritized value system that influences
his or her behavior and thought.
Motivation, Anomalies of: (AFP) Characteristics of a person's value system that may result in unsafe
acts.
Excessive Motivation - (AFP) Attributing a higher value to successfully performing the mission
than actually warranted by the importance of the mission. Past failures often create this higher
than desirable will to succeed, especially if the failures resulted in criticisms. Overmotivation has
also resulted from overemphasis on competition, with the attendant underemphasis on training.
(BASI) Attributing a higher value to successfully performing the flight than actually warranted by
the importance of the mission.
Misplaced Motivation - (BASI) The factors influencing a person's selection of course of action
that were superficial to or not related to the objective requirements of the flight.
Undermotivation- (BASI) Attributing a lower value to successfully performing the flight than
actually warranted by the importance of the mission.
Motivational Exhaustion: (AFP) The type of exhaustion associated with the wearing effects of such psy-
chosocial problems as unresolved conflicts, prolonged frustration, or constant worrying. It is not elimi-
nated by any number of sleep periods without first resolving the conflict or removing the frustrations.
(Also called subjective fatigue or burnout.)
Myopia, Space: (BASI) Space myopia is a condition that reduces the ability of the eyes to focus due to the
lack of objects to focus on. Relatively "empty" visual fields occur when you are flying at night, at high
altitudes, over water or snow, or during a hazy day. Also, clouds have surprisingly little effect as stimuli
for distant focusing. Under such conditions, the eye relaxes and allows the lens to seek an intermediate
curvature that requires no particular focusing effort. This relaxed state is known as the dark focus (about
lm to 2m).
Near Midair Collision: (NASA TM 81225) A near midair collision is defined for the purposes of this
study as a conflict between two aircraft in which the reporter's estimate of miss distance is less than 500
ft, evasive action is taken to avoid a collision, or it is reported that there was insufficient time to take
evasive action.
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Noise, Vibration, and Buffet: (BASI) The performance of certain tasks may be adversely affected if per-
formed in conditions of specific types and patterns of noise or excessive vibration or buffeting. The de-
gree of interference with task performance will vary with the nature of the task being performed.
Nonperception:See Perception.
Operational Profile: (Stoklosa, 1983) Potentially influencing operational and procedural factors. In-
cludes training, experience, operational procedures, and company management policies. Looks at
assessing the relation of such issues as habit patterns, information aids, and company personnel practic-
es to operator performance.
Operator: (Annex 13) A person, organization, or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in aircraft
operation.
(AFP) The person in control of the aircraft at the point of the mishap. Other personnel involved in the
mishap sequence of events are considered part of the operator's equipment or support.
Organizational and Supervisory Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Time pressure before flight,
short-term changes in flight order, inadequate briefing, supervisory pressure, and insufficient crew
coordination.
Oscillator: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Mechanism generating a rhythm.
Overcommitment: (AFP) A response set in which a person commits to a task for which he or she is
knowingly ill prepared and that presses pilots and their aircraft beyond reasonable limits ("taking a
chance" or "pressing").
Overconfidence: See Confidence.
Overtasking: (AFP) When a pilot is tasked to perform a mission element he or she is not capable of
performing or put in a situation where success requires that person to exceed his or her capabilities, the
pilot is considered to be "overtasked." Overtasking normally involves supervisors, schedulers, or flight
leaders and implies some need for supervisory awareness of the variable capacities of those being
tasked.
Peer Pressure: (AFP) A motivating factor stemming from a person's perceived need to meet peer expec-
tations. Peers may or may not express those expectations.
Perception: (BASI) The detection and interpretation of transthreshold information from the environ-
ment by one or more of the senses.
Delayed Perception - (BASI) (AFP) Failure to detect information in a timely manner due to an
anomaly of attention or motivation.
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Misperception - (BASI) Failure to detect or correctly interpret information due to an inappropri-
ate perceptual set.
Nonperception - (BASI) Inability to detect information from the environment because of sensory
limitations and the manner in which the information is presented.
(AFP) Inability to detect cues from the environment because of sensory limitations or the manner
in which the cues are presented. (Possibly a cockpit design concern.)
Perception, Anomalies: (BASI) There are several anomalies of perception that singly or in concert play a
part in deceiving the pilot:
Nonperception - (BASI) Failure to see an obstruction that blends into its background due to simi-
larities of texture, coloring, or lack of contrast. Such foreground masking is enhanced by lighting
conditions that reduce or eliminate shadows, as with a high sun angle, beneath an overcast, or in
haze. This camouflage applies not only to the ground and ground objects, but to vegetation and
man-made structures as well.
Height Estimation - (BASI) Accuracy in gauging altitude or terrain clearance may be quite diffi-
cult. Height estimation involves one or more of the following factors:
Perspective - (BASI) A function of size constancy, the appreciation of relative size of some
object of known dimension to its surroundings. Confusing the size of the "known" object(s)
by which perspective is gained can create a dangerous trap. For example, pilots accustomed
to flying over forested ranges with tall trees or large rocks may unwittingly be drawn to low
altitudes over ranges peppered with short trees and small rocks. A low sun angle can pro-
duce long shadows from short trees and create the same effect. Switching from a range with
3-ft sage brush to a range with 1-ft sage brush demands an immediate recalibration of the
visual system. The type of terrain affects perspective. Perspective is essentially absent over
relatively flat and featureless terrain. It may be impossible to gauge height over water, snow,
dry lake bed, or desert. Desert, with its subtle, insidious elevation changes and its propensity
for disguising obstructions, is particularly treacherous.
Definition - (BASI) Fine definition or clarity conveys closeness, whereas anything that fuz-
zies definition conveys a false impression of distance, (e.g., haze, fog, blowing snow, drizzle,
dust, or twilight).
Motion Parallax - (BASI) The relative motion of near objects to those distant. Motion paral-
lax is a function of ground speed and distance as well as height; the faster, the lower.
Perception, Delayed: See Perception.
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Perception, Intellectual: (AFP) The individual's general interpretation of surroundings, events, or con-
ditions. This is influenced by such factors as the personality, motivation, and the expectations of the
person.
Perception, Mis: See Perception.
Perception, Non: See Perception.
Perception, Sensory: (AFP) The detection of transthreshold cues from the environment by one or more
of the senses.
Period: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Time after which a phase of an oscillation recurs; in a looser sense
also used for phase angle.
Peripheral Visual Cues: (AFP) Visual stimuli falling outside of an approximately 6 ° cone from a per-
son's normal sight lirie. Visual cues in this region are typically detected scotopically (with rods). Periph-
eral vision detects gross movement and even if not consciously recognized, contributes to ambient
orientation.
Phase Angle: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Value of the time scale (abscissa) corresponding to a phase of a
rhythm; given in fractions of the period (units of time and angular degrees or radians).
Phase of Flight, Mishap: See Mishap, Phase of Flight.
Phase Shift: (Klien and Wegmann, 1980) Abrupt or gradual displacement of a rhythm along the time
scale.
Physical Condition: (BASI) The relative physical condition of a person in terms of the extent of a regular
rigorous exercise program and/or physically active lifestyle.
(AFP) The relative physical state of a person in terms of the extent of a regular rigorous exercise program
or a physically active lifestyle.
Athletic - (AFP) At least 6 hr of rigorous exercise per week and a physically active lifestyle.
Above Average - (BASI) At least 2 hr of rigorous exercise per week or a very active physical
lifestyle.
Active - (AFP) At least 2 hr of rigorous exercise per week and a physically active lifestyle.
Average - (BASI) Less than I hr of rigorous exercise per week or an intermittently physically ac-
tive lifestyle (e.g., sports and yardwork).
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Inactive. (AFP) Less than 1 hr of rigorous exercise per week or an intermittently physically active
lifestyle.
Physical Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Poor actual physical fitness, fatigue.
Physical Fatigue: See Fatigue, Physical.
Physical Strength: (BASI) A consensus judgment of peers as to the relative physical strength of a person.
(AFP) In the absence of objective measurement, this may be a subjective judgment of peers as to the
relative physical strength of a person.
Physical Task Saturation: (BASI) A situation in which the number or difficulty of tasks to perform in a
compressed time period exceeds a person's physical capacity to perform all of them.
(AFP) A situation in which the number or difficulty of manual tasks to perform in a compressed time
period exceeds a person's capacity to perform all of them (may be a result of poor crew coordination).
Pilot's Proficiency Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Low overall flying experience, insufficient
training, lack of familiarity with aircraft, and lack of training with regard to specific events and
procedures.
Point of Mishap: See Mishap, Point of.
Poor Decision: See Decision.
Poor Response: See Response.
Postanomaly: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) This term includes all activities related to the conduct of a mission
that occur after an anomaly and prior to the end of a flight.
Postflight: (Barnhart. et al., 1975) This term includes all activities related to the conduct of a mission that
take place subsequent to a flight. It includes postcrash rescue and survival efforts.
Preanomaly: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) This term includes all relevant activities from the beginning of a
flight to the occurrence of an anomaly.
Preflight: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) This term includes all activities relevant to a mission that occur prior to
the beginning of the flight.
Preconscious Level: See Awareness, Level of.
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Preliminary Report: (Annex 13) The communication used for the prompt dissemination of data ob-
tained during the early stages of the investigation.
Press-On-Iris: (BASI) Assigned when an individual sees a perceived need to continue a flight beyond
personal, human, equipment, or environmental limits. The pilot confers on the flight higher priority than
really exists. There are various reasons for pressing: self-imposed pressure, peer pressure, command
pressure, overconfidence, etc.
Prioritized Significant Events and Conditions: (AFP) A dynamic, cognitive hierarchy of perceived envi-
ronmental factors that serves to organize what tasks need to be performed, and in which order, to man-
age the immediate situation.
Procedures Inadequacy: (AFP) When the procedures for accomplishing a task are clearly inadequate,
this factor is assigned. For example, procedures for determining the adequacy of a strafe pit were lack-
ing, and the resulting increased ricochet density caused a destroyed aircraft due to 22 mm engine FOD.
Processing: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) The act of making a decision.
Professional: (AFP) A term applied to a vocation that implies autonomy, group identity, altruism, ex-
traordinary skill, and exercise of judgment.
Psychological Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Psychic stress prior to flight, excessive motivation
to succeed, high tension and arousal level during flight, lacking awareness of risk, overconfidence, and
task oversaturation.
Radar Approach Control Facility: See RAPCON Facility.
Rain Check: (AFP) The decision not to carry out a given act after appropriate risk analysis.
Range of Oscillation: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Difference between maximum and minimum value of
a rhythm within a period.
Range Phase: (AFP) The time when the aircraft enters the area designated for practicing or conducting
mission activities until departure. This may be in a low-level route, military operating area, gunnery
range, warning area, refueling track, etc.
RAPCON Facility A: (AFP) A terminal ATC facility that uses radar and nonradar capabilities to provide
approach control services to aircraft arriving, departing, or transiting airspace controlled by the facility.
Re-entrainment: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Transient state of an endogenous rhythm after a phase
shift of its Zeitgeber with the tendency to achieve the previous constant phase relationship again.
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Reaction Time: (BASI) An inherent perceptual limitation that requires an individually specific amount
of time for information processing before action is taken.
(AFP) An inherent human limitation that requires an individual a task-specific mount of time for infor-
mation processing before action is taken. It includes the elements of perception, interpretation, judg-
ment, decision, and response. Execution time required at any step may depend on experience, attention
focus, fatigue, etc.
Regular Sleep Period: (AFP) The period of a 24-hr day that a person usually spends in continuous sleep.
This must be on home time.
Resources: (BASI) When adequate manpower, finances, equipment, knowledge, skill level, or training
were not provided to properly accomplish the task.
Response: (BASI) The execution of a selected course of action. This may include taking no action if that
was the selected response.
(AFP) The execution of a selected course of action. This may include taking no action if that was the
decision made.
Delayed Response - (BASI) The execution of a selected course of action due to cognitive or physi-
cal task saturation, an anomaly of attention, an anomaly of motivation, or lack of sufficient proce-
dural knowledge.
Poor Response - (BASI) Ineffective execution of a selected course of action due to cognitive or
physical task saturation, an anomaly of attention, an anomaly of motivation, or lack of sufficient
procedural knowledge.
Response Set: (BASI) Expectations that predispose a person to a certain course of action.
(AFP) A cognitive or mental framework of expectations that predispose a person to a certain course of
action regardless of the environmental cues.
Resynehronization: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Transient state of a rhythm after a phase shift of the
synchronizing rhythm, lasting until the previous constant phase relationship between the two rhythms is
achieved again.
Reversal Error: See Error, Technical.
Rhythm: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Changes of a biologic variable recurring systematically with de-
tectable periods; normally superimposed with random noise.
Risk: (ICAO-APM) The consequence of accepting a hazard.
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qRoutine action: (McRuer, et al, 1980) A well-practiced task carded out in familiar surroundings by
skilled operators.
Safety Recommendation: (Annex 13) A proposal of the investigating authority of the state conducting
the investigation, based on information derived from the investigation, made with the intention of pre-
venting accidents or incidents.
Self Preflight: (AFP) Personal self-assessment that includes physiological and mental readiness in light
of specific planned mission objectives.
Self-Image: (AFP) This factor has been assigned by HQ AFISC in mishap reviews where the pilots in-
volved persistently appeared to perceive themselves as far better, smarter, or more capable than they
were.
Sensorimotor/Handling Errors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1980) Deficiencies in timing and adjustment of
simple/discrete and complex/continuous motor activities as well as perceptual-motor reversal and con-
fusion. Examples are delayed actions and reactions, poor control precision and multiple limb coordina-
tion, and confused or inadvertent activation of controls. These are mainly associated with intrapersonal
conditions, such as tension, nervousness during flight, "fear of failure," lack of confidence, and excessive
motivation to succeed.
Serious Injury: See Injury, Serious.
Service Ceiling: (G-10 TSI) (AFP) The height above sea level, under standard atmospheric conditions, at
which a given airplane is unable to climb faster than 100 ft/min.
Short-Term Memory: See Memory.
Significant Others: (BASI) Those individuals in whom a person has a vested emotional interest such as
family members, close friends, or identity figures.
Simulator: (AFP) A device or facility that provides a representation of some essential elements of a
system out of their normal setting in such a manner that the representation is a valid analog of the system
to be used in the training and maintenance of pilots' skills. These are of limited value in mishap recon-
struction and such results must be guardedly interpreted.
Situational Awareness: (AFP) Keeping track of the prioritized significant events and conditions in one's
environment. Confusion here may affect the sequence or priority of tasks to be performed. ("Getting
behind the power curve.")
Skill or Technique Lack: (AFP) Skill or technique deficiencies are considered a factor when a pilot ei-
ther lacks the required motor skills or uses an improper technique to perform the task attempted.
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Slip: (Norman, 1981) It is a slip if the action is not what was intended.
Spatial Disorientation: (BASI) When the aviator fails to sense correctly the position, motion, or attitude
of his aircraft or of himself with respect to the Earth's surface and the gravitational vertical as a result of
conflicting sensory information.
Spatial Disorientation (Type III) - (AFP) Lack ofknowledge as to orientation in space due to the inabil-
ity to detect orienting cues, as in a rapidly spinning or tumbling aircraft. In this situation the lack of
orientation is recognized, but there are neither usable cues nor a cognitive expectation of true orienta-
tion. (Also called vestibulo-oeular disorganization.)
Spin: (cited in Aderet and Tal, 1984) A sustained spiral descent of fixed-wing aerodyne with angle of
attack beyond stalling angle. Theoretically a spin can be described as a rapidly descending maneuver in
which the airplane rotates about its vertical axis with unequal lift on its wings.
Stability, Aerodynamic: (AFP) The inherent flight characteristic of an aircraft tending to restore it to its
original condition when disturbed by an unbalancing force or moment.
Stagnant Hypoxia: See Hypoxia.
Standard Sortie: (AFP) One of a set of preplanned, commonly flown flight itineraries in use by a
squadron.
State of Manufacture: (Annex 13) The state(s) responsible for the certification as to the airworthiness of
the prototype.
State of Occurrence: (Annex 13) The state in the territory of which an accident or incident occurs.
State of Registry: (Annex 13) The state on whose register the aircraft is entered. Note: In the case of the
registration of aircraft of an international operating agency on other than a national basis, the states
constituting the agency are jointly and severally bound to assume the obligations which, under the Chica-
go Convention, attach to a state of registry. See, in this regard, the Council Resolution of 14 December
1967 on Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated by International Operating Agencies (DOC
8722-C/976).
State of the Operator: (Annex 13) The state in which the operator has his principal place of business or,
if he has no such place of business, his permanent residence.
State-Dependent Memory: (AFP) A learning anomaly in which a learned task is best remembered when
the conditions exist that were present at the time of learning. Thus, procedural "knowledge" gained in a
classroom setting may not be recalled in an operational setting.
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Strength:(BASI)Thestrengthrequiredto performataskmaybeassessedasexcessivedueto either
peculiarflight conditions,designfeaturesof theaircraft,or theconditionof the individual.
Stress:(BASI)A certainlevelof stress is a normal part of day-to-day living. Coping mechanisms are
developed by the individual to handle variations in stress levels and these adaptive mechanisms can be
overtaxed in certain circumstances. This may be related to one's personal life, family life, work environ-
ment, etc.
Mission Stress: (BASI) If the conditions surrounding a mission generate excessive stress, this is
considered a factor. These conditions are often present during deployments, checkrides, exer-
cises, and other high-visibility missions.
Personal Stress: (BASI) Personal stress may be a factor if a pilot has unusual or severe personal
problems. Although difficult to assess the extent to which these problems might influence his or
her performance, personal stress may be considered a factor if severe problems exist.
(Barnhart, et al., 1975) Any element in the environment of man that evokes a response.
Stress, Acute Reactive: (Green, 1985) The "fight or flight" syndrome of increased autonic activity in the
face of threat is well known and recognized, and when confronted with an aircraft emergency a pilot is
likely to experience such acute reactive stress.
Stress, Environmental: (Green, 1985) For a military pilot this can mean noise, vibration, heat, cold, and
even, possibly, mild hypoxia. Civil pilots likely to be affected by sleep deprivation.
Stress, Life: (Green, 1985) Stress produced by recent life events, such as bereavement or divorce, or less
obviously traumatic occurrences such as moving house or changing jobs.
Stress, Other: (BASI) A degraded capability to perform specified tasks when faced with psychosocial
stresses such as family, financial, legal, religious, death, or illness of significant others.
Stress, Task Related: (BASI) A heightened psychophysiological response state experienced by a person
when he/she perceives that the workload demands of the task may exceed his/her capabilities and that
the successful completion of the task is thus threatened. In such a situation, a person's adaptive mecha-
nisms become severely taxed. Problems arise when his adaptive mechanisms are taxed to the point that
they collapse and the person is unable to meet the workload demands of the task.
Subconscious Level: See Awareness, Level of.
Subjective Fatigue: See Fatigue, Subjective.
Substantial Damage: (cited in BCA, 1984) Except as provided in the second sentence of this paragraph,
substantial damage means damage or structural failure that adversely affects the structural strength,
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performance,or flight characteristicsof theaircraftandthatwouldnormallyrequiremajorrepairor
replacementof theaffectedcomponent.Enginefailuredamagelimited to anengine,bentfairingsor
cowling,dentedskin,smallpuncturedholesin theskinor fabric,damageto landinggear,wheels,tires,
flaps,engineaccessories,brakes,or wingtipsarenot considered"substantialdamage."
Substitution Error: See Error, Technical.
Subsystem: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) A complex of aircraft components, such as electrical system, hydrau-
lic system, etc.
Subthreshold: See Threshold (2).
Supervisory Pressure: (BASI) A motivating factor stemming from a person's need to meet perceived
supervisory expectations based on a perceived threat to the subordinate's interests.
(AFP) A motivating factor stemming from a person's need to meet perceived supervisory expectations
whether or not those expectations are overtly expressed.
Suprathreshold: See Threshold.
Synchronization: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Steady state in which rhythms run with equal periods and
constant phase relationships.
Synchronizer: See Zeitgeber.
System, Aviation: (Barnhart, et al., 1975) The total complex of persons, components, and facilities in-
volved in the movement of persons and cargo by air.
Takeoff Phase: (AFP) Runway hold line to airborne and past the field boundaries (until configuring for
climbout).
Task: (McRuer, et al., 1980) An activity at the functional interface of the human operator and the individ-
uals, objects, and environments with whom or which he interacts. Further specified as a goal- or criteri-
on-oriented work increment involving application of a skill or set of skills by the human operator.
Task Design: (BASI) Properly balanced allocation of tasks for both man and machine to prevent over-
load. This is dependent on the realistic flight based on the capabilities and limitations of the man and the
machine (proper SOPs).
Task Profile: (Stoklosa, 1983) Focuses on the specific work performance events and variables of the acci-
dent scenario. Includes task information, task components, task-time relation, and workload. Collect
data related to information sources, task alternatives, attention, workload demands, and time
constraints.
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Taxi Phase: (AFP) From engine start to runway hold line and from clearing the active runway to having
parked the aircraft.
Tech Data Inadequacy: (AFP) Mishaps involving maintenance or design technical data that are clearly
deficient are assigned this factor. A lack of description of generally known procedures (such as button-
ing up panels when through or using left rudder if the aircraft drifts right on landing) is not considered an
inadequacy.
Technical and Design Factors: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Malfunction of technical subsystems, inad-
equate cockpit design, and personal equipment deficiency.
Technique, Poor: (BASI) Operation, workmanship, or mechanical skills below that which can be reason-
ably expected from a person with equal training and experience.
Temporal Distortion: (BASI) A temporal distortion is a temporary, false perception of the apparent
slowing of time. When an individual experiences a temporal distortion, time expands and events appear
to happen in slow motion. This can occur automatically under conditions of acute stress, but it can also
be artificially induced by certain drugs such as marijuana.
(AFP) A transient subjective experience of space or time compression or expansion relative to reality
usually associated with a "fight or flight" response.
Terrain: (AFP) Conformation, texture, and type of Earth surface beneath the plane of flight.
Thermal Stresses: (BASI) Extremes of ambient temperature (cold or heat) may produce changes in
body temperature causing either discomfort or decrements in task performance.
Threshold: (BASI) An inherent perceptual limitation that requires that stimuli be presented within a
certain range of intensity and duration.
(AFP) An inherent perceptual limitation that requires that stimuli be presented within a certain range of
intensity and duration to ensure perception by the individual.
Subthreshold - (BASI) Stimuli are presented below a detectable range or duration and thus are
not perceived.
Suprathreshold - (BASI) Stimuli are presented above a detectable range or duration and thus are
not perceived.
Transthreshold - (BASI) Stimuli are presented within a detectable range and duration and thus
are perceived.
Threshold, Sensory: See Threshold.
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Total System Approach: (Stringer and Riley, 1985) Provides for comprehensive analysis of pilot error
accident data by providing a model of task performance. Contains the following system elements: mis-
sion, aircraft characteristics, environment, pilot capacity, and cockpit interface.
Training: (BASI) Training is the acquisition of required skills, knowledge, and attitudes for satisfactory
task performance. Allocation of this category can relate to such issues as insufficient training, inappro-
priate training, or negative transfer of training.
Training Program Inadequacy: (AFP) Training program deficiencies are considered to be a factor when
a pilot was not trained or was judged inadequately trained to perform the mission element being
attempted.
Transfer of Training: See Learning.
Under Motivation: See Motivation, Anomalies of.
Underconfidence: See Confidence.
Unintentional Activation: See Error, Technical.
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Aircraft: See VIOL.
Vertigo: (BASI) Vertigo is defined as illusory sensation of turning, but in aircrew jargon 'vertigo' is
applied to any form of spatial disorientation, even when there is no illusory sensation of turning.
Vestibular Illusion: See Illusion, Vestibular.
Vicarious Learning: (AFP) Learning by observation in the absence of any structured effort to impart the
knowledge gained or "reading between the lines."
Vigilance: (AFP) The active, assertive management of attentional resources in information seeking and
making decisions.
Visual Approach Slope Indicator: See VASI.
Visual Illusion: See Illusion, Visual.
Wave: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) Pattern of periodic variations.
Workload, Emotional: (Gerbert and Kemmler, 1985) Psychological stress factors such as responsibility
pressure, risk taking, and "fear of failure."
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Workload,Mental:(GerbertandKemmler,1985)Qualityandquantityoftheincominginformationcon-
stitutethe"mentalworkload"of theoperator.
Workload,Physical:(GerbertandKemmler,1985) Physical factors such as the amount of acceleration
forces, vibrations, noise, and other environmental stressors determine the "physical workload."
Zeitgeber: (Klein and Wegmann, 1980) External periodicity driving an endogenous biological rhythm to
achieve a certain phase or period; also called time-give, synchronizer, entraining agent, cue, or clue.
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APPENDIX 4
SCENARIOS FOR PILOTED SIMULATION
PILOT ERROR STUDY
0
0
0
0
0
0
LGA-BOS (La Guardia to Boston)
Filed for Clipper 542:
LGA direct MERIT direct ORW direct PVD V-151 INNDY direct BOS - Cruise altitude FL210
La Guardia ATIS
"La Guardia information Echo, XX47 observation. Estimated ceiling 3000 broken, visibility 3, haze.
Temperature 59. Wind 290 at 9. Altimeter 29.92. ILS approach RW 22 in use. Landing RW 22, depar-
tures RW 31."
Initial route clearance issued before pushback:
"Clipper 542 cleared to Boston Logan Airport via LGA 1 Departure, turn right heading 360 radar
vectors to Merit as filed. Maintain 5000, expect FL210 10 miles after departure. Contact New York
Departure on 120.4. Squawk 4060."
"Taxi to RW 31"
After takeoff and reaching 400 to 500 ft, they begin turn to 360. Tower will tell them to contact Depar-
ture. "Clipper 542, contact Departure." They clean up aircraft and by 1000 ft call Departure.
"Clipper 542, New York Departure, radar contact. Maintain $000, expect higher in 2 min."
About 10 nmi NE of LGA (113.1), "Clipper 542, turn right heading 075 to intercept 055 radial of LGA,
contact New York Departure on 126.8."
Miniscenario No. 1- unfamiliar route, high CDU complexity, short lead time. distraction- ("Say
Groundsoeed"L no malfunction:
After calling on 126.8, "Clipper 542, turn further right heading 085 and join V-99 to MERIT, as filed.
Climb and maintain 17 000. For traffic, cross 20 NE of LGA at 13 000 and 250 kn."
At about 15 000 ft and about LGA 26DME, "Clipper 542, contact BOS Center on 134.0."
"Clipper 542, BOS Center, roger."
Miniscenario No. 2- unfamiliar route, low CDU complexity, short lead time. no distraction, no mal-
function:
At about LGA 31DME, "Clipper 542, cleared direct DENNA direct ORW direct BOS. Climb and
maintain FL210, for traffic cross DENNA at FL190."
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Boston Logan ATIS
"Boston Logan Information Foxtrot. XX50 observation. Measured ceiling 500 overcast, visibility 2,
rain. Temperature 59. Wind 240 at 8. Altimeter 29.92. ILS DME approach RW 27 in use. Noise abate-
ment procedures in effect. Landing RW 27, departing RW 22."
Priorto ORW (II0.0),"Clipper542,contactBOS Center on 128.6."
MiniscenarioNo. 3-unfamiliarroute,low CDU complexity,shortleadtime,distractionfMaster Cau-
lion),no malfunction:
At ORW, "Clipper542,cleareddirectPVD directARCER. Descend to crossPVD atand maintain
II 000."
At PVD, "Clipper542,contactBOS Approach on 120.6."
"Clipper542,InformationFoxtrotiscurrent.ExpectvectorsforILS DME RW 27 approach."
MiniscenarioNo. 4-unfamiliarroute,highCDU complexity,shortleadtime.distractionfwaypoint
resolution),malfunctionfA/P Disconnect):
About 7DME pastPVD (115.6),BOS Appr: "Clipper542,due totrafficflyheading I00 tojoinV-268
to BURDY. Depart BURDY heading 070.Descend and maintain 4000,crossBURDY at 7000 and
190 kn,"
Two more vectors for sequencing, then cleared to 3000 on last vector of 290 to intercept final approach
course. Intercept localizer on heading 290, about 15 nmi outside of LONER (25 nmi from RW).
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BOS to LGA (Boston to La Guardia)
Filed route for Clipper 547:
BOS direct GLYDE V-292 BARNES direct HAARP direct LGA. Cruise altitude 16 000.
Boston Logan ATIS
"Boston Logan Information Golf. XX49 observation. Measured ceiling 900 broken, visibility 5. Tem-
perature 59. Wind 240 at 8. Altimeter 29.92. ILS DME approach in use RW 27. Noise abatement proce-
dures in effect. Landings RW 27. Departures RW 22."
Initial clearance for pushback:
"Clipper 547 cleared to the New York LGA airport via LOGAN SIX Departure to GLYDE, as filed.
Maintain 5000, expect 16 000, 10 (min) after (departure). Contact BOS Departure on 127.2. Squawk
3502."
"Taxi to RW 22."
After reaching 400 feet after takeoff, begin left turn to 140 as per SID. "Clipper 547, contact
Departure."
"Clipper $47, radar contact. Continue left turn to heading 120. Climb and maintain 5000. Expect
clearance on course in 2 min."
About BOS 9DME (112.7), BOS Departure calls: "Clipper 547, turn right heading 270." (This will
place plane over or near CELTS on heading 270.)
Miniscenario No. 1- unfamiliar route, low CDU complexity, long lead time. no distraction, malfunc-
tion (A/P Disconnect):
About 7 nmi past CELTS, "Clipper 547, cleared direct MILLS. Do not exceed 250 kn, cross MILLS at
and maintain 11 000. Depart MILLS heading 320 for enroute vector."
About 1 min to MILIS, "Clipper 547, contact BOS Departure on 128.7."
Miniscenario No. 2- unfamiliar route, high CDU complexity, long lead time. distraction ("Request
turbulence"), no malfunction:
Just before MILIS, "Clipper 547, after MILLS fly heading 330 to join V-292 to BARNES, as filed.
Cross 35 NW of BOS (112.7) at 15 000, climb and maintain 16 000."
La Guardia ATIS
"La Guardia Information Hotel, XX50 observation. Measured ceiling 400 overcast, visibility 1. Rain.
Temperature 59, dewpoint 55. Wind 180 at 10 gusting 15. ILS approach RW 22 in use. Landings RW 22,
departures RW 31."
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Prior to BARNES: "Clipper 547, after BARNES, cleared direct IGN, direct HAARP, flight plan route.
Contact BOS Center on 127.35."
"Clipper 547, roger."
Nine miles before IGN (117.6), "Clipper 547, contact New York Approach on 120.8."
"Clipper 547, Information Hotel is current. Expect vectors for the ILS RW 22 approach."
Miniscenario No. 3- unfamiliar route, low CDU complexity, long lead time. distraction ("Sauawk
4_07"), no malfunction:
Six miles before IGN, "Clipper 547, cleared direct VALRE, direct HAARP, flight plan route. Descend
and maintain 8000, cross VALRE at or below 10 000."
Few miles before VALRE, "Clipper 547, contact approach on 134.9."
Just before VALRE, "Clipper 547, after VALRE, fly heading 160, radar vectors to the ILS RW 22
approach at LGA."
Miniscenario No. 4- unfamiliar route, high CDU complexity, short lead time. no distraction, no
mcllfunction:
About 2 to 3 miles past VALRE, "Clipper 547, RW 22 localizer just went down. RW 13 is now the
active. Turn right heading 180 to intercept V-3 to NYACK. Cross NYACK at 5000 and 210 kn. Expect
vectors to ILS DME 13." (Don't forget to select new approach.)
At NYACK, "Clipper 547, turn left heading 220, descend and maintain 3000, slow to 170 kn."
"Clipper 547, 8 miles from GARDE, turn left heading 160, maintain 3000 until established on the
localizer, cleared for ILS DME 13 approach."
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KBFI-KMWH (Seattle to Moses Lake)
Filed for Alaska 123:
KBFI direct KMWH - Cruise altitude FL190
Boeing Field ATIS
"Boeing information Charlie, XX47 observation. Measured ceiling 600 overcast, visibility 1 1/2. Rain.
Temperature 59, dewpoint 56. Wind 150 at 5. Altimeter 29.92. I].,S approach RW 13R in use, landings
and departures RW 13."
Initial route clearance issued before pushback:
(Assume 13R for departures)
"Alaska 123, cleared to the Grant County Airport via the Kent Two Departure, as filed. Maintain
5000, expect FLI90 20 East. Contact Departure 119.2. Squawk 4601."
"Taxi to RW 13R"
After takeoff and reaching 400 to 500 ft, "Alaska 123, contact Departure." They clean up aircraft and
by 1000 feet call departure.
"Alaska 123, Seattle Departure, radar contact. Maintain 5000, expect higher in 2 min."
Two rain later, "Alaska 123, expect enroute clearance in 2 min, climb and maintain 7000."
Miniscenario No. 1- familiar route, low CDU comulexity, lone lead time. no distraction, malfunction
(A/P Disconnect):
After reaching about 13 DME SEA (116.8), "Alaska 123, proceed direct HUMPP direct MWH. Cross
HUMPP at 11 000 and 250 kn, climb and maintain 13 000. Contact SEA Center on 120.3."
'9,1aska 123, Seattle Center, roger."
Miniscenario No. 2- familiar route, high CDU comolexity, long lead time. distraction (Master Cau-
tion), no malfunction:
At HUMPE "Alaska 123, resume normal speed. Fly heading 060 to join V-2 to ELN direct MWH.
Cross 29 west of ELN at and maintain 17 000."
Miniscenario No. 3- familiar route, low CDU complexity, short lead time. distraction ("Say winds/
temps aloft"), no malfunction:
Twenty-one miles before ELN (117.9), "Alaska 123, for traffic proceed direct PERTT direct PELLY.
Cross PERTT at and maintain FL190."
Grant County ATIS
"Grant County Information Delta. XX49 observation. 800 scattered, measured ceiling 1400 broken.
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Visibility 5. Temperature 59. Wind 300 at 10. Altimeter 29.92. ILS approach RW 32R in use, landing
and departing RW 32R."
Prior to ELN, "Alaska 123 contact SEA Center on 126.1"
"Alaska 123, expect vectors for ILS RW 32R."
Miniscenario No. 4- familiar route, high CDU comolexitv, short lead time. no distraction, no mal-
Five miles past PERT_ "Alaska 123, revised route due to traffic. Fly heading 040 to join V-187 to
FEBUS. Depart FEBUS heading 070. Descend and maintain 9000, cross FEBUS at 12 000 and
250 kn."
At FEBUS, "Alaska 123, turn left heading 070, vector to ILS RW32R. Descend and maintain 6000."
"Turn left heading 020. Descend and maintain 4000."
Two rain later, "Alaska 123, 6 miles from PELLY, turn left heading 350, maintain 4000 until estab-
lished on the localizer, cleared for the ILS RW 32R approach."
Boeing Field Legend:
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KMWH-KBFI (Moses Lake to Seattle)
Filed for Alaska 123"
KMWH direct KBFI - Cruise altitude FL180
Grant County_ ATIS
"Grant County Information Alpha. XX48 Observation. 2500 hundred scattered, estimated ceiling
4000 broken. Visibility 16. Temperature 59. Wind 300 at 7. Altimeter 29.92. Landing and departing
runway 32R."
Initial route clearance:
"Alaska 123, cleared to Boeing Field via direct EPH direct. Climb and maintain 7000, expect higher in
$ min. Contact Departure 126.4. Squawk 3503."
"Taxi to RW 32R."
After takeoff and reaching 400 to 500 ft, "Alaska 123, contact Departure." They clean up aircraft and
by 1000 ft call departure.
"Alaska 123, Grant County Departure. Report leaving 5000."
In a couple minutes, reach 5000 and call Departure. "Alaska 123, contact Seattle Center on 126.1."
Miniscenario No. 1- familiar route, high CDU complexity, short lead time, distraction ("Say
Groundsueed"L no malfunction:
"Alaska 123, radar contact 4 SE of EPH (112.6). Revised routing. Fly heading 250 to join V-336 to
ELN, direct BFI. Climb and maintain FL180, for traffic cross QUINT at 13 000."
Miniscenario No. 2- familiar route, low CDU complexity, short lead time. no distraction, no malfunc-
tion."
At QUINt, "Alaska 123, cross IF NE of ELN at 16 000, maintain FLI80. Contact Seattle Center on
120.3."
"Alaska 123, Seattle Center, roger."
Boeing Field ATIS
"Boeing Information Bravo, XX50 Observation. Measured ceiling 700 overcast, visibility 2. Light rain.
Temperature 47, dew point 43. Wind 270 at 11. Altimeter 29.92. Loealizer BC Approach RW 31L in use,
landing and departing RW 31."
Miniscenario No. 3- familiar route, low CDU complexity, long lead time, distraction ("Souawk
3105"). no malfunction:
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Ten miles before ELN (117.9), "Alaska 123, cleared direct RUMOR direct HUMPP direct. Cross RU-
MOR at and maintain 14 000. Expect the Bense 3 Arrival, Ortin Transition."
Mi,iscenario No. 4- familiar route, high CDU complexity, short lead time. distraction ("Say Turbu-
lence"), malfunction (A/P Disconnect):
Eighteen miles to HUMPP (Halfway), "Alaska 123, turn left heading 210 to join V-187 to ORTIN.
Cleared to BFI via the BENSE 3 Arrival, ORTIN Transition. Cross ORTIN at 5000 ft and 190 kn.
Contact Seattle Approach on 123.9."
"Alaska 123, roger. After ORTIN fly heading 340, vectors for the Localizer BC RW 31L approach."
Legend:
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